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Abstract  
 
A number of state railways over the world have experienced railway reform, and 
vertical separation has been frequently utilized during its process. This thesis 
investigated a variety of models of vertical separation, which the railway sector has 
experienced over the twenty years. 
 
The main aims of the research are clarifying the key issues on vertical separation: 
aims of the reform; forms and implementation; advantages; disadvantageous effects. 
Based on the examination into the selected cases, this study comparatively 
analyzed them in terms of: 1) separation of operational factors; and 2) separation of 
financial responsibilities. The study also tried to examine an appropriate form of 
railways depending on the market structure. 
 
There are a number of different forms of vertical separation, and the study clarified 
the characteristics of each type of it. It also disclosed that whether it intends to 
introduce within-rail competition or not largely outlines the form of railways. In 
case it is intended to introduce within-rail competition promoting new entry into the 
market, it leads to separate operational (at least slot-allocation) and financial 
responsibilities between infrastructure and operation, whereas without an 
intention to introduce it, coordination problems through vertical separation are 
endeavoured to be lessened through certain measures such as integrated operation, 
share-holding relationship, and confining the separation into the smaller market. 
 
The study showed that vertical separation has a number of advantages, and that 
the unique exclusive advantage of complete separation, such as the case in UK and 
Sweden, is introducing within-rail competition fostering neutrality even between 
the passenger and the freight. It also revealed that this form raises coordination 
problems even in the prime market especially on condition infrastructure capacity 
is limited. The result of the study leads to the conclusion that full costs and benefits 
should be considered upon introducing a form of vertical separation, and that the 
appropriate form of it depends on the circumstances as well as its objectives.  
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CHAPTER1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1  Background 
 
During the past 20 years, in many countries railways have seen their transport 
market share decline sharply. This is mainly because of severe competition with 
other transportation modes such as road and air, despite technological development 
in the railway sector. (UNESCAP, 2003) As the railway is one of the most 
environmentally-friendly modes of transport, it should have an important role to 
play in the transport sector both in the passenger and the freight in order to keep 
and develop preferable environment through reduction of air pollution and urban 
congestion and so on. (UIC/CER, 2004) Nevertheless, many governments are facing 
difficulties in allocating adequate resources to maintain and develop their railways 
partly because they think railways are costly to operate. (UNESCAP, 2003) 
 
As a result, many governments have started to introduce measures to improve the 
efficiency of their railways, for example by establishing contracts with government 
for the provision of non-commercial railway services instead of the traditional 
provision of subsidies to cover the deficits. 
 
Moreover, many governments have started to examine measures to restructure 
their railways in order to create better managed, more commercially-responsive and 
market-led railways. Many countries are trying to introduce reforms in order to 
improve the operational and financial performance of national railways, and these 
structural changes in railways show little sign of abating worldwide. 
 
In Europe, “rail policy has concentrated on the introduction of competition into the 
rail transport market via separation of infrastructure from operations (at least in 
accounting sense), by the progressive opening up of entry to the market for new 
operators and by rules regarding the allocation of slots and the pricing of 
infrastructure use, administered by an independent regulator.” (Nash, C.A. and 
2 
Trujillo, C.R., 2004 p.1) 
 
Railway reform has also been carried out in many railways in non-European 
countries such as Japan, Korea, Vietnam, Indonesia, Iran, Australia, the United 
States, Mexico, Argentine, Russia, Tunisia and other African countries, and so forth. 
It is also being planned in many other railways such as Taiwan, Kazakhstan, 
Uzbekistan, Saudi Arabia, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Cambodia, Thailand, and so on.  
 
Certainly, an appropriate model of railway reform is affected by the economic and 
social circumstances and condition of the railways. Nevertheless, unfortunately 
there are several railway reforms which did not improve their performance as they 
were originally aimed. It is essential for railway administrations and policy makers 
to have an opportunity to gain insights from other railway reforms and the impact 
of those changes.  
 
In many of the railway reform processes, the ownership of infrastructure was 
transferred to separate organizations from the operators in order that railway 
operators can be relieved of huge amount of capital costs of infrastructure and, in 
some cases, its maintenance costs as well. Sometimes, the term “separation of 
infrastructure and operation” or “vertical separation” is used in order to indicate to 
a specific management model of railways, such as the model of European railway 
policy mentioned above. Nevertheless, as it will be explained in detail in Section 
2.4.1, this thesis defines the term as a model of railway operation under the 
condition that owner of the infrastructure does not provide the railway service over 
the infrastructure itself. And the study will investigate and analyze variety of 
vertically separated structures, which the railway sector has experienced. 
 
Vertical separation of railways has been implemented in many countries and its 
aims seem to vary. In some cases this model is utilized for introducing the external 
funds for investment or maintenance for infrastructure. For the railways in 
European Union, this model is used mainly for promoting competition among 
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railway operators. In many railways in South America and Africa a concession 
system has been introduced in order to procure efficient management by the private 
sector leaving the ownership of infrastructure remained to the government.  
 
Despite some merits of vertical separation, it greatly changes the relationship 
between infrastructure and operation, and the appropriate relationship between the 
two entities is one of the most crucial factors in order that the railway can be 
operated efficiently. In general, introduction of vertical separation changes some 
factors of railway operation: investors in infrastructure; financial burdens of 
maintenance works; responsibilities in maintenance works; train control; 
timetabling, and so on. These changes influence the relationship between the two 
entities and also the operation of railways as a whole.   
 
 
1.2  Aims of the Thesis 
 
There are several reasons why detailed investigation and analysis into the vertical 
separation of railways are needed and why this research focuses on its analysis: 
▪  Vertical separation has been introduced as a part of the railway reform process 
in many countries around the world; 
▪   It seems to have a variety of aims, and these objectives appear to be important 
for the development of railways for the future; 
▪   A number of further restructurings are about to be implemented, and the 
results and effects are so large such as a drastic impact on financial performance 
of the railway organization, efficiency of railway operation, and so on; 
▪   It is argued that vertical separation has disadvantageous influences as well as 
advantageous effects; 
▪   Despite having been implemented with several forms under different market 
conditions, sufficient analysis has not been performed on each type of them 
partly because of the limited opportunities to share or obtain information due to 
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scattered geographic locations around the world. 1 
▪  It greatly changes the vertical relationship which is crucial for efficient 
management of railways;  
▪  Effectiveness of vertical separation has been under serious debate in EU 
countries and also in some other countries as the results vary so much; 
▪   In order to improve efficiency, the government of many state-owned railways 
has been promoting market liberalization, private participation in transport 
service and privatization. And vertical separation has been utilized as a 
complementary policy for this universal movement. 
 
Based on the above-mentioned background, the research aims to analyse vertical 
separation of railways in terms of the following four key issues: 
1) aims of railway reform through vertical separation; 
2) forms and implementation of vertical separation; 
3) advantageous effects of vertical separation; and 
4) disadvantageous effects of vertical separation.  
 
 
1.3   Thesis Structure 
 
This thesis is composed of ten chapters. Following this introduction to the subject, 
Chapter 2 goes on to describe the background to vertical separation of railways. 
Firstly, as a background of the railway industry, traditional railway structures, 
which have the nature of natural monopoly, will be described. Secondly, the 
characteristics of network industry which are traditionally considered as a ground 
of government’s regulation are reviewed, and also they are compared with other 
network industries. For the discussion in the latter part of study, models of 
competition are also reviewed. In Section 2.3, current status and challenges in the 
railway sector will be studied. Firstly, it is described that a severe competition with 
                                                  
1  “While much of the theoretical literature focuses on the idea of the monopoly supply 
of track (often by a public agency) with competition for access to that track, and this 
has been the favoured approach in, for example, the UK and Sweden, in practice there 
have been important deviations from this.” (Brooks, M. and Button.K , 1995 p.244) 
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other transport modes has worsened the market share and the financial 
performance of many railways. Then the author reviews social functions of railway 
operations contributing for environment such as modifying traffic jams on roads 
and decreasing emission of carbon dioxide gas from vehicles, and will describe the 
opportunities for the railway sector to develop social benefit. The typical problems 
arising from the state-owned railways and the rationale of railway reform will be 
also explained. Section 2.4 reviews the background to vertical separation of 
railways. Firstly, the author defines the term of vertical separation of railways in 
this thesis, and then reviews the literature on vertical separation of railways. 
Section 2.5 investigates advantages and disadvantages of vertical separation 
through literature. Finally, the author prospects vertical separation of railways.  
 
Chapter 3 presents survey design and methodology for this research. Firstly, the 
objectives of the research are set and then the research methodology is developed. 
As the research would be made based on case studies by means of interviews and 
questionnaires, this chapter outlines how studies and comparative analysis will be 
made in the following chapters. 
 
Chapter 4 investigates state-owned railways without within-rail competition. 
Firstly, for a comparison with various forms of vertical separation the author 
studies an integrated railway focusing on the Indian Railways. Then the case 
studies for vertically separated railways are performed focusing on railways in 
Vietnam, Indonesia and Tunisia. In these railways, the government owns the 
infrastructure and supports its maintenance cost. The essential factors of railway 
operation are performed by the liberalized main operator. It will be also examined 
how the private sector has participated in a transport service by means of a 
joint-venture or a management contract with the state-owned railways in Vietnam 
and Tunisia. 
 
Chapter 5 focuses on vertically separated railways with competition among 
operators, and will make studies of railways in Sweden, UK, Germany, France and 
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Australia. The author will examine the five railways after surveying recent 
transport policies which European and Australian railways are based on. In these 
railways vertical separation was introduced mainly in order to promote competition 
among operators, and below-rail functions such as slot allocation are performed by 
the infrastructure manager. In the freight market of these railways, competition 
“in” the market has become common. As most of the passenger market is 
unprofitable, franchising is prevailing in practice. Based on the regulation of open 
access and franchising, the private sector is active to participate in a transport 
service. But there are also coordination problems derived from the fragmented 
industry structure.  
 
Chapter 6 investigates railways with vertical separation for passenger or freight 
traffic, and examines the railways in Iran, Japan (JR Freight) and USA (Amtrak). 
In these railways, essential factors of railway operation are performed by an 
integrated dominant railway performing in the primary railway market, passenger 
or freight. Another railway operating in the smaller/minor market accesses the 
infrastructure as a tenant. As cross-subsidy between the two markets was abolished 
through vertical separation, the railway in the primary market has improved 
significantly especially in Japan and USA.  
 
Chapter 7 examines private railways with long-run access to infrastructure, and 
focuses on: 1) freight concessionaires in Mexico and the Mexico City Terminal 
Railway (TFVM); 2) two newly-organized lines in Japan. In the railways with 
long-run concessions the government retains ownership of the infrastructure, and 
the concessionaire can perform railway operation in an integrated manner once a 
concession license has been granted. Thus, except the ownership of the 
infrastructure the concessionaire performs its railway operation as if it were an 
integrated railway during the concessioning period. In the case of TFVM, the three 
concessionaires attained access to the tracks in the capital city as a status of the 
share-holder of the infrastructure manager. This chapter also focuses on the two 
cases in Japan: new Shinkansen lines and Aoimori Railway. New Shinkansen lines 
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are constructed as public works projects utilizing the finance of state and local 
governments. The JR Passenger Company in the region is designated as an operator, 
and it operates the line as if it were an integrated railway once after the usage fee is 
fixed. Aoimori Railway, a joint-venture between the private and public sectors, was 
established as an operator, and the capital cost of the infrastructure is borne by the 
public sector in order to sustain its management. 
 
In Chapter 8, investigation and comparison among different groups of vertical 
separation are made analytically in terms of forms, operation and finance. Firstly, 
in terms of operational responsibilities, forms and implementation of vertical 
separation are compared among different types. Then, they are compared and 
analyzed in terms of the separation of financial responsibilities. Finally, 
relationship among operators is investigated to clarify the characteristics of various 
types of vertical separation.  
 
In Chapter 9, advantages and disadvantages are investigated and compared among 
different types of vertical separation analytically. Firstly, advantages of vertical 
separation are examined based on this study. As the promotion of within-rail 
competition is one of the advantages, competition issues are also discussed from the 
viewpoint of vertical separation. Subsequently, disadvantages of vertical separation 
are investigated. Based on the above investigation into advantages and 
disadvantages, the relationship with each type of vertical separation will be 
examined in order to clarify the characteristics of it. Lastly, an appropriate form of 
vertical separation is examined in different types of the market structure. 
 
Finally, based on the above analysis, Chapter 10 summarizes the findings of the 
research and provides the final conclusions and lessons from the investigation in 
this study. The author suggests several directions for further research as well. 
 
The structure of this thesis is summarized in diagrammatic form in Figure 1.1. 
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CHAPTER 2:  
BACKGROUND TO VERTICAL SEPARATION OF RAILWAYS 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
In this chapter, as a literature review for the research, the background to vertical 
separation of railways is investigated. 
 
Firstly, next section examines characteristics of railways such as traditional railway 
structures, competition issues, a basis of transport regulation, and so on. Then, 
Section 2.3 surveys the current status of railways, for which competition with other 
transport modes has become so severe. This section also reviews the necessity to 
take both external costs and benefits into account at the time of investment into 
transport modes and discusses the opportunities for railways. Then, it investigates 
the problems which many state-owned railways face in common, and discusses the 
rationale of railway reform. Section 2.4 makes a study of vertical separation of 
railways, and defines the term of vertical separation in this paper. Then, literature 
regarding vertical separation is reviewed. Section 2.5 investigates advantages and 
disadvantages of vertical separation through literature, and Sections 2.6 discusses 
future prospects of vertical separation in the railway sector. 
 
 
2.2 Characteristics of the Railway Industry 
 
2.2.1 Traditional Railway Structures 
 
In many countries railways were once the dominant means of land transport, and 
railways have developed as vertically-integrated organizations. Thus traditionally 
the most common structure for the rail sector, in most countries, had been that of a 
single state-owned firm, which was responsible for both the railway infrastructure 
facilities and train services.(UNESCAP, 2003) As the next section discusses, the 
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vertically integrated railways are characterized by large infrastructure costs, and 
the provision of rail transport services is typically regarded as a classic example of 
natural monopoly. “State-owned railways have therefore often been organized as 
vertically-integrated publicly owned monopolies.”(ibid, p.6) 
 
State railways are not necessarily technically inefficient or lacking in investment 
funds.(ibid, p.5) For example, Japanese National Railways (JNR) dominated 
Japan’s post-war passenger and freight markets making profits and played an 
important role in its post-war economic recovery until the 1950s, when competition 
with other transport modes started to become severe.(Aoki, E. et al, 2000) 
Nevertheless, as it will be examined later, there are several problems which often 
arose out of state-owned railways, and the change of transport market in over the 
past twenty years brought about reform of the state railways. 
 
 
2.2.2 Competition Issues and Regulation 
 
2.2.2.1 Characteristics of Network Industry 
 
Klein, M.(1998 p.43) notes that “some types of networks, such as water pipelines 
systems, railroad track, gas pipelines, and power transmission lines, exhibit 
technical characteristics which appear to make them natural monopolies. In other 
words, it would be a waste for society to have several parallel networks of this type 
compete with each other.” And because of the prominence of infrastructure costs in 
the railway industry, it has significant economies of scale. 1  This means that 
generally average costs fall as output increases in the railway industry. Thus it is 
                                                  
1   Enonomies of scale refer to the situation when an increase in production is 
associated with a less than proportionate increase in cost. As the other key concept, 
“economies of density refer to the situation when average total cost decreases with 
increase in traffic level due to increase in capacity utilization of transportation capital, 
vehicles and fixed facilities.” (Yevdokimov, 2001 p.15). The two concepts should be 
considered simultaneously otherwise any analysis could give the impression of 
economies of scale when in fact large companies have lower unit costs due greater 
customer density rather than any inherent scale benefit.(Stone & Webster 
Consultants, 2004 p.54) 
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considered that competition, which may be unstable and destructive, is unsuitable 
in a natural monopoly. Under these circumstances, this kind of structure has been 
operated by a public firm, or heavily regulated in order to avoid the use of monopoly 
power.(Nash, C.A. and Trujillo, C.R., 2004） 
 
Nevertheless, this traditional vertically integrated model has been challenged last 
decades and some countries have unbundled at least some network industries 
including railways. (Drew, J., 2006 p.7) One of the backgrounds of this change is the 
problem that “market power is greater when there are fewer firms, and 
monopolistic behaviour worsens allocative efficiency.” (Vickers, J. and Yarrow, G., 
1988 p.48) Thus, the balance between allocative efficiency and scale economies is 
principal issue to many problems in competition policy. (ibid. p.48) 
 
Another essential ground that network industries have traditionally been vertically 
integrated is their economies of scope2 arising from the needs for co-ordination, 
because the loss of economies of scope with vertical separation takes the form of 
higher transaction costs. (Drew, J., 2006) 
 
 
2.2.2.2 Comparison with Other Network Industries 
 
Gómez-Ibáñez, J.A. (2003) investigates the benefits of introducing competition and 
costs of unbundling comparing five network industries – electricity, natural gas, 
water, telecommunications, and railways.  
 
As the benefits of unbundling stem from the introduction of competition into 
additional activities, he suggests that they should be roughly proportional to two 
factors:  
1) the share of total industry costs that are in activities where competition can be 
                                                  
2  Bitzan, J.D.(2003 p.204) explains that “an issue related to the cost impacts of 
multi-firm operation over single networks is that if economies of scale and scope exist 
in providing transport services, after excluding the costs of way and structures, 
multiple-firm operation over a single network will result in an increase in costs.”  
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sustained; and 
2) the untapped potential for productivity improvements in those potentially 
competitive activities. 
 
He also suggests that the costs of unbundling are likely to depend on four factors 
that affect coordination: 
1) the share of total industry costs absorbed by the key monopoly or bottleneck 
infrastructure provider; 
2) the degree of heterogeneity in the industry’s products or services; 
3) the extent to which the flows over the infrastructure network are interdependent;  
4) the prevalence of common functions or assets among vertically separate 
activities. 
 
Then, he compared the benefits and costs of unbundling across the five network 
industries. The results are summarized in Table 2.1. 
 
Based on the investigation, he concluded that the potential for vertical unbundling 
seems much greater for large electricity, gas, and water customers and 
telecommunications users than for railways’ users. 
 
He stresses that unbundling is least attractive particularly for passenger railway 
services. The infrastructure critical to coordination accounts for relatively high 
proportion of costs on the system, which makes the strategy of easing coordination 
by building excess infrastructure capacity prohibitively expensive. In addition, the 
services provided are much less homogeneous or standardized, which makes 
coordination through negotiations, congestion pricing, or auction regimes more 
difficult. 
 
Comparing with passenger railways, he notes that rail freight would seem a more 
promising candidate for unbundling since the percentage of potentially competitive 
activities is much higher.  
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Table 2.1 Comparison of the Benefits and Costs of Unbundling across Selected 
Industries 
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Factors that affect benefits       
1) Competitive activities’ share 
of total costs 
80-90% 60-80%
Variable 
but high
50-60% 60-80% 50-60%
2) Opportunities for innovation 
in the competitive activities 
Moderate Moderate Moderate High Moderate Moderate
Overall benefit High High High High High Moderate
Factors that affect costs       
1) Bottleneck infrastructure 
share of total costs 
10-20% 20-30% Variable 40-50% 20-40% 40-60%
2) Product heterogeneity Low Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate High 
3) Network interdependence High Low Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate
4) Common functions or assets Low Low Low Moderate Low Moderate
Overall cost Low Low Moderate Low Moderate High 
Overall advantage High High High High Low / Moderate Low 
Source: Gómez-Ibáñez, J.A. (2003) 
 
 
In summary, Gómez-Ibáñez, J.A. (2003) strengthened the case against vertical 
separation in the railway industry since the cost increase of vertical separation 
appears to be more significant in rail compared with other network industries. 
 
Gómez-Ibáñez, J.A. and Rus, G (2006 p.3) also stresses that “the quality of railroad 
service depends heavily on the close coordination of infrastructure and train 
operation, and this coordination seems much harder to achieve when the two 
activities are provided by separate companies.” 
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2.2.2.3 Regulation in the Industry 
 
Economists have also recognized that transport markets may, in practice, suffer 
from serious imperfections or market failures, which could adversely affect the 
users of transport services. In addition to the containment of monopoly power, 
Button, K. J. (1993) argued a basis of transport regulation such as follows. 
 
▪ The control of excessive competition: Unregulated competition may limit the 
quality of service offered to customers and result in instability in the industry. 
▪ The regulation of externalities: Imperfections in the market mechanism may 
result in transport activities imposing costs which are not directly included in the 
private sector’s decision-making – pollution and congestion being the main causes 
for concern. 
▪ The provision of high-cost infrastructure: The sheer cost and long pay-back period, 
combined with possible high levels of risk, makes it unlikely that all major pieces 
of infrastructure would be built without some form of government involvement. 
▪ The integration of transport into wider economic policies: Land-use and transport 
are clearly inter-connected and some degree of coordination may be felt desirable 
if imperfections exist in either the transport or the land-use markets. 
▪ The improvement of transport co-ordination: Because there are numerous 
suppliers of transport services, inefficient provision may result if their decisions 
are made independently. There is also the prospect of duplication of transport 
facilities and consequential wastage of resources, without some degree of central 
guidance. 
 
Based on the characteristics of the railway and transport industry mentioned above, 
railway transport has been a sector which has been subjected to various forms of 
regulation, such as governing maximum fares and both entry into and exit from the 
services. (Sharkey, W.W., 1982) 
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2.2.2.4 Models of Competition  
 
Based on the above discussions on the characteristics of the railway and transport 
industry, there are common views that competition is unsuitable in the traditional 
rail industry. Nevertheless, there are numerous models of competition in the 
railway sector (Velde,V. 1999 p.359): 
▪  Type 1: competition for the tracks (concession / franchising); 
▪  Type 2: competition on the tracks (intra-modal competition on the same tracks); 
▪  Type 3: competition between the tracks (intra-modal competition on different 
tracks – parallel lines serving the same main cities); 
▪  Type 4: competition beside and above the tracks (inter-modal competition with 
car, bus and plane); and 
▪  Type 5: competition between companies on their own tracks (yardstick 
competition by the authority). 
 
As the next section investigates, it appears that competition with other modes, 
which is listed in Type 4, is the most intense in majority of the countries in common. 
 
Velde,V.(1999 p.360) notes the following regarding competition in the railway sector: 
▪ Pure models do not exist in reality; 
▪ It would be wrong to think that there is one single better model that can be 
developed as a blueprint and then implemented once and for all. Each model 
will need adjustments in the future; 
▪ It will be necessary to take account of the specific local situation and aim to 
design an appropriate model. 
 
The next section focuses on the most serious competition, which the railway 
industry faces at present. 
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2.3  Current Status and Challenges of Railways 
 
2.3.1 Competition with Other Modes 
 
Railways were, for a period of time, the most technologically-advanced and 
dominant means of land transport, but their market share has declined sharply in 
many countries over the past thirty years. In addition to market circumstances, 
various constraints on state railways led to growing operating deficits during the 
1970s and 1980s. Changes in the transport market have diminished the competitive 
advantages of railways in many countries simultaneously. (UNESCAP, 2003)  
 
For example, due to the lack of other means of transport, the railways dominated 
post-war passenger and freight markets in Japan. In 1950, Japanese railways had 
92 percent of the passenger market (passenger-km) and 52 percent of the freight 
market (tonne-km), and they continued making profits through the 1950s and early 
1960s. Nevertheless, 1964 was the first of many subsequent years that Japanese 
National Railways (JNR) ran a deficit. (Aoki, E. et al., 2000 p.181) Figure 2.1 shows 
the trends of the passenger and the freight transport in Japan. It reveals that, 
despite the steady performance especially after the reform of JNR in 1987, the 
modal share of the railway has been decreasing by degrees as the traffic volume and 
share by road have been increasing both in the passenger and freight sectors. UIC 
(2004) indicates that, as one of the backgrounds of these trends, the road 
infrastructure in Japan has been developed largely in the last fifty years. 
 
Figure 2.2 represents the trends of each sector in EU-15 countries3. Despite the 
steady modal share of the railways in the last decade, similar to the 
above-mentioned case in Japan, the road traffic has been increasing both in the 
passenger and the freight sectors. Thus the rapid increase of the road traffic is the 
same trends in both sectors in the two cases. 
                                                  
3  EU-15 countries are those Members that joined the EU before 2004. 
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  Figure 2.1 Trends of Transport in Japan with Respect of Different Modes 
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  Figure 2.2 Trends of Transport in EU-15 with Respect of Different Modes 
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2.3.2 Opportunities for Railways 
 
2.3.2.1 External Costs of Railways 
 
Severe competition from other transport modes has raised the basic issue of the 
continued viability of railways in many countries. Nevertheless, there are reasons 
why public transport operators may not be given a purely commercial remit (Nash, 
C.A., 1982 p.9): 
▪ the social need for some level of service; 
▪ the existence of economies of scale and monopoly power; and 
▪ the relative levels of externalities produced by public and private transport. 
 
With respect to the third factor, he divided these externalities into four main 
categories (Nash, C.A., 1982 p.9): 
1. Delay to other vehicles and pedestrians; 
2. Environmental degradation, of which the most significant factors appear to 
be noise, air pollution, visual intrusion and destruction of facilities to provide 
new transport infrastructure; 
3. Accidents; and 
4. Depletion of non-renewable natural resources. 
 
To make investment decisions, it is important to trace through the effects using 
techniques such as social cost-benefit analysis. Figure 2.3 is taken directly from the 
INFRAS/IWW report commissioned by UIC/CER. They show the external cost 
representing an average across Western Europe, while congestion costs are 
excluded.4 As they are shown, external costs of railways are considered to be 
relatively lower than those of other modes of transport both in the freight and in the 
passenger sectors. Therefore, railways can contribute to the environment, and the 
decision taker has to weigh up these external costs.  
                                                  
4  EU funded research project “UNITE”. As the external effects, UNITE also covers 
congestion costs in addition to external accident costs, and environmental costs. 
(Nash.C.A., 2003) 
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2.3.2.2 Social Demand for Railways 
 
In many countries, railways are suffering from declining market share and 
deteriorating financial performance, and many railway managers believe that 
construction and fundamental improvement of infrastructure has to be financed 
mainly by the state or local government. This view is based on the fact that 
undertaking a major rail project by the private sector or a railway operator is not 
generally financially viable in many cases, and also on the fact that a project should 
be justified by taking both external benefits and user benefits into account 
compared with the total cost. 
 
As it is mentioned in the previous section, the problem of transport externalities is 
one example of market failure which should be resolved by “valuing them in money 
terms and charging a tax which will lead decision takers to place appropriate 
weight on them when making transport decisions.”(Nash.C.A. and Rus.G., 1997 
p.253) Nevertheless, “environmental costs and other externalities are 
systematically neglected or underestimated in transport prices. As a result, the 
individual transport user receives distorted price signals, … because users perceive 
[these social costs] only indirectly.”(ECMT, 1998 p.19) Based on this background 
there have been often criticisms that current transport policies are not necessarily 
environmentally friendly in some countries. Thus, despite the difficult status of the 
railway, at a time of growing concern about congestion and the environment, the 
railway sector is widely seen as having an increasingly important role in the future 
transport market by permitting energy-efficient, low-pollution, safe mass transport. 
 
For example, rail investment is now running at high levels in Western Europe. The 
total investment in the network from 1998 to 2001 was around 129 billion Euros, 
and in line with Community policy, twice as much was invested in rail than on roads. 
Accordingly, the total length of high-speed sections in operation increased from 
6,800km in 1996 to 10,000km in 2001.(Commission of the European Communities, 
2004) 
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There are also efforts to realize welfare gains by adjusting regulations, charges and 
taxes to provide incentives for reducing the external costs of transport. For example, 
the Polish government has decided that 20 percent of fuel tax would be utilized to 
promote modal shift and to finance the development of rail infrastructure as a 
means for reducing the environmental and safety problems arising from motor 
transport. (Akiyama, Y., 2005) 
 
 
2.3.3 Problems of State-Owned Railways 
 
As mentioned in Section 2.2.1, state enterprises are not necessarily technically 
inefficient or lacking in investment funds. However, UNESCAP (2003 p.5) indicates 
that “the problem is that as long as they have recourse to deficit financing to 
maintain supply, railways have little incentive to be cost-effective or to respond 
flexibly to changes in user demand. Interference, from the government on matters 
relating to day-to-day operations, has often led to the railway enterprises having 
poorly defined goals and relatively passive management unlikely to respond to 
changing market conditions.” It is also likely that the objectives are not in a 
commercial focus but in a social basis. In addition, because of frequent changes in 
government policy and government’s single-year budget process, a long-term capital 
expenditure programme is difficult to achieve. (Matsuda, M., 2002 p.135) 
 
For example, in Japan, JNR, a public corporation owned by the government, was 
separated into several railway companies in April 1987. In 1986, JNR’s deficits 
amounted to 15.5 trillion Yen with loans of over 25 trillion Yen, which was larger 
than Mexico’s external debts.(Hosoya, E, 1994 p.12) Besides a substantial fall in the 
modal share of national railways caused by rapid motorization and development of 
air transportation, JR East (2000) described the reasons of the failure of JNR as 
follows. 
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Firstly, the administrative format of the public corporation rose following three 
problems, which limited freedom of JNR: 
1.  The philosophy and organization was not built on the premise of competition. 
Despite the fact that an era of intense competition with other modes had begun, 
the administration was not oriented to compete with them; 
2.  The administration was not autonomous.  
The budget, personnel and fares were regulated by the Diet or cabinet. 
Politicians also exerted strong pressure for the construction of unprofitable new 
lines; 
3.  Business scope was severely limited.  
There were very rigid regulations preventing JNR from expanding its business 
scope to outside of the railway sector. 
 
Secondly, its unified organizational structure throughout the country caused the 
following two issues: 
1.  The management was standardized. 
Local conditions could not be reflected in train schedules, fares, employee wages, 
and so on; 
2.  Labor unions lost awareness of costs.  
Labour unions demanded improved benefits without any consideration of 
competitive conditions and they did so with the attitude of being civil servants. 
 
Changes in the transport market have led many railways into financial difficulties, 
and UNESCAP (2003 p.7) regarded the reasons for the failure of state-owned 
railways as following factors, all of which are quite similar to those of JNR: 
1) misguided intervention from a government; 
2) excessive operating costs; 
3) perverse management incentives; and 
4) lack of dynamism.  
 
Because of severe competition with other transport modes and the background of 
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centralized control of publicly owned railways, nowadays profitable integrated 
state-owned railways are limited to a few such as Chinese Railways, Indian 
Railways (freight sector), where the transport market is relatively advantageous to 
the sector.  
 
Many other state-owned railways receive subsidy from the government by some 
means. Nevertheless, Oum, T.H. and Yu,C. (1994), investigating into nineteen 
OECD countries, found: 1) direct subsidies reduce rail efficiency; and 2) greater 
managerial autonomy leads to higher levels of efficiency. Although the 
above-mentioned evidence itself does not necessarily provide a case for vertical 
separation, it does suggest that the efficiency of a part of rail activities is likely to 
improve in case it is freed from high degrees of regulatory intervention. For example, 
vertical separation can contribute toward balanced financial management of an 
operator and realization of the higher managerial autonomy in its activities. Thus 
vertical separation provides more scope for achieving the improvement of certain 
rail activities.(Brooks, M. and Button, K, 1995 p.242) 
 
 
2.3.4 Rationale of Railway Reform 
 
Kopicki, R and Thompson, L.S.(1995 p.9) note that “railways, like other service 
providers, are in the business of creating value for their customers. As the needs of 
customers change, or as customers discover new ways to satisfy their needs, the 
railways must redefine their services, trim their cost structure, and reach 
customers more effectively in order to increase the value that they are able to 
deliver and thereby regain their customers’ service commitment.” In consequence, 
many countries have introduced structural reforms designed to improve the 
operational efficiency and the financial performance of their state-owned railways.  
 
On the other hand, in Japan there are many private railways, which have developed 
as a vertically-integrated structure. Until a few years ago, many of them had been 
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successful in independent management making active efforts with sufficient 
incentive to improve their efficiency. However, in addition to the change in the 
transport market, social changes such as the rapid decrease in population and 
transition into aging society especially in local districts have seriously worsened the 
financial performance of many private Japanese railways. (Study Group for the 
Problem in Rural Railways, 2003) Based on the above background, the government 
has started to support regional public transport by various policies such as 
enforcing new laws. 
 
Different rail markets are likely to require different forms of regulation to maximize 
efficiency of the railways. ECMT (2001 p.10) put forward the following objectives, 
which should be considered in designing regulatory frameworks for most rail 
markets: 
▪ preventing pricing abuses in captive markets; 
▪ ensuring transparency in the provision and use of public subsidies; 
▪ providing for an adequate level of investment in rail infrastructure and rolling 
stock; 
▪ ensuring fair conditions for inter-modal competition; 
▪ encouraging intra-modal competition, where feasible; and 
▪ minimizing potential losses from reduced competition arising from mergers. 
 
 
2.4 Vertical Separation of Railways 
 
2.4.1 Definition of Vertical Separation 
 
OECD (1998 p.9) explains that “separation of infrastructure ownership from the 
operation of services over the infrastructure has been advocated by economists for 
many network industries, such as telecommunications, electricity and gas 
distribution and, latterly, railways. The view has been that such an approach partly 
overcomes the problems generated by the fact that infrastructure costs are largely 
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sunk and infrastructure provision exhibits natural monopoly characteristics.”  
 
Vertical separation has been introduced into the railway sector in various forms in 
many countries in recent years. As a result, the terms “separation of infrastructure 
and operation” or “vertical separation” are utilized in various ways, and sometimes 
they imply only a specific type of it in the railway sector. For example, Kessides, I.N. 
and Willig, R.D. (1995) discussed the generic options for vertical railway structuring, 
and referred to the options that separate ownership of facilities from other rail 
functions such as train operation and marketing. Hearsch.J (2001 p.15) mentions 
that “vertical separation requires that train operations, including the businesses of 
providing passenger and freight services to customers (i.e. the “above rail” 
functions) be organizationally separate from the provision and maintenance of 
infrastructure (the “below rail” functions).” And, OECD (2005 p.6) explains that the 
term “vertical separation” refers to “the situation where the owner of the 
infrastructure is not allowed to provide the given rail service over the given piece of 
infrastructure itself.” 
 
As mentioned above, there have been a range of definitions for vertical separation of 
railways. There again, Hori.M (2000) defined “separation of infrastructure and 
operation” as follows: 
1)  It is in a public service industry, which has the nature of a natural monopoly 
because of its network infrastructure provision; 
2) There are legally and financially independent institutions in order to provide 
final public services for customers; 
3) One independent institution owns5 the infrastructure, which is the essential 
facility for the final public services for customers; and 
4) Another independent institution utilizes the infrastructure and performs 
productive activities for providing the final public services for customers. 
                                                  
5  In the literature, Hori, M. (2000) described “owns or occupies” by using a Japanese 
word “senyu”. However, the meaning of “senyu” in railway infrastructure is so 
ambiguous that it is not certain what it contains such as maintenance, signalling, 
daily control or safety responsibility of infrastructure. Therefore, the author narrowed 
his definition and confined it to “ownership” only. 
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In order to discuss vertical separation of railways it is essential to define the scope 
of research in this thesis. Therefore, the author defines “separation of infrastructure 
and operation” and “vertical separation” by utilizing above-mentioned Dr Hori’s 
explanation. 
 
In other words, in this thesis the terms “separation of infrastructure and operation” 
and “vertical separation” refer to the situation where the owner of the 
infrastructure6 does not provide the given rail service over the given piece of 
infrastructure itself. 
 
 
2.4.2 Structure of Vertical Separation 
 
As opposed to the road for motor vehicles, infrastructure of the railway is also its 
traffic operating system and an essential production element. And the historical 
model of railway operations is the monolithic organization, whereby a single entity 
controls all facilities, train operation and administrative functions. Nevertheless, 
the production of railway services can be divided into several factors: 
1) investment and ownership of infrastructure; 
2) maintenance of tracks and infrastructure; 
3) capacity allocations and timetabling; 
4) route setting (daily traffic controlling and signalling); 
5) investment and ownership of rolling stock; 
6) maintenance of rolling stock; 
7) daily operation of trains (train service running and crew rostering); 
8) service marketing and ticket sales; 
9) administrative regulations on safety, technology, entry and retirement of services, 
fares, conflict settlement and so on. 
 
                                                  
6  In this paper, “infrastructure” refers to essential facilities for railway networks such 
as civil engineering structures and tracks. 
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An integrated railway, where the owner of the infrastructure provides the rail 
service itself over its infrastructure, generally performs these productive activities, 
the factors 1) to 8), within an integrated entity.  
 
On the other hand, in vertically separated railways the owner of the infrastructure 
is different from the provider of the rail service over the infrastructure. Therefore, 
the “above rail” functions, which generally indicate the factors 5), 6), 7) and 8), are 
performed by a different independent entity from the owner of the infrastructure. 
As the entity which carries out the other factors varies according to the railway, 
various models of vertical separation exist in the railway sector. 
 
As we will see in the cases in latter chapters, there are a variety of forms and 
implementation of vertical separation in the railway sector. In some models 
infrastructure and operations are managed by completely different independent 
entities, as it is shown in the case of Sweden, UK and Australia (ARTC). On the 
other hand, in the case of long-run concessions in Mexico, a railway operator also 
controls the infrastructure as if it were an integrated railway.  
 
As the author considers that, among the above, the following factors are especially 
essential for daily operation of trains. Thus, this thesis defines these factors as 
“essential factors of daily operation”7:  
2) maintenance of tracks and infrastructure;  
3) capacity allocations and timetabling; 
4) route setting (daily traffic controlling and signalling); 
6) maintenance of rolling stock; 
7) daily operation of trains (train service running and crew rostering); 
8) service marketing and ticket sales. 
 
The author refers the term “essential factors of daily operation” in order to 
                                                  
7  The author considered that investment and ownership of infrastructure and rolling 
stock are not necessarily essential for “daily” operation because an operator can 
perform railway operation by leasing them from other entities. Thus author excluded 
the factors 1) and 5) from the “essential factors of daily operation”.  
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investigate forms and implementation of vertical separation in the latter chapters.  
 
 
2.4.3 Literature Review of Vertical Separation 
 
Quite a few countries have experienced railway reform through vertical separation. 
Despite the fact that each country introduced vertical separation against the 
background of its own market conditions and the government’s intention to the 
sector, most research focused on a specific type of vertical separation in certain 
countries mainly from the viewpoint of introduction of within-mode competition into 
the railway transport. 
 
Ivaldi, M. and McCullough, G.J. (2001 p.1) found “strong cost complementarities 
among operational outputs, but not between operations and infrastructure” in the 
US freight railroads. The latter result implied that at the levels of output that 
characterize freight rail operations in the US, there may be no inherent 
technological advantages from vertical integration. The former suggests though 
that competitive access alone will not necessarily lead to competitive outcomes in 
rail freight markets. 
 
On the other hand, there is also another study which reverses the above view. For 
example, Bitzan, J.D (2003) examined the cost implications of competitions over 
existing US freight rail lines by testing for the condition of cost subadditivity. The 
study found: “1) there are economies associated with vertically integrated roadway 
maintenance and transport, suggesting that separating the two would result in 
increased resource costs; and 2) railroads are natural monopolies in providing 
transport services over their own network, suggesting that multiple-firm 
competition over such a network would result in increased resource costs.”(ibid, 
p.222) The study found the above by mentioning that “the findings do not 
necessarily apply to railroads in other countries with smaller railroad networks and 
a mix of passenger and freight services.”(ibid p.224) 
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Although both of the above studies focused on the integrated freight railroads in the 
US, their results with regard to vertical separation vary. As these examples imply, 
there are heated arguments whether intra-modal competition among railway 
operators through vertical separation makes benefits or losses in the sector. 
 
The debate over integration versus separation is still lively in Europe as well. (CER, 
2005) Trujillo, C.R. (2004) examined, evaluating 14 Western European railways, the 
effect of separation and open access on productive efficiency. He concludes that 
vertical separation contributes negatively to the technical efficiency but new entry 
to the rail market contributes positively.8 Nevertheless, to make issues difficult, it is 
discussed that complete vertical separation, such as the model adopted in UK and 
Sweden, makes “new entry easiest by removing all incentives for the infrastructure 
manager to favour one operator over another, but also leads to problems in 
coordination between the infrastructure manager and the train operating 
companies in terms of planning, investment, timetabling and day to day 
operations.” (Nash, C.A., 2007 p.75) 
 
Frequently, opinions against vertical separation are expressed. For example, a 
number of train operating companies in Britain have called for a return to vertical 
integration.(Nash, C.A., 2007 p.76) CER (2005 p20) quoted the view of CEO of the 
Swiss Federal Railways that “the recent substantial improvement in service – 
increasing the number of passenger trains by 12% on one of the already most 
densely used networks in Europe – would have been simply impossible in a 
separated structure, as it required an extremely high degree of coordination 
between operating services and infrastructure use.”  
 
Campos, J. and Cantos, P. (2000 p.192) also noted that “the problem associated with 
managing capacity is easily eliminated in the case of vertically integrated 
companies, although this is not so simple for systems of competitive access or 
                                                  
8  He stresses that consistency of his data is incomplete. 
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separation. In this case, the problem is increased for companies with high traffic 
densities and conflicting capacity demands.” Drew, J. (2006) also stresses that 
density and scarcity of the infrastructure capacity are key factors to consider 
whether the railway can be vertically separated or not.  
 
As the above examples show, several studies have discussed for and against vertical 
separation. Partly because the European Union intends to promote competition 
within railways, the most of studies about vertical separation, especially those 
about European railways, have analyzed railway efficiency in terms of introduction 
of competition into the rail sector.  
 
Nevertheless, a number of different forms of separation have already been put in 
place in the railway sector internationally. And, in several cases the separation 
between infrastructure and operations has been utilized as complementary policies 
of private sector participation into the railway sector.9 (Brooks, M. and Button, K., 
1995 p.236) Thus, in the following section, various kinds of advantages and 
disadvantages of vertical separation will be investigated through literature 
available. 
 
 
2.5 Advantages and Disadvantages of Vertical Separation 
 
2.5.1 Investigation into Advantages through Literature 
 
There are several reasons for introducing vertical separation. Thompson, L.(1997; 
2001), Nash, C.A. and Toner, J.P. (1999), ECMT (2005b), Hori.M.(2000), and others 
explain various advantages of vertical separation of railways. 
 
Based on the examination, the author categorized them into the following main 
                                                  
9  Brooks, M. and Button, K.(1995 p.242) notes that “not all of the recent interest in 
vertical separation of rail functions has involved debates over privatisation but many 
have embraced at least a degree of interest in privatisation.”  
32 
aims: 
 A.1) to facilitate public investment into infrastructure; 
 A.2) to permit private sector involvement; 
 A.3) to introduce competition; 
 A.4) to promote specialization; and 
 A.5) financial arrangement among different entities. 
 
In the followings, more specific objectives in each aim would be examined mainly 
through the literature. 
 
A.1) To Facilitate Public Investment into Infrastructure 
A.1-1. Putting different modes on an equal footing within the transport industry. 
In Sweden the government decided in 1988 to separate the national railway in two 
parts, infrastructure and operation. Berggrund, L.(1997 p.126) explains that “full 
responsibility for the maintenance and upgrading of the rail infrastructure was 
assumed by the State. Train operators pay charges for using the tracks similar to 
road taxes in the road sector. Resulting total cost coverage is about 30 % of the 
total cost of infrastructure maintenance.”  
 
It has also contributed to clarifying the fairness of the public expenditures 
combined with the transport policy. “Prior to separation, Swedish Railways (SJ) 
suffered from trying to perform services on a network that was under-capitalized. 
Once a line started to make losses, infrastructure investments typically came to 
halt. For the state, it was difficult to grant more money to SJ, partly because it 
could be seen as unfair from the view of other transportation companies, and 
partly because it was difficult to monitor how SJ actually spent the money. Setting 
up the national authority Banverket made it much easier to increase public 
spending on the railways, since all the money was channelled to a national 
authority rather than to a specific operator in the transportation industry.” 
(Alexandersson, G. and Hulten, S., 2005 p.11) 
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A.1-2. Utilization of external financial support for improving railway infrastructure 
through voluntary negotiation. 
Generally, it is difficult for private railway companies to invest sufficiently for the 
improvement of railway infrastructure because of managerial risks. Nevertheless, 
a third party such as a local government, frequently, agrees to develop the railway 
service investing a part of the infrastructure, and also agrees the current operator 
would continue providing railway services. Accordingly, sometimes, a new entity, 
such as a joint-venture who owns the infrastructure, would be established in order 
to achieve this aim. 
 
In the case of Yamagata Shinkansen in Japan, JR East provides the railway 
services while the infrastructure and the rolling stock are invested and owned by 
the joint-venture among JR East, Yamagata Prefecture, and so on. The agreement 
of this project was reached not by a law but by voluntary negotiation between the 
railway operator and the entities concerned.  
 
A.2) To Permit Private Sector Involvement 
A.2-1. Utilization of ability of the private sector through monopoly concession for 
achieving efficient controlling both infrastructure and operation. 
Concessioning has been introduced in many railways especially in Latin America 
and Africa. “In general, the governments involved decided to withdraw from 
public operation and delivery of rail services, … [and] chose [this] model because 
the operating concessionaire was without exception the sole or heavily 
predominant operator on the infrastructure and none of the normal reasons for 
considering infrastructure management separation applied.”(Thompson, L., 2003a 
p.338)  
 
A.2-2. Facilitating a private entry into a part of railway system separating sunk 
costs. 
Under vertically separated railway a new operator can be free from the 
infrastructure costs which are largely sunk. As the cost structure also can be 
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clarified by introducing access charges, vertical separation facilitates private 
entry into a part of the railway system, and opportunities for attraction of private 
investment into a certain part of the system should also increase. (ECMT, 2005b 
p.1)  
 
A.2-3. Track-access based on voluntary agreement for economy of enhanced density. 
“A railway can often allow a new operator on a line at a charge higher than its 
added costs, but far lower than the cost to the tenant operator of providing its own 
facilities. This was the impetus for the voluntary, private trackage rights 
agreements that arose in the United States.” (Thompson, L., 1997 p.1) 
  
A.2-4. Promoting convenience with through-trains. 
In some cases, vertical separation of railways is effective for promoting track 
access on the infrastructure owned by different entities, improving convenience of 
customers. (The Association of Japanese Private Railways, 2003) 
 
For example, Orient Express, the international passenger trains crossing 
European borders, had this kind of advantage as the passengers could enjoy 
crossing several infrastructures owned by different entities without changing 
trains operated by a single operator. (Hori, M., 2000) 
 
A.3) To Introduce Competition 
A.3-1. Encouraging intra-modal competition permitting track-age access to more 
than one operator. 
A vertically integrated railway has a substantial barrier to introduce competition 
among operators because “infrastructure costs are largely sunk and infrastructure 
provision exhibits natural monopoly characteristics. [Therefore,] separation of 
infrastructure ownership from the operation of services over the infrastructure 
has been advocated by economists for many network industries.” (Nash, C.A. and 
Toner, J.P., 1999 p.200) 
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The European Commission set about opening up the market for new entrants to 
come into rail freight transport, particularly to create genuine competition for 
cross-border freight rail transport.(Nash, C.A., 2007) In the US, “the Interstate 
Commerce Commission often gave one railway the right to operate over another in 
order to create competition between the two.”(Thompson, L., 1997 p.1) These are 
examples that vertical separation has been utilized for encouraging intra-modal 
competition permitting track-age rights to more than one operator.  
 
A.3-2. Creating competition among train operators by franchising out operational 
services. 
For example, in UK the railway industry has been radically reformed since 1994, 
and the right to run the ex-BR passenger trains was franchised to 25 private 
TOCs. In general, the number of passenger operator on the same track is limited 
to only one except overlapping franchisees on a certain line. 
   
A.4) To Promote Specialization 
A.4-1. Specialization of technical and managerial knowledge either infrastructure 
or operation.  
In case the operation is vertically separated, the member of staff belongs to 
“highly specialized firms whose range of activities is more limited.” (ECMT, 1996 
p.2) For example, a railway operator concentrates on efficient train operation and 
the infrastructure manger devotes its management efforts to the efficient track 
maintenance, and so on.  
 
A.5) Financial Arrangement among Different Entities 
A.5-1. Dealing financial settlements among several companies.  
In the case of splitting up the Japanese National Railways (JNR) in 1987, 
Shinkansen network was divided into the three Honshu JR Passenger Companies: 
JR Central; JR East; and JR West. It was prospected that profit adjustment 
among them is indispensable for privatization of JNR. Accordingly, Shinkansen 
Holding Corporation (SHC), who owned the assets of the Shinkansen network and 
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also the same amount of debits as a market-based revaluation of them, was 
established. Each line would then be leased for operation to the three JR 
Companies, and the above-mentioned profit adjustment was realized through the 
amount of lease charges paid by them.10 (Sumita, S., 2005) 
 
A.5-2. Common ownership/management of the infrastructure for sharing accesses.  
In case more than one operator can access the commonly owned/managed 
infrastructure under smooth coordination, each operator can attain the services 
with far lower costs than providing their own infrastructure. (Thompson, L., 1997) 
 
In Japan, Kobe Kosoku Railway has only infrastructure and does not own any 
rolling stock, and was established, as a joint-venture among the four private 
operators and the local government, etc. in order to make it possible that the four 
operators in the region access its infrastructure. (Mizutani, F., 1999 p.288)  
 
As it is investigated a number of advantages have been indicated regarding vertical 
separation of railways. 
 
 
2.5.2 Investigation into Disadvantages through Literature 
 
Despite a number of advantages of vertical separation studied in the former section, 
significant changes are brought about in the railway sector once infrastructure and 
operation are separated. Of course, the disadvantages differ according to the form of 
separation and other factors such as regulatory mechanisms. Nevertheless, Pfund, 
C. (2002; 2003), ECMT (1996), White, P. (2003), Trujillo, C.R. (2004) and others 
explain various disadvantages of vertical separation of railways. 
 
Based on the examination, the author classified them into the following problems: 
D.1) coordination problems due to vertical separation of entities performing 
                                                  
10  On 1st October 1991, the SHC was disbanded, and its assets and liabilities were 
allocated to the three JR Companies. 
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railway operation; 
D.2) coordination problems due to separation of finance; and 
D.3) coordination problems due to multiple operators.  
 
In the following, more specific disadvantages in each coordination problem would be 
examined mainly through the literature. 
 
D.1) Coordination Problems due to Vertical Separation of Entities Performing 
Railway Operation 
D.1-1. Increase of the transaction cost between infrastructure and operation. 
Vertical separation of railways generally replaces centrally coordinated structure 
of the railways by a series of contracts between the train operators and the 
infrastructure manager. Nevertheless, in order to coordinate independent 
organizations avoiding confrontation they have to negotiate, transmit various 
kinds of information until enforcing the contracts. Thus the cost of such contracts, 
the transaction cost, may be considerable in vertically separated railways. (Quinet, 
E. and Vickerman, R., 2004) 
 
D.1-2. Difficulty in clearly identifying the respective responsibilities of the different 
parties. 
Under vertically separated railways, especially in case operational responsibilities 
are also separated into different entities, they suffer “the difficulties of clearly 
identifying the respective responsibilities of the parties. (if a train is late, for 
example, both the infrastructure manager and the operator can be held 
responsible, depending on the circumstances)”(ECMT, 1996 p.2) Furthermore, 
there are also possibilities that two entities, an operator and infrastructure, do not 
cooperate even with inspecting regulator for finding out the cause of an accident 
because each entity is reluctant to bear the liability. (Wolmar, C., 2001). 
 
D.1-3. Difficulties in acquiring broad knowledge for operation and safety measures. 
In operationally vertically separated railways each player is confined to a more 
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limited field of activity (track or rolling stock maintenance, etc.), and players 
manage inter-dependence on a contractual basis. Thus, there are serious concerns 
that members of the staff find it more difficult to acquire broad knowledge, 
experiences for efficient operations and sufficient skills for implementing safety 
measures because of fragmentation of the responsibilities. (ECMT, 1996 p.2) 
 
D.1-4. Difficulties to harmonize the technologies and to optimize train operation on 
the network.  
Different from the road, the railway infrastructure is also an essential traffic 
control system. As railway operation is based on rolling stock, infrastructure, and 
operation control technology, harmonization of these technologies is essential for 
realizing better train service such as train speed, headways, punctuality and more 
reliable operation. Nevertheless, this technical harmonization would be more 
difficult in vertically separated railways. (Pfund, C., 2002) 
 
D.1-5. Difficulties to achieve further technical development of the comprehensive 
railway system.  
Most of the railway technologies need close inter-action between the 
infrastructure and rolling stock. This inter-action is essential for the harmonized 
railway technologies, and it can be performed efficiently within one entity, an 
operationally integrated railway. Once they are managed by different 
organizations under an operationally separated railway, it will be more difficult to 
develop technical innovations smoothly. (Pfund, C., 2002 p.6) 
 
D.2) Coordination Problems due to Separation of Finance 
D.2-1. Difficulties in planning and performing adequate investment in a railway 
system. 
Pfund, C. (2002 p.5) indicates that an efficient cost management, which is 
necessary for competing with other transportation modes, would be difficult 
without harmonized links between the two.  
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D.2-2. Poor economic performance arising from monopolistic status of the 
infrastructure manager.  
ECMT (1996 p.3) indicates that “it is possible that the infrastructure manager will 
charge the highest possible price when ‘selling’ timetable slots, thereby concealing 
inefficiencies. … There will always be a tendency for the infrastructure manager 
to over-estimate his investment requirements, which will have to be submitted to 
the authorities for approval.” 
 
D.3) Coordination Problems due to Multiple Operators 
D.3-1. Difficulty in slot allocation, timetabling and coordination among operators.           
In the event of separation, especially when more than one operator accesses the 
same track, capacity management such as the allocation of time-slots must be 
based on negotiation.(ECMT, 1996) Moreover, “settlement of conflicts (i.e. if a 
train is late or if traffic is disrupted for various reasons) may prove to be 
extremely complicated. [Additionally,] in unforeseen situations, the solution to a 
conflict may be difficult to establish in a fragmented railway system, particularly 
if the network is saturated, and in all probability will be interpreted differently by 
the various parties involved.”(ibid. p.2) 
 
D.3-2. Lack of integration of prices and services.  
Where a large network is covered with the same operator, it can promote 
passenger benefits through coordinating timetables, offering common fare 
structures, and so on. (White, P., 2003) In case there is no regulation or mutual 
agreement, introduction of on-track competition in the passenger sector can have 
undesirable results such as disruption of connections, biased passenger 
information, tickets not inter-changeable with other firms, discontinuance of 
regular headway services, and so on. (ECMT, 1996 p.3) 
 
As examined above, a number of disadvantages are also pointed out concerning 
vertical separation of railways. 
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2.6 Prospects of Vertical Separation of Railways 
 
Due to severe competition with other modes, nowadays, there are only a few 
profit-making integrated major railways without subsidy from the government.  
 
Some of the Japanese passenger railways and the US freight railways are the 
typical examples of profit-making railways which own the infrastructure. These 
railways are operated as private companies, and investments are performed based 
on a financial appraisal on each investment project. In principle, they do not invest 
in projects which do not contribute to their management financially. Nevertheless, 
as mentioned in Section 2.3.2, investments in the railway sector are recommended 
to be made based on social cost-benefit analysis including external costs and 
benefits for realizing better environment. 
 
Based on this background some railway investments have been performed by the 
public sector in Japan as well. As the first example, after the privatization of JNR, 
the public sector invests in new Shinkansen lines as Chapter 7 investigates. 
Secondly, in August 2005 a new law which can promote public investments for 
private urban railways’ infrastructure was established in order to exploit the 
potential of the current urban rail network. Thirdly, the number of railways which 
transfer their infrastructure to the local government is increasing in Japan as 
Chapter 7 discusses in the case of Aoimori Railway. Fourthly, another law which 
also allows public investment into regional public transport including railways 
based on the agreement of the regional committee was established in May 2007. 
 
In other countries many state-owned railways have been suffering from 
accumulating deficits. In order to deal with these problems various types of railway 
reform have been introduced. For example, some state-owned railways, such as the 
case in Vietnam, Indonesia and Tunisia, have transferred their infrastructure to the 
government. In Europe and Australia vertical separation (at least in accounting 
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basis) was introduced mainly for promoting competition among operators. In some 
countries in Latin America and Africa, the government has introduced 
concessioning in order to utilize market mechanism and the ability of the private 
sector retaining ownership of the infrastructure. 
 
Vertical separation is expected to be utilized in the railway sector in coming years as 
well, since there are good reasons for its introduction in various circumstances as 
shown in the above cases.  
 
 
2.7 Conclusion  
 
This chapter reviewed the background to vertical separation of railways. It was 
reviewed that railways were traditionally developed as vertically-integrated 
organizations, which are characterized by large infrastructure costs. In general, 
railways have been operated by a public firm, or heavily regulated for avoiding 
monopoly power partly because transport markets suffer from serious imperfections 
or market failures.  
 
Nevertheless, with the growing concern for the failure of state-owned railways and 
severe competition with other transport modes, many state-owned railways have 
performed restructuring. Through the reform process, the railway sector has 
experienced various forms of vertical separation based on different market 
conditions and the state’s own intention. For example, most of the discussions in 
Europe have been performed in terms of introducing competition into the railway 
sector, whereas the other countries have introduced the different form of vertical 
separation for the different reasons.  
 
Several studies have discussed for and against vertical separation, but they are not 
sufficient to understand the forms and characteristics of the various types of 
vertical separation. Some studies discuss advantages and disadvantages of vertical 
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separation, but their relationship with the type of separation is not clear enough 
either. It is because there are various types of it in the railway sector. In addition, 
owing to the geographical conditions, enough analysis comparing the varied forms 
in different conditions has not been performed yet.  
 
Therefore, this thesis aims to examine and analyze various types of vertical 
separation that the railway sector has experienced so far. The study identifies the 
characteristics of each type of vertical separation, especially by focusing on the 
following key issues: 
1) aims of railway reform through vertical separation; 
2) forms and implementation of vertical separation; 
3) advantageous effects of vertical separation; and 
4) disadvantageous effects of vertical separation. 
 
The next chapter develops the appropriate methodology for the research in order to 
attain the aims to identify and analyze the characteristics of each type of vertical 
separation of railways. 
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CHAPTER 3: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The primary aim of this chapter is to identify the appropriate research structure 
and methodology for the work. Section 3.2 describes that the case study technique 
mainly based on interviews to several railways is selected as an appropriate way of 
the research. In Section 3.3, in order to establish a firm research focus over the 
course of the case study, the research aims are reviewed and its objectives are 
established. The methodology for the research is outlined in Section 3.4. Then the 
detail process of the interviews/questionnaires is represented as the main method to 
gather the large part of essential data and information necessary for gaining the 
insights to achieve the aims and objectives of the research. 
 
 
3.2 Selection of Research Methodology 
 
This section provides academic justification for the use of a case study method 
underpinned by the interviews for the research methodology. 
 
Yin, R.K. (2003 p.5) explains: 
 the case study is but one of several ways of doing social science research. Other 
ways include experiments, surveys, histories, and the analysis of archival 
information. Each strategy has peculiar advantages and disadvantages, 
depending on three conditions:  
(a) the type of research question posed; 
(b) the extent of control an investigator has over actual behavioural events; and  
(c) the degree of focus on contemporary as opposed to historical events.  
 
Table 3.1 shows these three conditions and explains how each is related to the five 
major research strategies. “In general, case studies are the preferred strategy when 
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‘how’ or ‘why’ questions are being posed, when the investigator has little control over 
events, and when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life 
context.”(ibid. p.1)  
 
Table 3.1 Relevant Situations for Different Research Strategies 
Strategy Form of 
Research Question 
Requires Control of 
Behavioural Events 
Focuses on 
Contemporary Events
Experiment how, why? Yes Yes 
Survey 
who, what, where, 
how many, 
how much? 
No Yes 
Archival 
analysis 
who, what, where, 
how many, 
how much? 
No Yes / No 
History how, why? No No 
Case study how, why? No Yes 
Source: Yin, R.K. (2003), Case Study Research: Design and Methods 
 
This research work needs to gain a sharpened understanding of the issues of 
vertical separation in the railway sector in order to clarify the research questions. 
In this research, investigations and explanations of the research aims are especially 
important indicated as follows: 
1) “why” vertical separation was introduced to the railway during the 
restructuring process; 
2) “how” vertical separation is formed and implemented; 
3) “how” the aims and advantageous effects of vertical separation resulted, and 
“why” they did so; and 
4) “how” the disadvantageous effects of vertical separation resulted, and “why” 
they did so. 
 
In addition to the above forms of research questions, this research has the following 
characteristics: 
▪ an investigator does not have control over actual behavioural events; and  
▪ the research focuses on contemporary as opposed to historical events. 
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Thus the above-mentioned characteristics in this research lead to the adoption of 
case studies as the preferred research strategies. And it is justified that case study 
through an in-depth examination into a limited number of cases using a variety of 
data is an appropriate methodology for this research. 
  
 
3.3 Focus and Objectives of the Research 
 
In a case study research method it is important to establish a firm research focus to 
which the researcher can refer over the course of study of a complex phenomenon or 
object.(Soy, Susan K., 1997) Thus this section reviews the focus of the study, and 
also investigates the objectives of the case study to produce evidence that leads to 
understanding of the case and answers the research aims.  
 
The main aims of the research are clarifying the four key issues: 
1.  Aims of railway reform through vertical separation 
 The aims and reasons for introducing vertical separation vary depending on the 
background of the railway reform. Thus the research clarifies the aims of 
introducing vertical separation in each case of the reform. 
2.  Forms and implementation of vertical separation 
The forms of vertical separation are to be identified in each case. The research 
finds out how each factor of railway operation is implemented under vertically 
separated structure.  
3.  Advantageous effects of vertical separation  
In addition to the results of the above aims, the study clarifies the advantageous 
effects as a result of introducing vertical separation and finds out the 
background behind the results.  
4.  Disadvantageous effects of vertical separation  
Vertical separation frequently raises various disadvantageous effects as well. 
The research identifies these effects and examines the background behind these 
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negative results. 
 
In order to attain the aims of the research, as objectives of the research, the study 
performs investigation into the cases and analyzes them using a variety of data and 
interviews/questionnaires. Specifically, the study is performed in terms of the 
following viewpoints: 
 
1) The study examines which entity performs each essential factor of daily 
operation, and identifies the form of vertical separation in terms of operational 
responsibility for below rail functions and above rail functions. Followed by the 
case studies, the different types of vertical separation are compared in order to 
distinguish the degree of operational separation between infrastructure and 
operation; 
 
2) Vertical separation can be analyzed in terms of separation of the financial 
responsibility as well. Thus the study examines the forms of financial separation 
of the railway into the two divisions:  
▪ the division which the railway performs the services with its own financial 
responsibility (the commercial division);  
▪ the division that the public sector has assumed the financial responsibility (the 
social division). 
  Followed by the study into each case, the comparative analysis among different 
types of financial separation is performed to distinguish the characteristics of 
each type; 
 
3) The study examines the way of entry into the rail market and its results. 
Investigation is made in terms of regulation for a new entry into a transport 
service, relationship with the incumbent operator, and other related issues, and 
finds out the characteristics of each form of entry to a railway transport service; 
 
4) Under vertically separated railways, the entity which performs railway operation 
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and owner of the infrastructure are separated. In addition, in many cases more 
than one operator performs railway operation. Thus the study investigates into 
the relationship between different entities in vertical separation and examines: 
 ▪ relationship between infrastructure and the main operator;  
▪ relationship among different operators. 
The study also identifies the coordination problems among different entities; 
 
5) The case study investigates into a change of management and operation through 
the introduction of vertical separation. It also examines the transition in railway 
performance comparing before and after the reform through the statistical data 
such as change of traffic output. In order to distinguish the impact of reform 
through vertical separation on system performance from the effect of other 
exogenous factors, transition of the traffic output would be compared with the 
trend of real-term Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The study also tries to identify 
how the change of management and operation affected the performance of the 
railways; 
 
6) Investigations into advantages and disadvantages of vertical separation are key 
issues among the main aims. Thus, the study also examines the backgrounds of 
the positive and negative results of vertical separation, and tries to find out the 
reasons for them.  
 
The next section describes the appropriate methodology of the research in order to 
attain the above-mentioned aims and objectives. 
 
 
3.4  Methodology for the Research 
 
This research is performed mainly based on: 
 1) data collection on literature;  
 2) investigation through interviews/questionnaires; and 
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 3) comparative analysis.  
This section describes how in practice the above-mentioned works are performed.  
 
 
3.4.1 Data Collection on Literature 
 
The author reviews and synthesizes the results of the previous research based on 
available literature, and a part of this work is performed in Chapter 2. The 
corroborating data and statistics are utilized in order to provide the ground for the 
investigations, arguments and analyses in the latter chapters as well. 
 
In order to obtain corroborating data and statistics the author utilizes a variety of 
reliable literature sources: 
▪ Annual reports and corporate information of each railway; 
▪ Published industry analysis and academic journals; 
▪ Database and working papers by the World Bank; 
▪ Papers of related international organizations such as ECMT and OECD; 
▪ International Railways Statistics of UIC1; and 
▪ Other published sources. 
 
In general, the study investigates vertical separation of railways mainly in terms of 
qualitative aspects as described in the former section. In addition, although the 
study covers the railways whose size varies to a large extent, there are some 
difficulties to collect certain consistent data for the correct estimation of railway 
performance which can be compared among the cases. Thus the study examines the 
trends of traffic output (passenger-km and freight tonne-km) in each case in order to 
support the argument and analysis. 
 
 
                                                  
1  The official name of UIC is Union Internationale des Chemins de fer (International 
Union of Railways). It is a worldwide organization for railways that provides detailed 
world-wide statistics. 
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3.4.2 Investigation through Interviews/Questionnaires 
 
In the case studies the author generates a range of information. Especially, a 
substantial part of the material required to underpin the analysis is formed through 
the interviews/questionnaires to each railway.  
 
As far as possible, the author performs interviews in a meeting. Nevertheless, in 
case it is not possible to perform the interviews because of geographical distance, 
the author makes investigation by means of questionnaires. In this case, in advance 
of sending the questionnaire, the author explains the intention of the questionnaire 
to the subject by e-mails and/or phone. Furthermore, even after receiving the 
answers of the questionnaire, the author keeps contacts with the subject so that the 
author can obtain the detailed information equivalent to the railways which a direct 
interview has performed. In addition to the answers to the questionnaire, close 
interaction after receiving them is so useful for the author to gain detailed 
information and to deepen the investigation as it is aimed. The detail procedure for 
the interviews/questionnaires is described in Section 3.5. 
 
 
3.4.3 Comparative Analysis 
 
It is expected that there are some differences in the four key issues even within the 
similar type of vertical separation. Thus, firstly, the author compares the key issues 
among the railways which have similar characteristics in terms of vertical 
separation. This investigation is made within the same chapter, from Chapter 4 to 
Chapter 7. 
  
Based on the above studies, investigation and analysis are made comparatively 
among different types of vertical separation. The investigation is performed 
focusing on the four key issues so as to clarify the differences among each type of 
vertical separation, and to distinguish its characteristics. This work is performed 
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mainly in Chapter 8 and Chapter 9. 
 
 
3.5 Interviews/Questionnaires to the Railways 
 
3.5.1 Railways to be Investigated 
 
In order to achieve the aims of the research, the railways for the study are carefully 
selected based on the following conditions: 
▪  The state-railways have already experienced a reform through vertical 
separation and the results have become clear to some extent; 
▪  The railways cover different motives for introducing vertical separation;  
▪  The railways cover different forms and implementation of vertical separation; 
▪  The railways have different sorts of results through vertical separation; 
▪  The state railways are large enough and have sufficient transport volume to 
investigate the transition2; 
▪  The cases of reform are confined to those within past decades of years since 
competition with other transport modes had become severe. 
 
In the case study, various types of vertical separation are divided into four 
categories based on their characteristics. The railways selected and chapters 
discussed are shown in Table 3.2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                  
2  Exceptionally, Chapter 7 focuses on the case of TFVM in Mexico and the two cases of 
newly-organized vertically separated lines after the JNR Reform in Japan. Although 
these are small railways, they are selected for discussing and comparing various 
forms of vertical separation. 
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Table 3.2 Group of Railways by the Type of Vertical Separation 
Title of the Chapter 
Group 
Chapter Country (Railway) 
State-owned railways without within-rail competition 
Group 1 
Chapter 4 
India (IR) *1 
Vietnam(VNR), Indonesia (PT.KA), Tunisia (SNCFT) 
Vertically separated railways with competition among operators 
Group 2 
Chapter 5 Sweden, UK, Germany, France, Australia (ARTC) 
Railways with vertical separation for passenger or freight traffic 
Group 3 
Chapter 6 Iran, Japan (JR Freight), USA (Amtrak) 
Private railways with long-run access to infrastructure 
Group 4 
Chapter 7 
Mexico (Freight Concessionaires, TFVM)  
Japan (New Shinkansen Lines, Aoimori Railway) 
*1: As a basis for comparison with vertically separated railways, the Indian 
Railways (IR) is investigated as an integrated railway. 
Source: Author 
 
 
3.5.2 Subjects of the Interviews/Questionnaires 
.  
The data collected through the interviews/questionnaires are essential for the study, 
and the characteristics of the data are heavily dependent on the subjects of the 
works. Thus, a research interview must be performed to a subject who is identified 
to have sufficient information and knowledge about vertical separation of the 
railway. In principle, the author makes interviews/questionnaires with managers 
with enough working experience in the railways concerned and an intimate 
knowledge about vertical separation of the railways. As far as possible the author 
interviews with managers who were engaged in planning of the railway reform. In 
the cases of UK, Australia, the US and Mexico, the author interviews or asks a 
questionnaire to a retired expert or to a consultant who was deeply engaged in the 
railway reform process. 
 
In case the author can not directly contact an official who has good knowledge about 
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the reform, the author sends questionnaires to the railway in advance of the 
interview and asks to have a meeting with an appropriate member of staff in the 
railway. As the questionnaire covers a variety of issues regarding railway operation 
and management, in some interviews such as the case in Sweden, meetings are 
performed with multi-attendance from different departments. 
 
The outline of the interviews/questionnaires such as the country, railway 
organization, biographical details of the subjects, and the first date of inquiry, is 
summarized in Appendix 1.  
 
As it is listed, the author could perform an interview/questionnaire at one 
organization in each country because of the limited research schedule. 3  In 
particular, the author could not perform it to both the infrastructure manager and 
an operator in European countries and Australia, in which the railway industry has 
been operationally separated into infrastructure and operation. It might be possible 
that the relatively small number of interviews/questionnaires during the study 
biases the findings through the research. Nevertheless, wherever it is possible, the 
author attempted to cross-check the acquired information with the reliable 
literature sources 4 , and made efforts to verify the facts and the expressed 
information. 
 
 
3.5.3 Structure of Questionnaires 
 
The structure of questionnaires is listed in Appendix 2.  
 
The questionnaire not only covers extensive questions sufficient to comprehend the 
management of the railways but also contains investigative ones which contribute 
to analyze how and why management has changed through vertical separation.  
                                                  
3  The author’s term in UIC World Department was fixed to terminate in March 2006. 
It was expected that, after his return to Japan, it would be practically difficult for the 
author to perform the interview except that for railways in Japan. 
4  The examples of available literature are listed in Section 3.4.1. 
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The questionnaire contains relevant questions to attain the aims and objectives of 
the research, and it covers the items: 
1) outline of the vertical separation and aims of the reform; 
2) ownership, investment and way of planning the infrastructure; 
3) maintenance works of the infrastructure and tracks; 
4) ownership, investment, maintenance of the rolling stock; 
5) timetabling and daily operation; 
6) operators on the track including those of new entrants; 
7) relationship between infrastructure and operation; 
8) relationship among operators; 
9) safety issues; 
10) transition of management and operation through vertical separation; 
11) advantageous effects of vertical separation and their background; and  
12) disadvantageous effects of vertical separation and their background. 
 
 
3.5.4  Methods of Interviews 
 
In general, interviews are based on the questionnaire listed in Appendix 2.  
 
Among various questions the interviewer puts emphasis on investigating the four 
key issues so that they can be analyzed providing the necessary grounds later. The 
interviewer asks questions in a reactive way. Even if a discourse with the 
interviewee enters into a topic slightly peripheral to the agenda, it is continued as 
this kind of discourse, sometimes, contributes to generate material useful to gain 
comprehensive views to clarify the key issues. 
 
In order to gain the interviewee’s frank opinion and to reveal the essence of the 
background of the key issues, the interview is held after explaining that the report 
would be written preserving the interviewees’ anonymity. 
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In some interviews such as the case in UK, the discourse has lasted a day. The other 
interviews have been held spending a half day. Because of a time limit of the 
interviews, in most cases the author keeps close contact with the interviewees 
mainly through E-mails even after the meeting, and follows up the related issues 
and seeks sufficient data and evidence to deepen the investigation and analysis. In 
addition to the close interaction with the interviewees, the author also endeavours 
to support the findings from the interviews through the literature sources. 
 
 
3.6 Summary and Critique of the Method 
 
Yin, R.K. (2003) defines the case study research method as an empirical inquiry 
that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when the 
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which 
multiple sources of evidence are used. In adition, Soy, Susan K. (1997 p.1) notes that 
“case study research excels at bringing us to an understanding of a complex issue or 
object and can extend experience or add strength to what is already known through 
previous research.” 
 
This chapter explained that the case study technique is selected as the most 
appropriate form to reach the aims and objectives of the research. The outline of the 
research methodology and detail processes of interviews/questionnaires are also 
represented. 
 
There are also potential weaknesses of the case study method. Soy, Susan K., (1997) 
indicates that the study of a small number of cases might be insufficient for 
establishing reliability or generality of findings, and the intense exposure to study 
of the case biases the findings. There are also possibilities for subjectivity on the 
part of the interviewer. Roberts, C.C. (2003) notes that qualitative data obtained 
through the interviews/questionnaires in the study would not necessarily provide 
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full evidence in support of the arguments and analysis either. In order to lessen the 
above-mentioned potential weakness, the author endeavours to investigate the 
object of the case study using a variety of data and information to produce evidence 
to attain the aims.  
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CHAPTER 4:  
STATE-OWNED RAILWAYS WITHOUT WITHIN-RAIL 
COMPETITION 
- INDIA, VIETNAM, INDONESIA AND TUNISIA - 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
For the comparison with vertically separated railways, firstly, this chapter studies a 
vertically integrated railway focusing on the Indian Railways (IR). 
 
Then, the author investigates vertically separated state-owned railways without 
within-rail competition, specifically, Vietnam Railways Corporation (VNR) 1 , 
Indonesian Railways (PT.KA)2 and Tunisian National Railways (SNCFT). After 
surveying the background and outline of the recent reform, the three railways are 
examined in terms of the four key issues to find out characteristics of vertical 
separation in the cases. 
 
 
4.2 A Model of Vertically Integrated Railways -A Case in India- 
 
4.2.1 Outline of the Indian Railways  
 
Indian Railways (IR) is completely owned by the Central Government. It is what is 
called as a departmental undertaking i.e. an organization owned by the 
                                                  
1  After the author’s interview to VNR in July 2005, Vietnam passed a new railway law 
in January 2006. The new registration stipulates access right by an operator other 
than VNR. (GTZ, 2006) As the results of this new law are not apparent yet, this paper 
does not discuss the new law and the transition after the establishment of the law. 
 
2  After the interviews to PT.KA in July 2005, the Director General of Railways (DGR), 
a Government body in Indonesia, was established. It was decided that other entities 
such as local governments and the private sector are permitted to operate railways 
accessing the existing tracks, and a new railway law has passed in March 2007. 
Despite its stipulation, there has not been any new participant to the railway services 
in Indonesia as of December 2007, and only PT.KA operates the railway. Thus this 
paper does not discuss the new law in Indonesia either. 
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Government of India. The highest decision making authority is therefore, the 
Minister of Railways who is a senior member of the cabinet, but the budget of IR is 
separate from the Central budget. The Government helps IR with funds for capital 
expenditure and modernization but expects it to cover the expenditure by the 
revenue from its internal generation. In general, IR enjoys autonomy i.e. 
independence from the Government in its daily railway operation. The Ministry of 
Railways, also called the Railway Board, is the decision making as well as 
regulatory body. [1/IN] 
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            Figure 4.1  Traffic Trends of IR 
            Source:  The World Bank’s Railway Database  
                    UIC Statistics 2006, UIC 
                    International Monetary Fund (2008) 
 
 
Figure 4.1 shows the traffic trends of IR over the last twenty years. ADB (2002) 
explains that “in the face of increasing competition from roads, the railways’ share 
of the transport market has dropped over the last two decades. Worsening financial 
performance, congested routes, lack of resources for investment and a high level of 
accidents hamper the sector. Between 1997 and 2001, the annual number of 
derailments, which account for the majority of accidents, rose from 282 to 344.”  
 
Nevertheless, the figure also shows that the traffic performance of IR has been 
improving remarkably these few years tracking the rapid growth of the real-term 
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GDP. The year of 2007 sees IR enter its 11th five-year plan period, and “over the next 
five years IR expects freight traffic to grow at 8% to 9% a year while passenger 
traffic is forecast to increase by 6% a year” (Garg., S. 2007 p.6) 
    
 
4.2.2 Management and Administration of the Indian Railways  
 
Through the questionnaire to IR, its management and administration of railway 
operation are clarified as Appendix 3. 
 
These years, the railway sector in India is active in managerial transition. For 
example, the Ministry of Railways signed concession agreements with 15 private 
and public sector operators in January 2007, and licensed for container train 
services.(Dayal, R., 2007) Nevertheless, for the most part of its operation, IR is a 
monopoly organisation and enjoys advantages of integrated system like lower 
transaction costs, easier decision making in capital budgeting and easier day to day 
operational control. [1/IN] 
 
Nevertheless, according to IR, the major disadvantage of integrated system is that 
there is little pressure to improve efficiency and for cost reduction.[1/IN] “Batra 
notes that ‘at present IR gets 67% of its earnings from freight traffic and 33% from 
passengers.’ As the railway is still an integral part of central government, it 
therefore has ‘social responsibilities to discharge’, which means using freight 
revenues to cross-subsidise un-remunerative local passenger services.”(RGI, 2007b) 
Rakesh Mohan Committee Report, which was submitted to the Railway Minister in 
2001, regards the root of the financial problem confronting IR as “the lack of 
adequate productivity increases that are commensurate with the real wage 
increases over time.” (Mohan, R., 2001) 
 
“The Rakesh Mohan Committee recommends that IR should be separated from the 
Government and turned into a free standing corporation.”(Bringinshaw, D., 2002 
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p.17) The committee also notes that “if IR is to survive as an ongoing transportation 
organisation it has to modernize and expand its capacity to serve the emerging 
needs of a growing economy. This will require substantial investment on a regular 
basis for the foreseeable future.”(Mohan, R., 2001) At present, the Railway Sector 
Improvement Project, which is supported by the Asian Development Bank (ADB), 
focuses on “carrying out institutional and policy reforms to put the railways on a 
more commercial footing and finance priority investments in capacity expansion.” 
(ADB, 2002) 
 
 
4.3 The Background and Outline of the Recent Reform 
 
The sections hereafter investigate vertically separated state-owned railways 
without within-rail competition. Firstly, the author surveys the background and 
outline of the recent reform in the three railways, Vietnam Railways Corporation 
(VNR), Indonesian Railways (PT.KA) and Tunisian National Railways (SNCFT). 
 
4.3.1 Vietnam 
 
Since the return of peace and reunification of Vietnam in 1976, the railways have 
been owned, financed and centrally managed by the State with all revenue and 
expenditure reflecting government-assigned traffic tasks fulfilled at 
government-imposed rates with little concern for economic efficiency or customer 
requirements. (Harris, K., 2003) 
 
In 1986, with the introduction of the “Doi Moi (Renovation)” policy to move from a 
subsidized centrally-planned economy into a market-led economy, Government 
decided to modernize the country’s transport sector and expand its capacity to serve 
the developing economy. In this changing context of deregulation and with the 
resulting emergence of competition from other modes of transport, especially road, 
renovation of Vietnam Railways has been implemented since 1989 as follows.  
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▪  March 1989   Decentralization and establishment of 3 Regional Headquarters. 
▪  May 1990     Re-organising and establishment of Vietnam Railways (VR). 
▪  March 2003   Establishment of Vietnam Railways Corporation (VNR). 
 
On 1 January 1995, Vietnamese Government decided to separate the ownership and 
financial responsibility of rail infrastructure from rail operations. Since then, 
Government owns the infrastructure and finances its maintenance, renewal and 
development investments, which used to be covered by Vietnam Railways. (Bang, 
N.H., 1999) 
 
 
4.3.2 Indonesia 
 
The main concern of the railway sector in Indonesia was to make up for past 
shortfalls in investment so as to satisfy rising demand for its services. According to 
Indonesian Railways (2002 p.4) the main reasons behind the urgent need for reform 
and restructuring were: 
▪  the insignificant role of rail transport; 
▪  the insignificant role of the private sector; 
▪  the great need for maintenance as well as development;  
▪  the need to lessen the dependence on the government as regulator. 
 
In 1992 Government decided to accept ownership and financial responsibility for 
investment and maintenance of the railway infrastructure. The corporate 
restructuring was also performed by means of the conversion from a public 
corporation into a limited liability corporation on 1st June 1999, under Government 
Regulation. Through this restructuring Indonesian Railways (PT.KA) were released 
from full government control. In this liberalisation PT.KA gained commercial 
freedom in all but fixing economy class passenger fares, which remain under control 
of Government. It also obtained freedom to borrow in the domestic banking market. 
(Indonesian Railways, 2005b) 
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4.3.3 Tunisia 
 
The five year-term Contract Programmes were established between the Tunisian 
Government and SNCFT in compliance with Economic and Social Development 
Plans. In order to attain the aims of the plan, SNCFT implemented a diversified 
and flexible tariff policy, with customer-oriented services. The laws, which have 
passed in 1998, regulate the railway reform and stipulate that Government owns 
infrastructure of railway networks and finances its maintenance, renewal and 
development investment. (Harris, K., 2005) 
 
 
4.4 Aims of the Reform through Vertical Separation 
 
The three state railways have introduced vertical separation as a part of their 
reform, and their aims of reform through vertical separation are listed in Table 4.1. 
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Table 4.1 Aims of the Reform through Vertical Separation in the Three State-Owned 
Railways 
Country (Railway) Aims of the reform through vertical separation 
Vietnam (VNR) 
 
(1) to place the government’s special emphasis on 
infrastructure investment for railway network. 
(2)  to encourage other organizations including the private 
sector to participate in railway operation and to invest in 
the railway infrastructure. 
(3)  to clarify the responsibilities of the state and those of the 
railway operator. 
Indonesia (PT.KA) 
 
(1) to involve the private sector and to promote private 
investment for the development of rail services.  
(2)  to modernize the maintenance system and to make rail 
operations more efficient so that the transport volume 
and revenues will increase accordingly. 
(3)  to make the rail as the backbone of land transportation.
Tunisia (SNCFT) 
 
(1)  to manage the railway under strictly commercial terms. 
(2)  to achieve a balanced financial result after state 
subsidies are taken into account. 
(3) to improve service quality, comfort, punctuality, safety 
levels, and so on. 
Source: ▪ Interviews to VNR, PT.KA and SNCFT [2/VN, 3/IN, 4/TN]   
       ▪ Vietnam Railways (2005a) 
       ▪ Indonesian Railways (2002)    
       ▪ Harris, K.(2003) 
     
These three state-owned railways have common directions to improve the railways 
through the following policies: 
▪ Improving the efficiency of the railways allowing more freedom for the 
management; 
▪  Reducing the high degree of regulatory intervention and direct subsidies from 
the government. 
 
In order to attain the above, vertical separation in these railways aimed to 
discriminate the role of the government and that of the railway. Instead of covering 
the deficit of the state-owned railways as a whole, the financial responsibility of the 
government has been clearly stipulated. This clear definition of the government’s 
ownership and financial responsibility for the railway infrastructure is the 
distinctive characteristic of this type of vertical separation. 
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4.5 Forms and Implementation of the Vertical Separation 
 
4.5.1 Forms of the Vertical Separation 
 
The forms of the vertical separation between the main operator and the 
infrastructure are summarised in Table 4.2. 
 
Table 4.2 Forms of the Vertical Separation in the Three State-owned Railways 
Country Infrastructure Owner The Main Railway Operator 
Vietnam Government  Vietnam Railways Corporation (VNR) 
Indonesia Government  Indonesian Railways (PT.KA) 
Tunisia Government Tunisian National Railways (SNCFT) 
Source: Author, based on the interviews to VNR, PT.KA and SNCFT. [2/VN, 3/IN, 4/TN]  
 
As it is shown in the above table, ownership of the infrastructure and financial 
responsibility for it was transferred to the government in the process of the reform. 
The scope of state’s responsibility on the infrastructure varies depending on the 
country. For example, Government of Vietnam has become responsible for the 
ownership and financial responsibility for most of the infrastructure including land, 
civil structures, track, stations, signalling and telecommunication systems. On the 
other hand, in Indonesia, although most of the infrastructure has transferred to 
Government, the state-railway (PT.KA) retains the ownership of stations, depots, 
workshops and land for them.  
 
Whereas vertical separation clearly defined that Government owns the 
infrastructure and has become responsible for it financially, the liberalized 
state-owned railways operate railway services in both the freight and passenger 
sectors. 
 
Despite the fact that the government owns the shares of the main railway, the 
state-owned railway retains a legally and financially independent status. Moreover, 
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since expenditure of the government is accounted as the annual expenditures of the 
state, it is considered that the financial responsibility for the infrastructure has 
become also independent. Thus in addition to the separation of infrastructure 
ownership, which is essential for the definition of vertical separation stipulated in 
Section 2.4.1, in these cases, financial responsibility for the railway has been also 
separated into different entities, the government and the state-owned railway. 
 
 
4.5.2 Implementation of the Vertical Separation 
 
4.5.2.1 Organizational Structure and Management with Vertical Separation 
 
The results of investigation about the organizational structure and its management 
are summarised in Appendix 3. 
 
The three railways follow a similar type of vertical separation. The government is 
committed ownership and financial responsibility in investment and maintenance 
of the infrastructure, and the main operator performs the essential factors of daily 
operation such as maintenance of the infrastructure and rolling stock, timetabling, 
route setting, daily operation of trains, and ticket sales.  
  
Through vertical separation the railway was separated into the government and the 
main railway, which has a legally and financially independent status. Since the 
introduction of vertical separation, the financial flow between the two entities, the 
government and the independent railway, has been drastically changed. Instead of 
former subsidy from the government to the railway, financial responsibility has 
been clearly stipulated under vertically separated structure. Different from the type 
of “separation of accounts” which is investigated in the next chapter, the separated 
entities do not belong to the sole legally and financially independent institution any 
more, and the government started to take primary financial responsibility for 
planning infrastructure work including its maintenance. Nevertheless, despite the 
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separation of infrastructure ownership and its financial responsibility, the 
government interacts and negotiates closely with the railway operator in order to 
operate and maintain the railway system as efficiently as it is planned.  
 
In the three countries, the government has its principle to pay much attention to 
the investment of the railway network, and the principle in each country is declared 
in the long/medium term plans shown in Table 4.3. 
 
Table 4.3 Long/Medium Term Plans for the Railway Sector 
Country (Railway) Long/Medium Term Plans  
Vietnam (VNR) ▪ Master Plan in 2002: “Master Plan on the Development of Vietnamese Railway Transport Sector Till 2020” 
Indonesia (PT.KA) ▪ Long-term plan : “Master Plan from 2006 to 2030” 
▪ 5 year-term plan 
Tunisia (SNCFT) ▪ 5 year-term Economic and Social Development Plans.  (The contract program between Government and SNCFT) 
Source: Author, based on the interviews to VNR, PT.KA and SNCFT. [2/VN, 3/IN, 4/TN]   
 
Some of these plans specifically stipulate future target of upgrading railway 
technologies, estimated investment, railway infrastructure development projects, 
and so on.3 Based on these long/medium term plans, the railway operators make 
efforts to promote smooth negotiation with the government for efficient construction 
and maintenance of the infrastructure. And, negotiation based on these plans 
largely contributes to a mutual understanding between the government and the 
railway operator. For example, in Vietnam when full amount of the fee is not 
                                                  
3   For example, the master plan in Vietnam titled “the Master Plan on the 
Development of Vietnamese Railway Transport Sector Till 2020” was approved on 7 
January 2002 by the Prime Minister, and this is considered to be very important 
future landmark for the development of VNR. In this master plan the target of the 
railway sector in the transport market is clearly noted such as follows: “The railway 
transport shall take a share of 25% - 30% in terms of tons and ton-kms and of 20% - 
25% in terms of passengers and passenger-kms in the total transport volume of the 
sector as a whole. By the year of 2020, the rail share in urban passenger transport 
shall reach at least 20% of the passenger volumes in Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh city.”  
 
In order to achieve the target more specific plans are also stipulated. These plans 
cover the estimated investment amount needed for railway infrastructure up to 2010 
and 2020, and also list railway infrastructure development project plans respectively. 
(Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 2002) 
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approved by Government, VNR revises the maintenance program of the year and 
makes re-calculation for further negotiation with Government.[2/VN] Like this 
example, these railways make efforts for reducing coordination problems raised by 
vertical separation. 
  
In Vietnam and Tunisia the negotiation between the two separated entities seems to 
have been working well based on these plans. Stipulated amount of funds for 
investment and maintenance of the infrastructure has been paid by the government 
by and large, and the railways have carried out the planned work both in 
construction works and railway operation.  
 
In Indonesia, the railway sector follows almost the same model as the above two 
countries. They have long-term and 5 year-term plans, and they have also 
established the payment schemes between Government and PT.KA. In construction 
process, different from the cases in Vietnam and Tunisia, the government is 
responsible for the practical construction works as well as the financial 
responsibilities for them.[3/ID] Nevertheless, in the operational processes after the 
completion of the project, the stipulated amount of financial flow has not been 
realized because of lack of resources in the government of Indonesia, and this has 
resulted in poor maintenance of the infrastructure. 
 
 
4.5.2.2 Relationship among Different Parties and Relevant Issues 
 
The investigation clarified the current railway operation in terms of relationship 
among different parties and relevant issues as shown in Appendix 4. 
 
Results of the investigation into these railways are summarized: 
▪  The state-owned main railway performs essential factors of daily operation such 
as maintenance of tracks and rolling stock, timetabling, route setting, daily 
operation of trains, ticket sales, and so on. It also takes responsibility for the 
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safety of train operation; 
▪ The government owns the infrastructure and finances for it both in investments 
and in maintenance. In case the stipulated amount is financed by the government, 
there is no particular dispute between the government and the main railway; 
▪  In case the stipulated amount of finance can not be paid by the government, 
serious problems are raised such as lack of the infrastructure maintenance. (This 
issue is closely investigated in Section 4.7.2); 
▪  In Vietnam and Tunisia, a new operator has entered into the passenger market 
through mutual agreement with the main railway by way of establishing a 
joint-venture or making a contract with the main railway. (This issue is closely 
investigated in Section 4.6.2); 
▪  As a result of the above new entry to the market, there has been no particular 
dispute between the main railway and a new entrant as the main railway 
coordinates most of the essential factors of daily operation of the new entrant as 
well. 
 
 
4.6 Transition of Management of the Railways  
 
4.6.1 Transition of the Main Railways 
 
This section investigates transition of the management of the main railways 
through introduction of vertical separation. In order to examine the transition of the 
management in depth, especially, the case of VNR is scrutinized among the three 
railways. 
 
4.6.1.1 Vietnam 
 
1) Management of VNR 
On 4th March 2003, Vietnam Railways was re-organized into a state-owned 
corporation, Vietnam Railway Corporation (VNR), and became more autonomous in 
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the planning and management of its business activities. VNR is a 100% 
Government capital enterprise, and performs the tasks of managing, exploiting and 
maintaining the State-assigned railway infrastructure system. VNR also has its 
legal status, civil obligations, and rights prescribed by law. It takes a responsibility 
for its whole business operation within the capital. The organization chart of VNR 
after the re-organization is shown in Figure 4.2. 
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   Figure 4.2 Organization Chart of Vietnam Railways Corporation  
   Source: Revise from Vietnam Railways (2005a) 
 
As the above figure shows, VNR is a multi-member company, and functions as 
follows: 
▪ Railway transport is operated by two passenger transport companies and one 
freight transport company. Each company is separately accountable and generates 
its own profits and losses internally;  
▪ The Traffic Control Centre is the body which coordinates all train operations in 
Vietnam. Therefore, the three transport companies and new operators have to 
follow the directions of the Traffic Control Centre;   
▪ Maintenance of railway infrastructure is performed through a different 
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department, and the works are carried out with Government funding. The 
Investment, Construction & Consultant Company also has an independent 
accounting, and its accounting is independent from the other two blocks. 
        
Renovation of Vietnam Railways, which has been undertaken since 1989, has made 
a remarkable change in the financial performance of VNR. The absolute amount of 
investment from Government for infrastructure maintenance has increased since 
1995 4 , and it has contributed to improving the performance of the railway 
remarkably. [2/VN] 
 
2) Performance of VNR 
Figure 4.3 shows traffic trends of VNR, and Table 4.4 shows travel time by 
limited-stop express from Hanoi to Ho Chi Minh city. While VNR improves its 
performance, the number of employees has decreased as Table 4.5. 
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       Figure 4.3  Traffic Trends of VNR 
       Source: ▪ Bang,N.H.(1999) 
              ▪ Vietnam Railways (2004)  
              ▪ ASEAN Railways (2005) 
              ▪ The World Bank Database 
              ▪ International Monetary Fund (2008) 
                                                  
4  The investment from Government has still not met VNR’s requirements for proper 
maintenance of railway infrastructure due to factors such as inflation, price 
fluctuation of materials, salary to the engineering staff, and so on.[2/VN] 
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Table 4.4 Travel Time by Limited-Stop Express from Hanoi to Ho Chi Minh City  
Year 1980 1988 1989 1991 1993 1994 1997 1999 2002 2004
Travel Time (Hours) 72 58 48 42 38 36 34 32 30 29 
Max. Speed (Km/h) 60 60 60 70 70 80 80 90 90 90 
Average Speed (Km/h) 24 33 36 41 45 48 51 54 58 60 
Source: Revise of Bang, N.H.(1999) 
 
 
Table 4.5  Number of Railway Employees in VNR  
Year 1988 1994 2000 2002 2004 
Total Staff 65,000 44,000 42,810 46,167 45,131 
Source: ▪ Bang,N.H.(1999) 
        ▪ ASEAN Railways Benchmarks, Report to 27thASEAN Railways CEO Meeting 
 
 
Figure 4.3 shows the unit of output especially in the passenger rail sector had 
decreased in the late 1980s.5 Nevertheless, it clearly shows that VNR has been 
successful in improving railway performance since the reform through vertical 
separation in 1995. Despite the fact that growth has occurred from a low absolute 
base, VNR has increased traffic with a 67 per cent in ton-kilometres and a 114 per 
cent in passenger-kilometres during the period from 1995 to 2005. These increases 
have been achieved in almost the same length of tracks without building new lines, 
and these figures are much higher than those of other railways in ASEAN countries, 
most of which are stable or steady increase. 
 
In order to distinguish the impact of the reform from the effect of other exogenous 
                                                  
5  This was mainly caused by reform of the economic management system of Vietnam. 
Since the introduction of the “Doi Moi” policy in 1986, the centralized planning 
mechanism of the country has changed into market-oriented mechanism. As a result, 
all sectors including the transport sector have been encouraged to promote private 
participation, thus railways started to face serious competition with other transport 
modes and lost its market share.  
The other reason is the limitation of Government investment into the railways in 
those years. Behind the background of economic conditions of the country during the 
period, the government’s investments into railways were forced to be limited. This led 
a lot of difficulties in maintaining the infrastructure, rolling stock and other facilities. 
Accordingly, it was difficult for the railway sector to compete with other transport 
modes, especially with the road which was paid more attention and investment by the 
government.[2/VN] 
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factors, Figure 4.3 also compared the transition of the traffic output with that of 
real-term GDP. It shows that, despite the steady growth of the GDP, the traffic 
output had been general down-turn trend especially in the passenger sector before 
the reform, and the traffic output has been clearly changed into upturn trend since 
the period of the railway reform. This statistical transition suggests the favourable 
managerial change through the railway reform, which is indicated also in the 
interview to VNR. 
 
Introduction of vertical separation in 1995 also had a great impact on the finances 
of VNR, and it made VNR profitable. The audited data, which is shown in nominal 
terms, on revenue and expenditure of VNR is listed in Table 4.6. 
 
Table 4.6  Revenue and Expenditure of VNR                   (million VN Dong)             
Year 1989 1993 1995 1997 2000 2002 2004 
Revenue 89,591 469,835 808,679 948,008 1,196,619 1,460,930 1,850,060
Expenditure 95,488 530,407 803,912 943,724 1,194,870 1,453,219 1,849,910
Balance -5,897 -60,572 4,767 4,284 1,749 7,711 150
Source: ▪Interview to VNR [2/VN] 
 
As vertical separation was introduced in 1995, expenditure after that date does not 
include the maintenance costs of infrastructure, and includes track charges, 10% of 
the operation revenue. This had contributed to reducing the infrastructure 
expenditure. Nevertheless, both the revenue and the expenditure have been 
increasing in total amount. The following factors contributed to the large increase of 
those amounts [2/VN]: 
1. The increase of traffic volume through market-oriented operation;  
2. Revise of the tariff structure for passenger fares and freight rates so as to reflect 
cost-recovery, competitiveness against other modes, service standard, and the 
need to optimize profit; 
3. Increase of foreign investment; 
4. Increase in domestic transport investment including locomotives, rolling stock, 
spare parts, station equipment and others; 
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5. Improvement of non-rail business such as tourism, construction, affiliated 
services, consulting services, and so on. 
 
The Railway Act in 2005 stipulates that the aim of the re-organization of VNR is to 
create favourable conditions for independent, self-controlled and market-oriented 
operation. Establishing transparent financial relationship with Government 
through vertical separation has been also contributing to attain this aim.[2/VN] 
VNR has been trying to develop as a corporation, in which state enterprises operate 
railway infrastructure business, railway transport operation and, where feasible, 
utilizing the ability of other organizations by establishing joint-ventures. 
 
 
4.6.1.2 Indonesia 
 
Although PT.KA has been generating profits since the introduction of vertical 
separation, performance has still not improved significantly in the last 10 years. 
The railway is still frequently facing daily operational and engineering problems 
such as delays, accidents, lack of maintenance, deteriorating condition of rolling 
stock, and so on.(Indonesian Railways, 2002) In 2001 passenger trains were delayed 
on average 36 minutes for departures and 59 minutes for arrivals. The average 
delays for freight trains were more than those for passenger trains. (Indonesian 
Railways, 2005c) 
 
Figure 4.4 shows transition of the railway performance in comparison with the 
real-term GDP. As the trend of the traffic shows, despite the separation of financial 
responsibility of the infrastructure in 1999, PT.KA has been facing some difficulties 
to improve its traffic performance. Even though the absolute transport volumes are 
the highest among ASEAN railways, the rate of increase is not better than other 
ASEAN railways, most of which are stable or steady increase. 
 
Indonesian Railways (2002 p.8) concludes that “policy reform and corporate 
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restructuring are basically directed towards a better national role of rail transport, 
healthy and efficient business, and higher quality of rail transport provision.”  
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       Figure 4.4 Traffic Trends of PT.KA 
       Source:  The World Bank’s Railway Database  
               Indonesian Railways (2005b) 
               International Monetary Fund (2008) 
 
 
Nevertheless, some challenges remained to activate the management of the railway 
further-more. In terms of the organizational structure, PT.KA has been corporatized. 
But all of the shares are owned by Government, and PT.KA must get an approval of 
Government in each important managerial decision such as investment for 
upgrading, and so on. It has been pointed out that the lack of managerial autonomy 
hinders PT.KA from active and liberalized management responsive to the market’s 
demand. [3/ID] 
 
In addition, although the government attached very high priority for initiatives to 
improve performance and to expand the capacity of rail transport, the development 
of the railway sector relies heavily on limited government funding in this type of 
vertical separation. As Section 4.7.2 investigates, lack of the financial abilities of 
the government to fulfil the payment of the stipulated amount of compensation has 
been regarded as the main cause of the failure to perform the smooth railway 
operation. Apparently, although financial flow has not been sufficient even before 
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the reform, this non-fulfilment of the payment resulted in coordination problems 
due to separation of finance between the different entities. 
 
 
4.6.1.3  Tunisia 
 
In 1998 SNCFT underwent a reform of its institutional framework, aiming to 
provide more commercially-oriented rail services by establishing five independent 
transport divisions: 1) Grandes Lignes (Main Lines); 2) Banlieue de Tunis (Tunis 
Suburbs); 3) Banlieue de Sahel (Sahel Suburbs); 4) Fret (Freight); and 5) 
Phosphate.  
 
Each division has independent accounting, and reports its own annual financial 
results as well as transport results in the annual report of SNCFT. This style of the 
report characterizes SNCFT’s distinctive ways of financial management. 
 
The financial management by the five divisions made cost controlling clearer and 
tightened up compared with the former monolithic organisation. Each division has 
become keener to earn the income than before, and started to make efforts to 
increase train speeds and improve services pursuing the profit. [4/TN]  
 
Each division has started seriously considering where investment should be made. 
They also started to decrease unnecessary costs as all maintenance costs are 
allocated according to the usage of the infrastructure by each division. If more than 
one division’ trains use the same track, the maintenance costs of the track are 
divided among the divisions according to their access. This internal financial 
management has resulted in focussing on necessary investment and maintenance, 
and decreasing unnecessary maintenance costs as no division requests needless 
maintenance any more. [4/TN] 
 
The transport performance after 1970 is shown in Figure 4.5 comparing with the 
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real-term GDP. Faced by the severe competition from other transport modes, 
SNCFT faces difficulties to improve its traffic performance for the last decade, and 
has not succeeded in improving its traffic tracking the growth of the real-term GDP 
statistically. 
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       Figure 4.5 Traffic Trends of SNCFT 
       Source: UIC(2005), International Railway Statistics 
              International Monetary Fund (2008) 
 
 
4.6.1.4  Summary  
 
This section examined transition of management of the three state-owned railways 
in terms of how vertical separation influenced their rail operation and management. 
The reults are summarised: 
▪ The government’s financial contribution to the infrastructure through vertical 
separation greatly affected the financial result of the railways, and made it 
balanced. Vertical separation has also contributed to establish transparent 
relationship with the government through stipulating the payment of access 
charges; 
▪ Along with the introduction of vertical separation, conversion of corporate status 
was undertaken in VNR and PT.KA. They have gained more freedom for 
management and more autonomy with self-responsibility; 
76 
▪ In order to achieve more commercially-oriented rail services, the reform of 
organisation structure was also experienced. For example, VNR became a 
multi-member company; PT.KA established several regional divisions; SNCFT 
established five independent transport divisions; 
▪ Traffic output of VNR has improved favourably since the reform. This transition of 
the traffic performance can not be explained by growth of the real-term GDP in 
the country. It was indicated during the interview that the above reform had a 
large influence on the improvement of the management.[2/VN] Nevertheless, 
other railways such as PT.KA still suffer some difficulties mainly due to lack of the 
stipulated amount of compensation by the government. (Explained closely in 
Section 4.7.2) 
 
 
4.6.2 Forms of Private Entry to a Transport Service 
 
As private participation into the railway sector is one of the main aims of the reform 
of these railways, this section investigates how the private sector has entered into 
the rail transport market. 
 
4.6.2.1  Vietnam 
 
1) Regulation for an Entry to the Railway Market 
According to the State-owned Enterprise Law, VNR is authorized to operate the 
railway infrastructure which is assigned by Government, and to perform the 
following main businesses (Vietnam Railways, 2005a p.1): 
1)  Providing railway transport and multi-modal transport services, undertaking 
joint-ventures with domestic and international organizations in railway 
business and other businesses; 
2)  Managing and making best use of the capital, natural resources, land and 
other resources authorized by the State to operate and develop businesses; 
3)  Doing joint-ventures, investing in stocks and shares, buying part of the asset 
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of other enterprises. 
The items 1) and 3) declare that VNR can establish joint-ventures in order to utilize 
the management abilities of other enterprises. Thus other enterprises can enter the 
railway market accessing the State’s network, and the private sector already 
entered the market establishing a joint-venture with VNR. A typical example is 
examined in the following section. 
 
2) Operation by a New Operator in the Passenger Market 
The new company was established in 1999 in order to run passenger transport on 
the Hanoi – Lao Cai 296km length line, in north-west Vietnam. Hanoi Railway 
Passenger Transport Company (HRPTC), which belongs to VNR, signed a contract 
with a foreign investment company, Victoria Sapa, which operates hotels in the 
region. The coaches are owned by HRPTC, and are leased to the new company. 
Victoria Sapa can invest and upgrade these leased coaches with its own funds for its 
tourism business running on the line for seven years, but these upgraded coaches 
must be returned to HRPTC after the lease period expires. In practice, Victoria 
Sapa invested in the coaches, and has been promoting tourism rail transport under 
the name of Victoria Express Train. The new company operates the train service on 
the line between Hanoi and Lao Cai, and promotes sightseeing tours in conjunction 
with its hotels. [2/VN] 
 
The drivers are dispatched from VNR, and the Traffic Control Centre of VNR 
controls the new operator’s trains as well. Thus VNR is practically responsible for 
railway operation and safety of the new company as well. [2/VN] 
 
 
4.6.2.2 Indonesia 
 
One of the main objectives of railway restructuring was the private participation to 
the railway market as mentioned in Section 4.4. Even though the policy issued by 
Government in 1995 stipulates enhancing private sector participation, there is no 
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new entrant as a railway operator. The private participation still concentrated in 
non-core business especially in property.  
 
 
4.6.2.3  Tunisia 
 
1) Regulation for an Entry to the Market 
Under the law established in 1998, SNCFT has concessioning rights for the railway 
network owned by Government. This means that other entities, including private 
companies, need to make a contract with SNCFT in order to access the railway 
networks. 
 
In the passenger sector, one private operator has entered the market under the 
regulation above, and its operation is described in the following section.  
 
In the freight sector, SNCFT is the sole operator, and locomotives are owned by 
SNCFT. Private freight companies can own wagons, and have to make a contract 
with SNCFT for the traction. 
 
2) Operation by a New Entrant in the Passenger Market 
Taking advantages of the new regulations, a new passenger operator, Galilee Travel, 
has entered the market. Galilee Travel is a private company, which is active in 
tourism around Maghreb region. It has made a contract with SNCFT for the 
operation of tourist passenger trains between Metlaoui and Tebadit, both of which 
are in south Tunisia. The trains are named “Lezard Rouge” and the passengers can 
enjoy sightseeing in scene, Selja Gorges, between the two stations. 
 
The new operator rents rolling stock from SNCFT and the drivers are also 
dispatched from SNCFT as shown in Figure 4.6. The new passenger operator 
promotes sale of passenger railway transport and receives the fares from customers. 
It pays a rent for the rolling stock, salaries of the drivers, and a commission to 
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SNCFT.6 [4/TN] 
 
Thus SNCFT is responsible for the new entrant’s essential factors of daily operation 
except service marketing and ticket sales, and the new entrant focuses its efforts 
mainly on marketing and sales promotion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Passengers 
A New Passenger 
Operator 
(Galilee Travel) 
 
SNCFT 
(The main operator) 
 
Fares 
▪ Rent for the rolling stock 
▪ Salary of drivers 
▪ Commission  
▪ Rolling stock 
▪ Drivers 
      Contract 
Figure 4.6 Operations by a New Entrant in the Passenger Market in Tunisia 
Source: Author, based on the interviews to SNCFT [4/TN] 
 
 
4.6.2.4  Summary 
 
The methods of entry to the passenger market as an operator have similarities in 
Vietnam and Tunisia. It has been achieved by way of mutual agreement between a 
private company and the main railway. It takes the form of establishing a 
joint-venture or making a contract with the main railway. Different from European 
railway reform discussed in the next chapter, these methods are not likely to 
promote competition with the main railway. For example, SNCFT receives 
commission and cooperates to promote the sales of the new passenger operator. On 
the other hand, these systems have been working well in order to retain 
coordination between the main railway and the new operator as the main railway 
practically performs the most of the essential factors of daily operation, and they 
                                                  
6  At present, neither SNCFT nor a new passenger operator pays track access charges 
to Government based on the transit scheme.[4/TN] 
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raise little conflicts in between. The interviewees in the two railways did not 
indicate any particular coordination problems between the different entities in this 
type of private participation. [2/VN, 4/TN]  
 
 
4.7 Advantages, Disadvantages and Results  
 
4.7.1 Advantages 
 
Besides the aims of the reform through vertical separation studied in Section 4.4, 
the interview found the following advantages in this type of vertical separation. 
 
1. Improvement of the accounting system and financial management 
The accounting system in VNR has improved and has become clearer through 
vertical separation. It is clearly defined, within the framework of the State-owned 
Enterprise and Regulations of the Corporation, that all Public Service Obligations 
(PSO) which their income can not cover the costs shall be subsidized by Government. 
In fact, VNR has not received any subsidy as the required proven formalities have 
not been settled yet. Therefore, VNR has been trying to improve its accounting 
system in order to clarify the costs of each transport service and submit to 
Government for approval to receive PSO. VNR is aiming to establish a better 
relationship with Government based on the exact accounting. [2/VN] 
 
As described in Section 4.6.1.3, SNCFT has succeeded in tightening its cost control 
by way of establishing five independent transport divisions with their own accounts. 
It was indicated that this kind of line of business organization is effective for 
market-oriented management and internal cost controlling. The improvement of 
financial management and accounting resulted in each division’s more active efforts 
for increasing revenue and decreasing costs. Access charges have become the cost 
for each division, and it has also contributed to decreasing unnecessary 
maintenance costs. [4/TN] 
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2. Development of infrastructure with authority of the state 
In Tunisia, it has become easier to promote infrastructure development projects 
taking up land with authority of the state as the responsibility has been transferred 
from the state-owned railway to the government. [4/TN]  
 
 
4.7.2  Disadvantages  
 
1. Conflicts raised by non-payment of the stipulated amount of compensation 
PT.KA indicated that lack of the stipulated amount of compensation from 
Government was a serious problem for smooth operation of the railway. In 
Indonesia, regulations implementing Public Service Obligations (PSO), 
Infrastructure Maintenance and Operation (IMO), and Track Access Charge (TAC) 
have been established by the Decrees in 1999 issued jointly by the three Ministers, 
Minister of Communications, Minister of Finance, and State Minister of National 
Development Planning. 
 
Thus the Government of Indonesia (GOI) ought to pay the railway for a 
compensation of the PSO, i.e. to operate economy-class passenger trains, which 
tariffs were set by GOI cheaper level than the actually incurred unit costs. GOI, as 
the owner of the rail infrastructure, should also pay the railway for the costs of 
IMO7 conducted by PT.KA. And PT.KA, as an operator and a user of the GOI’s rail 
infrastructure, ought to pay to GOI for the TAC. 
 
These payment schemes have been implemented since fiscal year of 2000. The 
railway would in total receive the following Net Value, which is normally paid in a 
quarterly schedule. 
Net Value = PSO + IMO – TAC 
PSO: Public Service Obligations 
                                                  
7  IMO also includes salaries of engineers in PT.KA working for maintenance of the 
infrastructure. 
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IMO: Infrastructure Maintenance and Operation  
TAC: Track Access Charge 
 
For detail calculations of PSO, IMO and TAC, Inter-Echelon Decree was issued, 
which involves Director General of Land Communications and the Director General 
of National Budget. 
 
Figure 4.7 shows financial flows in the railways in Indonesia, expressing the PSO, 
IMO and TAC. While the mechanism itself has been quite well implemented, 
however, the actual amount paid from year to year was much less than it was 
supposed to be.  
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Figure 4.7 Flow of Finance in the Restructured Railways in Indonesia 
Source: Revise from Arifin, S.J. (2004)      
Despite agreement on the Decrees by the three Ministers, Government could not 
fulfil payment of the stipulated amount of PSO and IMO to PT.KA because of lack of 
resources in GOI. According to Arifin, S.J. (2004 p.158), political change every five 
year period in Indonesia is also regarded as an obstacle to this process. Thus, the 
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funding schemes of PSO, IMO and TAC have not yet been implemented consistently, 
as records are listed in Table 4.7. 
 
 
Table 4.7  The Proposed and Approved Amount of the Net Value  
  (Unit: thousands IDR) 
Year Proposed Amount  
 (by the Ministry of Communications)
Approved Amount  
(by the Directorate General of Budget) 
Deficit 
2000 241,595 59,184 (182,411) 
2001 147,049 59,999 (87,050) 
2002 222,827 161,912 (60,915) 
2003 506,427 354,595 (151,832) 
2004 289,582 140,000 (149,582) 
Source: Indonesian Railways (2005c), Company Profile 
 
As Table 4.7 shows, the approved amount by GOI varies from 24 to 72 percentage of 
the calculation by the Ministry of Communications. This results in lack of stable 
allocation of funds for maintenance of the infrastructure, and is considered as one of 
the most serious problems, which the railway sector in Indonesia has faced after the 
restructuring through vertical separation. [3/ID] 
 
 
4.7.3 Results of the Aims 
 
This section investigates the results of the aims of the reform studied in Table 4.1. 
 
4.7.3.1 Vietnam 
 
(1) As mentioned in the Master Plan in 2020 and Railway Act in 2005, Government 
put an emphasis on infrastructure investment for national network, and the 
investment into the railway sector has improved. 
(2)Private companies already entered the railway market establishing a 
joint-venture with VNR and invested in the railway sector. 
(3) Infrastructure is owned by the state, and responsibilities of the state and VNR 
have been clearly distinguished as it is stipulated in the Railway Act. 
84 
 
Thus the aims of the reform through vertical separation were achieved in Vietnam 
in general. 
 
 
4.7.3.2  Indonesia 
 
(1) Private participation has been attained only in non-core business especially in 
property. 
(2) Despite Government’s priority for improving the railway transport, lack of 
compensation from Government resulted in shortage of stable allocation of 
funds for the infrastructure maintenance. 
(3) Infrastructure is owned by Government, and a number of Decrees clarified the 
responsibility of Government and that for PT.KA. Government started to control 
the construction projects for the development of the railway. 
 
The reform through vertical separation basically directed towards achieving the 
aims. Nevertheless, several issues, particularly non-fulfilment of the compensation 
by Government, remained in order to achieve the aims of the reform in Indonesia.  
 
 
4.7.3.3  Tunisia 
 
(1) The management of SNCFT has become more commercially-oriented through 
the re-organisation, and SNCFT is able to implement a diversified and flexible 
tariff policy. 
(2) Infrastructure is owned by Government, and the financial responsibilities of 
Government and SNCFT were clarified in a contract programme between them. 
(3) Government made investments based on the five-year term plan, and SNCFT 
kept stable traffic performance despite severe competition from other transport 
modes. 
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Thus, the railway reform through vertical separation has taken effect for achieving 
the aims in Tunisia in general. 
 
 
4.8 Conclusion  
 
Compared with other types, the three state-owned railways have similar 
characteristics of vertical separation. In these railways the government owns the 
infrastructure and is responsible for the investment and maintenance of it 
financially, and the main operator performs essential factors of daily operation. In 
brief, vertical separation in these railways is characterized by separation of 
financial responsibilities between the government and the railway. Instead of 
covering the deficit of the railway as a whole, vertical separation clearly stipulated 
the responsibilities of the government and those of the railway.  
 
Despite the separation of the financial responsibilities of the two entities, close 
relationship between the government and the state-owned railway is a specific 
characteristic of this type of vertical separation. The government retains a will to 
revitalize the state-owned railways through commissioning more autonomous 
rights of the management. Different from European railways which are discussed in 
the next chapter, the government has no intention to introduce within-rail 
competition among operators. Instead, it expects the incumbent state-owned 
railway to compete with other transport modes making the most of its engineering 
and operational abilities, and this is the background of introducing vertical 
separation in these countries. 
 
In order to attain the government’s expectation, long/medium-term plans were 
stipulated and the government and the state-owned railway have been trying to 
promote smooth negotiation based on them. These efforts contribute toward 
decreasing some expected coordination problems of financial separation between 
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two parties such as difficulties in planning investment and maintenance of 
infrastructure. Despite these expected coordination problems through separation of 
financial responsibilities, the interviewees did not indicate any serious conflict 
between the government and the state-owned railway except the case in Indonesia, 
where Government has failed to provide stipulated amount of compensation for the 
railway. 
 
In Vietnam and Tunisia, new operators entered the passenger market under an 
agreement with the main operator. These cases are of value to introduce private 
investment into the railway sector as well. In these cases the main operator 
dispatches its drivers, controls trains and makes a timetable taking almost all 
responsibilities of train operation within its networks. They do not have competitive 
relationship each other, and there is no particular dispute between the main 
operator and the new entrant. 
 
In general, the recent reforms in these railways, reinforced by the change of the 
legal status and restructuring of the organization, have made them more active 
even though practically a sole state-owned railway performs the railway operation 
without within-rail competition. The management of the railway has become more 
market-oriented and active through stipulating more flexible tariffs and 
establishing a joint-venture with the private sector. Along with the government’s 
positive financial contribution, these commercial efforts have, in general, resulted 
in the favourable traffic performance as typically shown in the case of Vietnam 
statistically. As the results of the study show, the principal advantage of this type of 
reform is to revitalize the stagnated state-owned railways by means of 
distinguishing the government’s role and the railway’s role mainly in terms of 
financial responsibilities. This kind of reform appears to be applicable to the 
state-owned railway, which can not cover the infrastructure cost by the revenue and 
lost sufficient incentive for attaining efficient operation despite its engineering and 
management capabilities. 
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CHAPTER 5:  
VERTICALLY SEPARATED RAILWAYS WITH COMPETITION 
AMONG OPERATORS 
- SWEDEN, UK, GERMANY, FRANCE AND AUSTRALIA - 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter investigates the railway reform with vertical separation in European 
and Australian Railways. In these railways, several operators started to compete 
each other without discrimination. Specifically, the author examines the reform in 
Swedish Railways (SJ), British Railways (BR), German Railway Corporation (DB 
AG), French National Railways (SNCF) and Australian National Railways (AN).  
 
Firstly, the next section surveys recent EU and Australian policies which reforms of 
the railways in these regions are based on. Then, after reviewing the background 
and outline of the recent reform, the author examines the key issues in each 
railway. 
 
 
5.2 Recent Transport Policy in EU and Australia 
 
5.2.1 Recent Transport Policy in EU 
 
This section reviews recent EU transport policy, which regulates the railway reform 
in European countries, and its principles are studied from the viewpoint of vertical 
separation. 
 
In response to the changes in the transport market and the decline of rail’s share of 
land transport, the European Commission issued a number of Directives as follows. 
 
In July 1991 EC Directive 91/440 was issued for encouraging competition between 
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European’s national rail systems. Specifically, the Directive governs the policy for 
railways for the following key demands (UIC, 2005b): 
▪ to ensure the management independence of railway undertakings; 
▪ to create and operate separate accounts for infrastructure and operations; 
▪ to ensure that infrastructure accounts balance, including government grants for 
specific social obligations; 
▪ to allow open access to each national network for certain types of international 
transport operator (licensed railway undertakings) and for railway undertakings 
from other member states. 
 
The succeeding Directive 95/18 stipulates licensing of railway undertakings. It sets 
common criteria for the issue of licenses to railway undertakings established in the 
European Union. The next Directive 95/19 regulates infrastructure capacity and 
charging. The intention of these Directives was to create genuine competition for 
cross-border rail operations. The background is that “it was thought that the failure 
of the railway in international traffic was partly due to the structure of the industry 
– separate national companies simply passed international traffic from one to 
another at the border with the quality of service determined by the weakest link in 
the chain.”(Nash, C.A., 2007 p.75) “Thus the European Commission set about 
opening up the market for new entrants to come into rail freight transport, 
particularly for international freight, where they might offer through service from 
origin to destination.” (ibid.) 
 
The European Commission has been moving forward to regulate the European 
railway systems further. In 2001, the first so-called railway package was passed, 
designed to extend and increase the effectiveness of the policy of open access. 
Specifically it required that (Nash,C.A., 2005a): 
▪  the body responsible for path allocation and the setting of charges must be 
independent of any transport operator; 
▪  where infrastructure, passenger operations and freight operations are part of 
the same organisation, they must be in separate divisions with separate 
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accounts; 
▪  in each Member State there must be a regulator, to hear appeals and regulate 
access charges, who is independent of the infrastructure manager; 
▪  charges to train operating companies for access to infrastructure must be 
based on direct cost although non-discriminatory mark-ups are allowed in 
cases where a higher level of cost recovery is necessary. 
 
It also demands the infrastructure manager to compile the network statement 
explaining price structure and the conditions for access to the network, to set the 
rules for capacity allocation and so on. Thus it requests the infrastructure manager 
to be responsible for allocating railway infrastructure capacity fairly and without 
discrimination. (UIC, 2005b)  
 
In the Second Railway Package, Directive 2004/51 requires to extend infrastructure 
access rights to rail freight services within a Member State and accelerate the 
opening up of the market.(UIC, 2005b) Thus there is a legal requirement for 
complete open access for international and domestic rail freight throughout the 
European Union since 1st January 2007. Furthermore, in October 2007 the Third 
Railway Package was adopted, and the necessary legal basis was created for 
opening up the market for international rail passenger transport service by 1st 
January 2010. (European Parliament, 2007) 
 
In essence, European Directives do not stipulate about ownership of either the 
operator or the infrastructure. Instead, they ensure that the account for transport 
service and one for railway infrastructure kept separate to secure 
non-discrimination among operators, and prohibit that state aids paid to one of two 
areas transferred to the other. 
 
European international trains had performed their operation following the 
regulations of each State and Railways until the issue of the 1991 Directive. Usually, 
the drivers and conductors had exchanged at the border stations, and each railway 
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had been in responsible for the train operation on its railway networks. To liberalize 
the market, the Directive proposes to allow the international railway undertakings 
to operate railway services in other Member States as it is shown in Figure 5.1. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Model A: Traditional international railway transportation 
Model B: Liberalized international railway transportation including 
cabotage requested by European Directive 
Country A Country B Country C Country D
Border 
Country A Country B Country C Country D
Border 
International trains follow the regulations of each State and Railway, and each 
Railway is responsible for the train operation on its railway networks. 
International railway undertakings are allowed to operate railway services on 
routes inside a Member State (cabotage). 
    Figure 5.1 Change of Access Models Requested by the European Directive  
    Source: Revise from Hori, M. (2000) 
 
      
Article 1 of EC Directive 91/440 refers to separation between infrastructure 
management and transport operations as separation of accounts being compulsory 
and organizational or institutional separation being optional. Thus, the three types 
of vertical separation which the EC Directive provides are shown in Figure 5.2. 
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Type 2: Organizational Separation 
Type 1: Separation of Accounts 
Figure 5.2 The Three Separation Types Stipulated by EC Directives 
 
 *:  ‘International grouping’ shall mean an association established by at least two railway 
undertakings in different Member States for the purpose of providing international 
transport services between Member States. 
 
     Source: ▪ Author’s Revision from Hori, M. (2000) 
            ▪ European Commission (1991)  
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The author defined “vertical separation” in Section 2.4.1, and briefly explained as 
the situation where the owner of the infrastructure does not provide the given rail 
service over the given piece of infrastructure itself. Type 1, separation of accounts, 
means that the owner of infrastructure also provides the railway service. Thus the 
author regards this type as vertical integration.1  
 
It is arguable whether Type 2, organizational separation, is within the scope of the 
author’s definition of vertical separation or not. Certainly, many published papers 
regard this type as an integrated structure. This is because two divisions, 
infrastructure and operation, work together within a common holding structure, 
and this holding structure, rather than each division, can be regarded as the sole 
legally and financially independent railway enterprise.2 Nevertheless, it also has 
characteristics of vertical separation in the respect that one division practically 
holds and operates track network and it accepts access charges from internal 
divisions of the railway undertakings as well as from other railway undertakings. 
In order to discuss variety models of railway structure and to compare with other 
types, the author investigates this type in the case of Germany.   
 
In Type 3, infrastructure manger and railway undertakings are legally and 
financially independent institutions. Thus the structure follows the definition of 
vertical separation explained in Section 2.4.1. 
 
 
5.2.2 Recent Transport Policy in Australia 
 
Since 1995 the policy reform task in the rail sector has been pursued by Australian 
                                                  
1  The relationship between the main railway which owns infrastructure and other 
railway undertakings accessing the infrastructure forms vertical separation. 
 
2  Vertical separation, defined in Section 2.4.1, presupposes that: 1) there are legally 
and financially independent institutions for providing the services; and 2) the 
institution which owns the infrastructure and the one which provides services should 
be separated. 
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Governments through the application of the general provision of the National 
Competition Policy agreements and a series of inter-governmental agreements 
designed to address institutional and regulatory barriers to competition.  
 
The major competition policy reforms which were demanded in the rail sector 
include (OECD, 2005 p.3): 
▪ Application of competitive neutrality principles through the commercialisation, 
corporatisation, and in many cases subsequent privatisation of government 
rail businesses; 
▪ The enacting of access regimes to provide third party access to essential rail 
facilities in all mainland jurisdictions through State-based rail access 
legislation; 
▪ Establishing regulatory pricing and rail access oversight institutions; and 
▪ Introduction of specific policies to promote competition “for” and “in” the 
market including franchise arrangements.  
 
Thus, all railways (whether state or privately-owned) are subjected to the 
Commonwealth Act, which sets out the rules prohibiting certain anti-competitive 
conduct. They may be regulated under an access regime, and most Australian 
States have also developed their own access regimes. 
 
 
5.2.3 Summary 
 
As the next section investigates, the background of the railways in these two 
regions, Europe and Australia, have several similarities: 
▪ Each railway has been developed as an state-owned integrated railway; 
▪ Each railway has introduced its own technical systems within the states even if a 
railway line goes through different states. For example, a wide variety of 
signalling systems, electrification and safety rules exist around Europe; 
▪ Because of the above background, it has not been easy for a specific railway 
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operator to access smoothly to the track which is owned by a different 
organization; 
▪ Because of the barrier for mutual access, railway transport has lost its 
competitiveness gradually, especially in the freight sector; 
▪ Smooth cross-border transport in the railway sector has been required to compete 
with road transport in recent years. 
 
The current transport policies in Europe and Australia aim to resolve the above 
similar problems. It can be expected that this background had resulted in adopting 
the transport policies, which have quite similar characteristics: 
▪ ensuring the management independence of railway undertakings (fostering 
competitive neutrality between rail operators); 
▪ promoting access for third parties to essential rail facilities based on legislations; 
▪ establishing regulatory pricing and rail access oversight institutions; 
▪ promoting competition within railway market. 
 
 
5.3 The Background and Outline of the Recent Reform 
 
This section investigates the background and outline of the recent reform through 
vertical separation in the four European railways and Australian National 
Railways. 
 
 
5.3.1 Sweden 
 
Sweden was the first country in Europe to introduce vertical separation into 
state-railways. Until 1988 the Swedish State Railways (SJ) was a state-owned 
business administration with a monopoly position by means of laws and regulations. 
The majority of passenger services were unprofitable, but were considered 
important for socio-economic and political reasons. (CER, 2005) “SJ suffered from 
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trying to perform services on a network that was under-capitalised. Once a line 
started to make losses, infrastructure investments typically came to a halt, 
eventually influencing the traffic and making things even worse. For the state, it 
was difficult to grant more money to SJ, partly because it could be seen as unfair 
from the view of other transportation companies, and partly because it was difficult 
to monitor how SJ actually spent the money. Setting up the national authority 
Banverket (BV) made it much easier to increase public spending on the railways, 
since the all the money was channelled to a national authority rather than to a 
specific operator in the transportation industry.” (ibid. p.51) 
 
In 1988 management of infrastructure became the responsibility of BV. “It 
implemented a systematic reform of its rail system … with the apparent aim of 
putting rail infrastructure on a comparable basis to road in terms of the pricing, 
planning and funding of investment. But at the same time, regional governments 
became responsible for planning and funding regional services, and received the 
right to use competitive tendering to procure such services.” (Nash, C.A., 2005a p.6) 
New freight operators were allowed to enter the market where the state-owned 
operator no longer wished to run services, and since 1996 the principal model in use 
for the railway freight sector is on-track competition through “open access”. SJ AB, 
formerly the passenger division of SJ, still holds legal monopoly in profitable 
inter-regional passenger services, but over the succeeding years competitive 
tendering has been expanded to cover the passenger services that are unprofitable. 
A new state authority, Rikstrafiken, has become responsible for competitive 
tendering of these commercially unviable inter-regional passenger services since 
January 2000.(CER, 2005) 
 
Following afore-mentioned EC’s first railway package, in July 2004, a new railway 
law and regulation took effect and a new Swedish Railway Agency was established. 
Besides the tasks regarding safety, it is responsible for monitoring the track access 
charges, capacity allocation, service provision so that they are determined securing 
non-discrimination among operators. It also issues a license to an operator who 
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wishes to operate rail services on the network. (CER, 2005 p.46) 
 
 
5.3.2 UK 
 
British Railways (BR) was radically reformed during the period 1994-1997. It was 
still owned by the government in 1994, but the railway operation had been 
transferred to the private sector by 1997.(Pollitt, M.G. and Smith, A.S.J., 2002) BR 
was divided into a number of entities and the process is outlined as follows (Kain, P., 
1998 p.248): 
▪ Railtrack became the sole owner and manager for the entire railway 
infrastructure, and was sold in 1996 to the private sector through flotation on the 
stock market; 
▪ The right to run the ex-BR passenger trains was franchised to 25 private sector 
train operating companies (TOCs), through the newly created (passenger) 
Franchising Director; 
▪ BR’s freight train operations (including rolling stock) were split into six 
companies, and two companies bought them; 
▪ BR’s passenger rolling stock was sold to three rolling stock leasing companies 
(ROSCOs), and these companies lease vehicles to train operators; 
▪  Many subcontracting companies were created, mainly to maintain and improve 
infrastructure.  
 
Behind the reform of BR, in addition to the government’s strong intention to 
perform privatization of BR, it was aimed to promote competitions within the 
railway sector. It was intended that new operators are able to enter the railway 
market with low amount of initial costs (sunk costs), and designed so that they do 
not need to buy neither infrastructure nor rolling stock. After the reform new 
entrants need to pay only running costs of the railway operation in practice. [6/UK] 
 
The restructuring of BR represents one of the most extreme cases of vertical 
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separation, which fragmented the state railway, and the outline of the reformed 
industry structure is shown in Figure 5.3. 
 
The infrastructure was transferred to a separate company, Railtrack, which was 
subsequently privatised. Nevertheless, the crash at Hatfield highlighted the 
worsening maintenance condition of the network and the following year, in October 
2001, the government withdrew support for Railtrack and placed it in 
administration. Then, Railtrack was replaced by Network Rail, a new ‘not-for 
dividend’ organization limited by guarantee. (Rail Freight Group, 2007 p.6) 
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       Figure 5.3  The British New Rail Industry in 1996-7 
       Source: Kain, P. (1998)  
         
 
Through the reforms, the following two regulatory bodies were established: 1) the 
independent regulator, named the Office of the Rail Regulator (ORR), set up by the 
government as an independent statutory office principally to regulate Railtrack; 2) 
Franchising Director, named the Office of Passenger Rail Franchising (OPRAF), 
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which was mainly responsible for awarding franchises, paying subsidies, and 
regulating the TOCs. (Pollitt, M.G. and Smith, A.S.J., 2002) These two regulatory 
bodies were responsible for overseeing the fragmented companies. Especially, the 
ORR played a role “to promote competition and prevent anti-competitive behaviour, 
to protect the interests of customers and rail operators, and to preserve the benefits 
of a national rail network.”(Montagu. N. 1994 p.5) It had a role “to ensure that 
monopoly power [of Railtrack] is not abused and to settle disputes which may arise 
between Railtrack and train operators. For example, while timetable disputes 
should be resolved based on negotiation among the parties, the ORR had the 
important role to settle such disputes on appeal.(ibid.) Its other functions included 
“ensuring that Railtrack achieves infrastructure ‘stewardship’ objectives of timely 
maintenance, timely renewal and replacement, and enhancement of the network.” 
(Kain, P. 2006 p.252) Thus the ORR independently reviewed Railtrack’s investment 
levels in order that the government shall appropriate funds for the railway sector.  
   
In the case of UK, the author investigates the vertical separation which a privatized 
infrastructure manager, Railtrack, had owned and managed the infrastructure in 
order to contrast with other cases, where it is owned and managed by a State 
Corporation/Administration. 
 
 
5.3.3 Germany 
 
Germany undertook a different fundamental reform, and DB AG was established in 
January 1994 absorbing the former West German DB and East German DR. 
 
In 1999 DB AG was converted into a holding company with shares owned by the 
state, and it still has the right to manage the rail infrastructure as Figure 5.4 shows. 
But it must grant third parties access without discrimination and under control of a 
neutral authority. (Häfner, P.,1996 p.27) 
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Figure 5.4  The Deutsche Bahn Structure in 2007 
Source
  
 
: Revised from Thompson, L. (2001)  
 
Another major change in 1996 was the ‘regionalisation’ which brought a shift of 
organisational and financial responsibilities for regional passenger services from 
the Federal government to the 16 individual states. It is investigated in Section 
5.6.2.  
 
The railway reform was originally planned to achieve institutional separation 
between infrastructure and operation in the future as Figure 5.5 shows. But the 
strategy committee considered that splitting off DB network will bring considerable 
risk and loss of synergies, and also go against the aims of German railway reform. 
The agreement in November 2006 chose the approach which would give DB AG the 
possibility to operate rail services and infrastructure as a financial unit.(RGI, 2006)  
 
As it is similar to the former two countries, in 1994, Germany also established a 
regulator, named the Federal Railway Authority, and operators retain rights to 
appeal. In 2006, though technical approval and regulation is still covered by Federal 
Railway Authority, the task of the regulator for railway infrastructure access and 
possibility to appeal has been transferred to the Federal Network Agency. In 2006, 
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there have been 73 appeals.3 However, the task of the Agency is to avoid conflicts on 
the network in advance, and works pro-active such as changing rules in Network 
Statement for non-discrimination. [7/DE]  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      Figure 5.5  Steps in German Railway Reform 
      Source: Revise of Link,H.(1994) 
 
 
 
Despite the insistence by DB AG4, the strong criticisms are expressed against the 
above-mentioned approach through organizational separation on the basis that “it 
                                                  
3  The author could not perform interviews to new entrants in the rail market in order 
to get a clear view about this issue.  
4  The interviewee explains that: 1) very few operators appeal to the Authority due to 
“bad access”; 2) there is nearly no space for discrimination due to the very strict and 
detailed laws in Germany.[7/DE] 
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 Nevertheless, this process is still hotly 
argued in the country.   
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is inadequate to ensure fair on-rail competition, arguing strongly in favour of a 
complete separation of operations and infrastructure.”(RGI, 2007a p.338) As these 
different opinions show, the future direction has been hotly argued in the country. 
         
 
5.3.4  France 
 
The French Law of February 1997 created a state-owned enterprise the French 
Railways Infrastructure Authority (RFF) to assume the management and 
development of, and investment in, the national rail infrastructure. The ownership 
of the assets making up the infrastructure was transferred to RFF. (Harris, K., 
2005) 
 
“The 1998 agreement between RFF and SNCF on traffic management on the 
national network and network maintenance specifies that SNCF receives an annual 
lump sum payment in consideration of the following three missions” (CER, 2005 
p.98): 
▪ Setting out the organizational system for all the traffic on the railway network, 
the working timetable, also termed the “graphic train diagram”; 
▪ Management of the traffic control and safety systems, and of train operations; 
▪ Monitoring, regular maintenance, repairing and other trouble-shooting and 
measures necessary for the network’s functioning and safety. 
 
Thus, France established an independent state-owned infrastructure manager but 
SNCF also performs the above-mentioned “below-rail” functions operationally. This 
relationship is a distinct characteristic of vertical separation in France. 
 
In the freight sector, although it is regarded access barriers are high 5 , the 
transposition of the EU First Railway Package into French law was accomplished 
by a Decree in 2003, and then the EU regulation required full opening of the rail 
                                                  
5  IBM Business Consulting Service and Kirchner (2004) notes that France offers 
restrictive market access conditions for new RUs. 
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freight market since 2007. France is also planning to establish an independent 
regulator in order to ensure non-discriminatory access to the national network in 
2009. (RGI, 2008) 
 
In the passenger sector, though regionalization has been implemented since 2002, 
the Regions, transport organizing authorities for regional services, must deal with 
SNCF at present. (CER, 2005) 
 
 
5.3.5  Australia 
 
Since early 1990s, the most railway industry had been vertically integrated modal 
monopolies, covering both the passenger and the freight operations. Each 
Australian state railway retained responsibilities for the rail network within its 
borders. Australian National Railways (AN) was one of the vertically integrated 
statutory corporations owned by the Australian Federal Government and 
responsible for operating both passenger and freight services. (Greig, D. et al, 2005) 
 
In 1997, the Australian Federal Government offered AN for sale to the private 
sector, and AN was unbundled into several separate components. However, AN’s 
interstate infrastructure was not sold and this residual portion of AN was renamed 
AN Access Corporation and continued to provide access to other operators. In the 
same year, the Federal Government and States reached agreement to establish 
national arrangements for access by all operators to the interstate rail network. It 
was further agreed that the Commonwealth establish the Australian Rail Track 
Corporation (ARTC) as a Commonwealth owned company under Corporation Law. 
ARTC was incorporated in February 1998 and its foundation asset was the residual 
AN Access Corporation which had remained in Government ownership. (ibid.)  
 
The policy of the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) 
addresses the institutional and regulatory barriers in the rail sector to competition. 
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Based on this policy ACCC approved the access regime of ARTC for the interstate 
freight track in 2002, and national arrangements for access by all operators to the 
interstate rail network were established. (OECD, 2005)  
 
 
5.3.6 Summary 
 
Certainly, each of the railways discussed in this chapter is obliged to follow the 
similar transport policies, which are described in Section 5.2. Nevertheless, the 
outline of the reform through vertical separation and the approaches to adapt to the 
policies vary so much.  
 
Germany adopted organizational separation placing infrastructure and operation 
under the holding company. Other four countries adopted institutional separation. 
Nevertheless, in France, Gallois, L. (2002) notes that he aimed to keep vertically 
integrated control to achieve efficient operation and safety.  Based on this intention 
SNCF performs most of the essential factors of railway operation including making 
working timetable, traffic control, regular maintenance of infrastructure and other 
related works.[8/FR] In Sweden, UK, Australia (ARTC), infrastructure and 
operation have been completely separated into different institutions in order to 
promote new entry into the railway services without discrimination. 
 
Although the above-mentioned different models have different implications for fair 
access, as a safeguard in the system, it is stipulated that there must be a regulator 
of track access and a right of appeal. 
 
 
5.4 Aims of the Reform through Vertical Separation 
 
Aims of the reform through vertical separation in the four European railways and 
AN are summarised as Table 5.1.  
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Table 5.1 Aims of the Reform through Vertical Separation in the Four European 
Railways and AN 
Country (Railway) Aims of the reform through vertical separation 
Sweden (SJ) 
 
(1) To put railways on an equal footing with roads by 
institutionally separating infrastructure from service 
operations. This is one reason why Banverket was made a 
government agency, operated in the same way as the national 
Road Administration.  
(2) To continue financial support to the sector, as railway is 
regarded as a uniquely safe and environmentally friendly 
means of transport. Especially, it was intended to arrange for 
subsidies to secondary, low-density lines, by way of 
transferring the responsibility for commercially unviable 
traffic over these lines to regional transport authorities.  
UK (BR) 
 
(1) To create many new opportunities for private sector 
involvement for the following objectives: 
▪  greater responsiveness to the customer; 
▪  higher quality of railway services; 
▪  better value for money for the public who travel by rail. 
(2) To introduce competition through greater involvement of the 
private sector and to end BR’s monopoly in the operation of 
services. 
Germany (DB AG) 
 
(1) To shift more traffic to rail. 
(2) To limit the financial burden caused by rail transport for the 
tax payer to a tolerable level. 
(3) To achieve the economic viability of DB AG by 
entrepreneurial management. 
France (SNCF) 
 
The following two intentions were indicated behind the railway 
reform of SNCF. [8/FR] 
(1) To follow EC Directives. 
(2) To realize integrated control. 
Australia (AN) 
 
ARTC was created for the following aims. 
(1) to enact access regimes to provide third party access to the 
National interstate rail network promoting competition “in” 
the market.  
(2) to improve the interstate rail infrastructure to increase the 
share of interstate freight carried by rail. 
Source:  
▪ Interviews/questionnaires to the railways. [5/SE, 6/UK, 7/DE, 8/FR, 9/AU] 
▪ Sweden: Nilsson, J.E. (2002)  
▪ UK: Department of Transport, UK (1992)  
▪ Germany: Nagel, R. (2005)  
▪ Australia: ARTC (2005)  
 
 
As the table shows, these railways adopted various approaches to EC Directive and 
Australian competition policies for achieving their own aims of the reform.  
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5.5 Forms and Implementation of the Vertical Separation 
 
5.5.1 Forms of the Vertical Separation 
 
The forms of the vertical separation in the four European Railways and ARTC are 
summarised as Table 5.2. 
 
Table 5.2 Forms of the Vertical Separation in the Four European Railways and 
ARTC 
Infrastructure Manager（IM）: Type of IM Country  
(Type of Vertical Separation) Relationship between freight and passenger services 
Banverket (BV) : the National Rail Administration Sweden  
 
(Institutional Separation) 
Freight and passenger operations are performed by 
different operators. 
Railtrack: a privatized company UK 
 
(Institutional Separation) 
Freight and passenger operations were performed by 
different operators. 
DB Netz : A corporation under the holding company DB AG Germany 
 
(Organizational Separation) 
Freight and passenger operations are performed by 
separated organization under the holding of DB AG with 
other new entrants.  
French Railways Infrastructure Authority (RFF) 
 : A state-owned enterprise
France 
 
(Institutional Separation) Freight and passenger operations are performed by 
different divisions of the dominant operator (SNCF) with a 
few new entrants in the freight sector.  
Australian Rail Track Corporation (ARTC) :  
                    : A Commonwealth-owned company  
Australia (ARTC) 
 
(Institutional Separation) Freight and passenger operations are performed by 
different operators. 
Source: Author  
 
 
As Table 5.2 shows, following EC Directive and Australian transport policy, these 
railways have introduced vertical separation at least in terms of organizational 
independence. 
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5.5.2 Implementation of the Vertical Separation 
 
5.5.2.1 Organizational Structure and Management with Vertical Separation 
 
The implementation form of the vertical separation and its management are shown 
in Appendix 3. From the viewpoint of vertical separation, characteristics of each 
factor of railway operation are summarized as follows. 
 
(Infrastructure) 
▪ The process of the investment varies even though the most of its finance comes 
from the public sector. For example, in Sweden, France and Australia, the 
government actively provided the state-owned infrastructure manager with the 
resources to carry out the enhancement programme needed to fulfil the transport 
objectives.[5/SE, 8/FR, 9/AU] In Germany the infrastructure manager negotiated 
with the concerned parties for the project as an independent company. [7/DE] 
▪  At the planning stage of a project, close negotiation between the infrastructure 
manager and the investor, such as the government or local governments, are at 
least required. In addition to the above entities, the train operator also joins in the 
negotiation in some cases such as in France and Australia.[8/FR, 9/AU] It is for 
confirming the train operation plan after the completion of the project. Thus, the 
number of concerned parties has increased, and negotiation for the planning has 
become more complicated and takes longer time than an integrated railway. 
[8/FR] 
 
(Maintenance Works of Infrastructure and Tracks) 
▪ In Sweden, UK, Germany and Australia the infrastructure manager plans and 
orders the maintenance works, and other engineering contactors perform the 
works. The infrastructure manager takes responsibility of the works, and inspects 
or examines the engineering works performed by the contractors. 
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▪ In France, RFF only stipulates the quality of the works, and contracts out all of the 
maintenance works to SNCF. As SNCF plans and performs all of the maintenance 
works, fundamentally, SNCF takes responsibility of the works. The above process 
is intended to decrease coordination problems between the two. Nevertheless, 
sometimes, there are conflicts between SNCF and RFF. For example, RFF thinks 
that SNCF does not need additional funds to carry out sufficient maintenance if 
SNCF uses it wisely, whereas SNCF insists that it is necessary to increase the 
amount of track maintenance for keeping the track condition.6 (Le Monde, 2004) 
▪ Interviewees think that track condition largely depends on the quantity of 
engineering works, and that vertical separation does not have much direct 
influence on the condition of the infrastructure. [6/UK, 9/AU] 
 
(Rolling Stock) 
▪ In Sweden and UK (the passenger sector), the owners of rolling stock were shifted 
from the former monolithic railways to other independent entities such as the 
local transport authorities, and leasing companies. This is because it is intended 
that new operators should easily enter the rail transport market. In Australia a 
rolling stock leasing industry has developed according as new operators enter the 
rail market. [9/AU] 
 
(Timetable and Operation) 
▪ In France, SNCF controls daily train operation. In other four countries the 
infrastructure manager performs train control and signalling. 
▪ In the process of timetabling, each operator applies for time-slots and the 
infrastructure manager allocates infrastructure capacity fairly and without 
discrimination. This is based on the EC Directive or the Australian transport 
policy, and this process is common in all the five railways. 
▪ In the case of complete separation (Sweden, UK and Australia), based on the 
application for the slots, the infrastructure manager does slot allocation and also 
makes timetable. Nevertheless, the data must be exchanged between the 
                                                  
6  This issue was striking at the time of speed restriction of 1500km additional track in 
2004, and the two entities blamed each other facing the problem. (Le Monde, 2004) 
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infrastructure manager and a number of operators as shown in Figure 5.6. This 
procedure has become more complicated compared with an integrated railway, 
where those information exchanges and every operational decision such as slot 
allocation and timetabling can be done within an organisation flexibly. [6/UK] 
▪ In these cases the infrastructure manager has difficulties to coordinate the 
operators’ application especially in the following cases [5/SE, 6/UK, 7/DE, 9/AU]: 
1) in a case infrastructure capacity is limited; 
2) in a case several operators apply for the same time-slots; 
3) in a case time schedule for maintenance works are difficult to be secured. 
 
 
 
The Infrastructure Manager 
Ex) Banverket, Railtrack, ARTC 
Operator 1 Operator 2 Operator 3 Operator4, 
Communication 1 Ex) question, confirmation, asking modification 
Slot application 
1 
2 Communication 2 Ex) answer, agreement 
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.6  Procedure for Making a Timetable in Sweden, UK and ARTC 
    Source: Author,  
           based on interviews/questionnaire to the three railways [5/SE, 6/UK, 9/AU] 
 
▪ In Germany, all operators have to stay in relation with DB Netz, as they have to 
apply for time slots on DBs network. This is a standardized process, being the 
same for DBs own operational companies, and the freight organization of DB 
(named “Railion”) also has to follow the same procedure as any other operator to 
get a time slot. DB Netz is not allowed to communicate any information on private 
operators to DBs own operators for competition reasons.7 German Federal Agency 
                                                  
7  Some private, small freight operators have cooperation agreements with DBs freight 
operator (Railion). DB transports the goods via long distances whereas the 
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ensures that DBs infrastructure is independent. [7/DE] 
▪ In France, SNCF makes working timetable based on the slot allocation by RFF 
since 2003. Figure 5.7 shows the procedure of timetabling by the two entities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Step 1: Slot allocation within SNCF and other affiliated operators 
Thalys
SNCF Path Service 
      Figure 5.7  Procedure for Making a Timetable in France 
      Source: Author, based on interview to SNCF [8/FR] 
        
 
As Step 1, ‘SNCF Path Service’, one of the divisions of SNCF, coordinates the slot 
application not only from train service divisions of SNCF but also from other 
joint-venture companies such as Eurostar and Thalys International SC. After 
                                                                                                                                                  
cooperation partner is distributing it into the regions. Other operators are completely 
independent and in competition with Railion. As a consequence, their contract with 
DB is limited to the infrastructure. [7/DE] 
Other Operators 1
   Ex) Europorte 2 
SNCF BH 
<Timetabling Office> 
1
2 3
4 5 
6
prohibited 
Step 2: Slot allocation by RFF 
Step 3: Making working timetable by SNCF 
SNCF Freight Eurostar
SNCF Inter-Regional Trains
Other 
International 
Groupings 
RFF 
SNCF Regional Trains 
Other Operators 2 
   Ex) CFTA Cargo 
Other Operators 3,4,･･
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coordinating the slot application within ‘SNCF Path Service’, the coordinated data 
is transferred to RFF, the infrastructure manager.  
 
As Step 2, RFF coordinates slot applications including those from other operators, 
which have entered to the freight rail market. Then, RFF transfers the combined 
time slot data to ‘SNCF BH’, timetabling office of SNCF, to ask to make working 
timetable, which is a detail timetable for train operation. 
 
As Step 3, ‘SNCF BH’ makes working timetable. Nevertheless, frequently ‘SNCF 
BH’ finds questions about the combined time slot data, or sometimes find some 
incorrect data. Before the reform, within one organisation ‘SNCF BH’ could 
confirm the questions or could ask to modify the data by contacting ‘SNCF Path 
Service’ very easily, for example by direct phone. Nevertheless, as it has been 
regulated that slot allocation should be performed by the infrastructure manager, 
it is prohibited for ‘SNCF BH’ to confirm or ask modification to ‘SNCF Path 
Service’ directly as it used to do. Instead of that, ‘SNCF BH’ has to ask questions 
about slot allocation to RFF, and RFF is going to ask them to ‘SNCF Path Service’. 
The answer from ‘SNCF Path Service’ is going to be transferred to ‘SNCF BH’ by 
way of RFF again. 
 
This internal procedure within rail industry has become more complicated than 
before and takes much longer time than an integrated railway’s procedure.[8/FR] 
There are some possibilities that smooth information transmission process will be 
realized by means of better information technology system. But at present it takes 
much more works, and resulted in loss of flexibility of timetabling such as quick 
scheduling of special trains. [8/FR]                                 
 
 
5.5.2.2 Relationship among Different Parties and Relevant Issues 
 
The current railway operation/management in terms of relationship among 
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different parties and safety issues are identified as Appendix 4. From the viewpoint 
of vertical separation, they are summarized as follows. 
 
(Relationship between operators on the same track) 
▪ In case several operators are on the same track, sometimes disputes are raised 
among them. Disputes are raised especially in the following cases: [5/SE, 6/UK, 
9/AU] 
1)  in a case an operator is faced with an accident or traffic delay because of 
other operator’s responsibility; 
2)  in a case of coordinating timetable within a limited infrastructure capacity.8 
 
(Relationship between infrastructure and an operator) 
▪  Vertical separation clearly stipulated the financial responsibilities of the 
infrastructure manager and those of the operator. 9  Each entity has an 
independent account, and they are inter-related by payment of access charges. 
▪  A principle for setting access charges varies largely according to the countries. 
For example, Sweden aims to improve rail’s ability to compete with road transport 
and the access charge covers only a part of Banverket’s payment for operation and 
maintenance, whereas Germany intends to allocate the total costs (excluding 
investment and renewal costs).  
▪  In some cases, the amount of access charges becomes complaints of the 
operators.[8/FR] Additionally, many of the disputes between infrastructure and 
operators are raised in the following cases [9/AU]: 
1) in a case of differing interpretations of the infrastructure manager’s decision 
                                                  
8  Along with its rules for slot allocation and train control, the infrastructure manager 
has a dedicated section for settling conflicts. When the conflict is not settled through 
the coordination by the infrastructure manager, they ask settlements to the 
independent regulator and finally they take legal action. The significant conflicts 
between the operators are not often, nevertheless they sometimes happen.[5/SE, 6/UK, 
9/AU] 
 
9  Vertical separation clearly stipulated financial responsibilities for infrastructure (the 
government) and railways in the cases in Chapter 4 as well. The main intention of the 
cases in the former chapter was to allow management freedom of the state-railway 
reducing the government’s intervention and its direct subsidies. On the other hand, 
the main intention in the cases in this chapter is promoting within-rail competition 
promoting new entry into the rail market.  
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rules for train priority; 
2) in a case of sudden planning of engineering works, which results in cutting 
scheduled trains. 
▪ Even though it is intended to realize an integrated control some conflicts have 
been raised also in France. Before the reform of SNCF, staff have been trained to 
perform various works without thinking whether the works are for a railway 
undertaking or for an infrastructure manager. For example, there are many 
manual switches especially in local lines. Even though turning the switches are 
works for an infrastructure manager, SNCF drivers have been trained and 
performed this kind of works as it results in operational efficiency. (It is not 
efficient to allocate the infrastructure manager’s staff to turn each manual switch 
in local lines.) Nevertheless, some of the new operators hesitate to perform this 
kind of infrastructure controlling works and insist on performing only train 
running. Thus, the interviewee worries that too much specialization results in 
inefficiency and loss of ‘railway-men spirits’ which wish for improvement of the 
railway operation as a whole. [8/FR] 
 
(Safety Issues) 
▪ In vertically separated railways it must be determined whether the operator or the 
infrastructure manager is responsible for the accident once it happened. It is 
because, in most cases, the responsible entity must compensate other entities 
within the railway industry as well. This is different from an integrated railway, 
where compensation is not paid within one entity, and a cause of accident is 
mainly investigated in order to prevent the similar accidents in the future. [6/UK] 
▪ So far some discussions have been held regarding safety issues of vertically 
separated railways. For example, although many people believe that safety has 
deteriorated on the privatized railway, Evans, A.W.(2004) found that the safety 
performance continued to improve in UK. Nevertheless, the interviewees 
expressed that procedure to settle down disputes concerning safety issues has 
become more complicated under vertically separated railways. [5/SE, 6/UK, 8/FR, 
9/AU] 
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▪ Independent regulator performs arbitration concerning safety conflicts among 
different entities in the vertically separated railways. Thus, generally, vertical 
separation requires additional coordination among separated entities. [6/UK] 
▪ At the time of accidents or compensation for train delays, in some cases conflicts 
between different entities can not be settled down in spite of the regulator’s efforts. 
Then, it can happen that they take legal actions within the rail industry. [5/SE, 
9/AU] 
▪ Australian experience suggests that appropriate measures ensuring ongoing 
collaboration in wheel and rail interface issues largely contribute to reduce 
negative effects on safety.10[9/AU]  
 
As summarized above, there are some conflicts among different entities in vertically 
separated railways. In general, these matters have to be resolved as a part of the 
management contracts in vertically separated railways, whereas the conflicts are 
internalised within the same organisation in vertically integrated railways. 
 
 
5.6 Transition of Management of the Railways  
 
5.6.1 Freight Traffic Service  
1) Economic Growth in the four European Countries 
In order to examine the transition of the freight traffic in Section 5.6.1 and the 
passenger traffic in Section 5.6.2, firstly, the transition of real-term GDP in the four 
European Countries is investigated. Figure 5.8 shows the trends of the real-term 
GDP in the four European countries since 1991, and it reveals that the national 
economy in these countries has progressed steadily over the years.11  
                                                  
10  Examples of such collaboration on the ARTC network are trackside installations to 
remotely monitor rolling stock condition. They are continuously provided to ARTC and 
the operator of the trains concerned. ARTC also makes available to rail operators 
track geometry data derived from track recording vehicles that shows trends in track 
condition over time. 
 
11  During the 15 years since 1991, the real-term GDP in each country has progressed 
by the following rates: Sweden (47%), UK (50%), Germany (24%), and France (33%). 
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Figure 5.8 Trends of Real-term GDP in the four EU Countries 
 Source: International Monetary Fund (2008) 
 
 
2) Procedure for an Entry into the Market 
In these railways, it has become common that several rail freight undertakings 
operate on the same tracks competing with each other. All of the five railways 
already introduced the regulation of “open access” in the freight sector. Especially, 
not less than 10 freight operators perform freight rail services in Sweden and 
Australia, and more than 100 undertakings operate in the freight market in 
Germany even though the most of them are small. (JRTT, 2006) 
 
The procedure to enter into the freight rail market in these countries is similar and 
explained in Figure 5.9.  
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(1) A potential rail operator obtains a licence/safety certificate. 
*  This is a demanding process which can take some time to 
achieve and may require substantial investment.  
   The Rail Agency/Regulator of each country issues it b
on the requirements set out in the rail safety legislat
ased 
ion. 
(2) A potential rail operator makes an access contract with the 
infrastructure manager. 
Figure 5.9 Procedure for an Entry into the Freight Market in EU Railways and ARTC 
Source: Author, based on the interviews to the railways. [5/SE, 6/UK, 7/DE, 8/FR, 9/AU] 
 
 
3) Trends of the Freight Transport 
The way of managing the rail transport operation, such as slot allocation and 
timetabling, has become more complicated as examined in the former section. 
Despite its complex structure of the rail industry, on-track competition in the 
freight rail market has become common, and trends of the transport performances 
in rail freight market in the four European countries12 are shown in Figure 5.10. 
 
In Sweden, UK and Germany, liberalization of the freight market has been 
progressed based on open access. In these countries, the rail freight performances 
took an up-turn in the last decade. In France, liberalisation of the freight market is 
relatively slow. Although a few operators have entered to the freight market since 
2004, practically the main operator, SNCF, still dominates the market, and its 
performance in the last decade is gradually decreasing in spite of the steady 
progress of the national economy during the years.  
                                                  
12  The figures of transport trends in ARTC were not available. 
*  The contract covers details on the type of traffic and the 
standards of the tracks. 
(3) A rail operator applies for time slots, and the infrastructure 
manager must allocate the infrastructure capacity fairly and 
without discrimination. 
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   Figure 5.10 Trends of Rail Freight Transport in the four European Countries  
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Certainly, it is not quite clear that the change of the rail performance was resulted 
from the market liberalisation or other exogenous factors such as transition of the 
national economy, development of other transport modes and so on. Nevertheless, 
despite the similar steady progress of the real-term GDP in these countries, the 
trends of the transport reveal a contrast among them. Some interviewees note that 
the improvement of the traffic performance has been achieved partly because of new 
railway transport markets created by the new freight operators and/or their 
competitive pressure to the incumbent operator. [5/SE, 6/UK, 7/DE, 9/AU] 
 
 
5.6.2 Passenger Traffic Service 
 
5.6.2.1 Outline of the Services 
 
1) Regulation for Track Access 
Different from the freight sector regulated by open access, the regulation of track 
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access for the passenger service varies according to the country and the type of 
transport services. They are summarized as Table 5.3. 
 
Table 5.3 Regulation of Track Access for Passenger Rail Service 
Inter-regional Services 
Country (IM) Regional Services 
(Non-profitable) (Profitable) 
Sweden (Banverket) Franchising  SJ AB 
UK (Railtrack) Franchising *1 
Germany (DB Netz) Open Access *2 
France (RFF) SNCF  
Australia (ARTC)  Open Access *2 
*1:  The charging regime for access to track for passenger operators does not rule out 
open access. In practice, Hull Trains commenced operations between London and 
Hull in September 2000. Nevertheless, as open access passenger operators have 
been still exceptional cases in UK, their effects are investigated in the case of 
Germany.   
 
*2:  Examples of competitive open access entry are limited. In reality, most of the 
services are procured through franchising or service contract. (This is studied in 
this section.)           
 
Source: ▪ Author, based on the interviews to the railways. [5/SE, 6/UK, 7/DE, 8/FR, 9/AU] 
       ▪ CER (2005) 
       ▪ White & Case (2006) 
    
 
2) Regional Passenger Services 
In Sweden, France and Germany, responsibility for the regional passenger services 
were decentralized to the regional authorities. After surveying the regionalization 
in Sweden and France, the case in Germany will be scrutinized in the following.  
 
In Sweden, based on the Transport Policy Act of 1979, County Public Transport 
Authority (CPTAs) was established as a new institutional structure for regional 
public transportation. Several CPTAs have become responsible for the decisions on 
local and regional railway lines threatened by closure, and also started to control 
some remained lines. Then, in 1988 the responsibility of the CPTAs was extended 
into the unprofitable regional railway services, and the rolling stock was also 
transferred to the CPTAs. Further, in 1991 the government expressed its principle 
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to open the railways to more competition through tendering. (CER, 2005 p.42)    
 
In France, every French Region has become responsible for organising regional 
passenger rail services, and it designs the services and defines the tariffs since 
January 2002. SNCF is charged to execute their decisions and the Regions pay a 
financial contribution decided in advance by a contract (the Convention) and fully 
subsidize rolling stock acquisitions. A Convention Agreement specifies the 
respective undertakings and obligates the Regions to stipulate their service 
requirements and SNCF to fulfil the agreed missions within budget. Thus the 
Regions have become full-fledged Transport Organising Authorities for Regional 
services. (CER, 2005 p.100) 
 
In Germany, one of the major changes in the reforms was the ‘regionalisation’ of 
regional passenger railway traffic. Organisational and financial responsibility for it 
had been shifted from the federal government to the German states (Laender). In 
January 1996, the respective federal responsibilities ended. “The Laender receive 
part of the federal petroleum tax revenues and distribute it to railway undertakings, 
which provide local and regional passenger transport. The legislator has 
acknowledged that local and regional public railway passenger transport is 
structurally dependent on public subsidies.” (CER, 2005 p.87) 
 
Before the ‘regionalisation’ the federal government was responsible for the regional 
transport, but appropriate transport planning based on each region was not 
necessarily achieved. Since the ‘regionalisation’ various decisions based on the 
conditions of each region have become possible and regional rail transport has 
become active.[7/DE] 
 
We can find several examples which some measures based on regionalisation have 
succeeded in revitalizing regional rail transport. For example, certain regional 
services such as between Kaarst and Mettmann in west part of Germany, and 
between Neumünster and Bad Segeberg in north part of the country were once 
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abandoned, but the services were re-opened based on the decision by the Laender. 
Besides the investment to the infrastructure, some other improvements in the 
operation process, such as coordination with other public traffic modes in timetable 
and fares, are also performed. The improvements of the services are regarded as one 
of the results of the ‘regionalisation’ and various efforts since then. [7/DE]  
 
Figure 5.11 shows the trend of regional passenger rail transport in Germany in 
contrast with the real-term GDP. It reveals that the regional rail transport has 
increased and has been keeping steady level since the establishment of DB AG in 
199413 unifying DB and DR. 
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     Figure 5.11 Trend of Regional Passenger Rail Transport in Germany 
     Source: Verkehr in Zahlen 2006, 2007, Deutscher Verkehrs – Verlag 
             International Monetary Fund (2008) 
 
        
3) Inter-regional Passenger Services 
As Table 5.3 shows, SNCF and SJ AB hold monopoly status in all lines in France 
and in profitable inter-regional services in Sweden respectively. Franchising is 
utilized for non-profitable inter-regional services in Sweden and for all networks in 
                                                  
13  In addition to the establishment of DB AG, the legislation on 1 January 1994 
contains alterations of the fundamental railway regulation, which characterizes the 
current railway operation such as opening of rail network to third parties, obligation 
of state regarding rail infrastructure, and so on.(Link, H.,1994) 
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UK. 
 
In Germany and Australia (ARTC), in principle, any qualified operators can access 
the infrastructure based on open access. On the track of ARTC, with the exception 
of Great Southern Railway (GSR) which is purely a commercial operator of 
long-distance tourist trains, all other passenger services are practically heavily 
subsidised by State Governments.[9/AU] In Germany, examples of competitive open 
access entry by private operators are also very limited. When the interview was 
held in December 2005, the examples are limited to only the following inter-city 
services: 1) between Stralsund and Dresden; and 2) between Rostock and Gera. 
Both of these cases are operated by a private operator “Inter Connex”. Practically, 
most of the non-profitable inter-regional services are also provided based on the 
franchising/service contract with a regional government utilizing the scheme for 
regional passenger services.[7/DE] Thus, voluntary attempts at open access entry 
into passenger inter-regional lines have been limited to profitable inter-regional 
lines only, and in practice these attempts are not common in Australia and 
Germany either. 
 
4) International Passenger Services 
In Europe international passenger services, especially high speed transport, 
between Member States are promoted by establishing joint-ventures among state 
railways. They are named “international groupings” in the EU Directives, and 
established by at least two railway undertakings in different EU Member States. 
The example of “international groupings” and the railway undertakings in 
cooperation are as follows14: 
    Thalys International SC: SNCF, SNCB, NS, DB AG 
    Eurostar Group: SNCF, SNCB, Eurostar (UK) Ltd. 
    Lyria: SNCF, SBB/CFF/FFS 
 
                                                  
14 The acronyms mean as follows: 
  SNCB: the National Railway Company of Belgium 
  NS: Netherlands Railways 
  SBB/CFF/FFS: Railways of Switzerland 
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Even though crews run through the border, the trains of international groupings 
are operated under the license of each railway undertaking. This means that their 
train operation is performed under the responsibility of each railway undertaking. 
For example, SNCF is responsible for the operation of Thalys trains in France, and 
the trains are operated under the license of SNCF within the country. The 
joint-venture, Thalys International SC, is responsible for other commercial affaires 
such as the policy of ticket sales, the level of services in the stations (special lounges, 
etc.) and in the trains. The costs and incomes are shared among railway 
undertakings based on the agreed rules.[8/FR] 
 
Thus, there is not particular conflict among these joint-ventures and the railway 
undertakings in terms of train operation, timetabling, safety measures, and so on.  
 
Today, on the line of East European high-speed lines, TGV (French high-speed 
trains) run between Paris and Munich, and ICE (German high-speed trains) 
operate between Paris and Frankfurt. But in these cases, SNCF and DB AG 
cooperate each other, and there is an agreement between the two railways to share 
costs and incomes.[8/FR] 
 
As the above cases show, the international passenger services are operated with 
cooperation among more than one railway. As of the beginning of 2008, competitive 
entry into the international passenger services is not common, even though 
liberalization of the market is scheduled in European Union in 2010. 
 
 
5.6.2.2 Procurement of the Services 
 
In the passenger sector of these countries, in principle, there are three kinds of 
methods to procure the transport services: franchising through competitive 
tendering; service contract through negotiation; competitive entry through open 
access. The characteristics of each type of service procurement are examined in the 
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following.  
 
 
1) Franchising through Competitive Tendering 
In Europe and Australia, many of the passenger lines are not profit making. This 
means that, different from the freight sector, private operators do not have an 
incentive to enter into a passenger rail market without receiving subsidy from the 
(local) government. Thus, franchising through competitive tendering is commonly 
utilized both for the regional and the inter-regional services in the passenger sector.  
 
ECMT(2005b p.68) notes the advantages of competitive tendering as “it permits the 
preservation of an integrated network of rail services, subsidised where necessary, 
whilst still introducing competitive pressures, leading to incentives to reduce costs 
and (depending on who bears the revenue risk and what other incentives are in 
place) improve quality of service.” 
 
Despite some disadvantages15, it also indicates that “compared with the alternative 
of open access competition as a way of introducing competitive pressures into the 
rail passenger industry, competitive tendering has particular advantages, and is 
especially useful in cases in which competition in the market is not 
feasible.”(ibid.p.68) 
 
2) Service Contract through Negotiation 
In France, regional services are provided based on contract between the Regions 
and SNCF. The Regions must deal with SNCF, and they make a contract without 
tendering.(CER, 2005 p.100) In Germany, the Laender conclude transport service 
contracts with either the DB Regio or other railway undertaking holding a valid 
license. For the conclusion of public service contracts, the Laender have the 
discretion to make a call for tenders or not. In a case of contract without tendering, 
usually the amount of it is decided based on the offer from the operator such as DB 
                                                  
15  Kain, P. (2006) indicates several challenges of the franchising system. 
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Regio. Thus, transparency/accountability for the tax payers is indicated as a 
problem of the contract without tendering. (Hori, M., 2000) 
 
3) Competitive Entry through Open Access 
Competitive entry through open access is effective only in case an operator comes in 
the market on the basis of commercial incentives. In practice, attempts of it are so 
limited in the passenger sector behind the background of its unprofitable market in 
these countries. 
 
In case it has attained, on-track competition in the passenger rail market has 
potential risks to raise several coordination problems especially those among 
operators. Moreover, it might have significant influence on the passenger rail 
market as a whole. Some of the examples of these conflicts are found in Germany, 
where open access regulation is introduced in the passenger sector as well. 
  
As a first example, there were disputes whether DB AG should include details of 
other operators’ trains in its information system in the station. Even though the 
infrastructure manager intends to provide detail information, such as a timetable 
and tickets of other operators, sometimes it is technically difficult, and it might 
result in a problem among concerned parties.[7/DE] This aspect of information 
sharing in the passenger sector is different from that in the freight sector as 
provision of the detail information about other operators is not necessarily 
demanded in the freight sector. 
 
Secondly, it should increase the total amount of subsidy from the local government 
to sustain unprofitable regional passenger rail services. There are some examples 
that a new operator entered into a railway passenger market only in peak hours. 
For example, Connex entered the passenger transport service between Dresden and 
Görlitz only in peak hours of weekdays. This kind of competitive entry to the market 
reduces some profits of the incumbent operator transferring them to the new 
operator. Considering the incumbent operator receives subsidies from the local 
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government, this kind of on-track competition would reduce the spare resources to 
be utilized to sustain other unprofitable services. Thus this kind of “cream 
skimming” behaviours in the market should result in the increase of the amount of 
subsidies or abolition of the other unprofitable rail services. [7/DE] 
 
Thirdly, close relationships among several train services are recommended for 
convenience of passengers. For example, in Japan in case of late arrival of a 
Shinkansen train, departure time of a regional train can be changed flexibly, and in 
a certain case it would be delayed intentionally until the Shinkansen train arrives. 
This kind of flexible operation for the passengers is expected to be possible as whole 
train services on the network are operated by a single operator. Once train services 
are operated by different operators this kind of close cooperation among the 
operators would be very difficult. [7/DE] 
 
 
5.6.2.3 Trends of the Passenger Transport 
 
According to the Rail Liberalization Index (IBM Business Consulting Service and 
Kirchner, 2004), railways in Sweden, UK and Germany are regarded as ‘easy access’ 
and railway in France is regarded as ‘restrictive access’.  
 
Figure 5.12 shows that the passenger transport in France has also steadily 
increased along with other countries. Thus, the trends of passenger rail transport 
show that ‘easy access’ would not necessarily result in the better improvement of 
the passenger rail performance. The background is that most of the passenger rail 
services, especially those in the regional rail transport, rely on the subsidy from the 
regional authorities. 
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Although some passenger services are procured by a service contract through 
negotiation, it is indicated that competitive tendering (franchising) has more 
advantages in terms of transparency for the usage of public funds. In addition, 
vertical separation is beneficial to promote new entry into the market through 
franchising. As it is investigated, instead of covering the deficit of the railways as 
before, the (regional) government has become active in the procurement of 
(regional) passenger service, which resulted in the increase of the passenger 
transport. 
 
 
5.7 Advantages, Disadvantages and Results  
 
During the interviews/questionnaires to the railways, the following advantages and 
disadvantages are indicated concerning vertical separation in this type. 
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5.7.1 Advantages 
 
Besides the aims of the reform through vertical separation studied in Section 5.4, 
the following advantage was indicated. 
1. Specialization of technical and managerial knowledge 
ARTC and the various rail operators put greater focus on their core businesses. 
ARTC’s principal aim is to maximize utilisation of their various rail corridors and 
thus maximize income from access charges. Conversely, the rail operators have 
concentrated on providing satisfactory service to their customers. [9/AU] 
 
 
5.7.2  Disadvantages  
 
1. Difficulties to coordinate the timetable 
In Germany, based on open access, several passenger operators provide services 
on the same track of certain lines. It was indicated that sometimes long-distance 
trains have to wait several minutes until regional trains pass by as the regional 
authority is not willing to change the timetable of regional trains. Thus, 
coordination of the timetable has become more difficult as a number of entities are 
responsible for the rail services.[7/DE] 
 
In Sweden, in general a sole franchisee provides services on a certain network. 
Nevertheless, it is not easy to coordinate the timetable among different franchised 
networks. Thus, sometimes well-coordinated timetable scheduling can not be 
achieved especially at the border of the networks. [5/SE] 
 
2. Limitation of investment solution 
Integrated railways can adjust their capacity more easily and appropriately 
according to the change of the transport demand. For example, when demand of 
railway transport increases, there are broadly three types of solutions for 
adjusting their transport capacity: 
127 
a) Introduction of other type of rolling stock, which has bigger capacity such as 
double deck trains. This solution can be performed by an operator; 
b) Increase of infrastructure capacity, such as constructing relief tracks or 
improving signalling system. This solution can be mainly performed by an 
infrastructure manager;  
c) Investments from both operation and infrastructure. For example, an operator 
extends the length of trains adding more coaches to the trains, and an 
infrastructure manager extends the length of platforms accordingly.  
As they are shown in the above examples, various investment options should be 
compared deliberately for the appropriate investment planning. Nevertheless, 
usually it is more difficult for vertically separated railways to compare and invest 
appropriately as these activities have to be performed among different entities. 
[6/UK] 
 
3. Difficulties to provide sufficient information of other operators 
In Germany several operators perform passenger train services on the same track 
based on open access. In most cases the new operator provides train services with 
cheaper tickets which are not exchangeable with other trains. There were serious 
arguments in Germany whether the staff of DB AG should provide sufficient 
information about the ticket conditions for the passengers, and should sell other 
operator’s tickets or not. Technically, advanced ticket information system might 
make it possible. Nevertheless, at present practically it is not easy task for the 
ticket sales staff to sell various kinds of tickets issued by different operators and 
to provide the customers with sufficient information about them. [7/DE] 
 
4. Increasing transaction costs 
Since the separation of infrastructure and operation, it has become necessary to 
negotiate and coordinate more frequently among different entities. It has resulted 
in the increase of transaction costs. [5/SE] 
 
5. Poor economic performance arising from monopolistic status of the infrastructure 
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manager 
Under vertically separated railways, the above and below rail organizations will 
necessarily have different objectives which can potentially lead to conflicts and, if 
not addressed, to dysfunctional relationships. In Australia, this can sometimes 
become an issue, particularly as most infrastructure is still in public ownership. 
Successful vertical separation therefore requires a degree of maturity and a 
professional approach to ensure that all decisions are ultimately in the best 
interests of the overall rail industry. [9/AU] 
 
6. Difficulties to harmonize the technologies and to optimize train operation on the 
network 
As the major potential problem of vertical separation, the interviewee indicated a 
risk of loss of control of the interface between wheel and rail, and the associated 
specialist knowledge.[9/AU] 
 
7. Loss of flexibility of controlling trains/crews 
The increase of market segment won by new operators tends to result in some 
sub-optimisation and loss of flexibility. For example, it is difficult to exchange 
drivers and conductors among different operators. If one operator operates on a 
certain railway network, the schedule for drivers and conductors can be planned 
more efficiently and flexibly. For example, facing an accident it is possible for a 
sole operator to change the schedule of trains/crews according to the situation 
quickly. This kind of flexibility is one of the advantages for an 
integrated/franchised railway, which a single operator controls train operation on 
the network. [6/UK, 7/DE] 
 
8. Several challenges for passenger competitive bidding  
“Franchising rather than open access appears the obvious way of introducing 
competition into [the passenger] sector.”(ECMT, 2005b p.75) Nevertheless, some 
challenges are also indicated during the interviews such as difficulties in 
assessing franchising proposal: the franchise assessments must be based on 
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various factors. In addition to a business plan, the proposal should be assessed in 
terms of service level, the amount of dividends/subsidies, the necessary 
investment into infrastructure, and so on. It is not easy task for a (regional) 
authority to judge various proposals. Without clear standards, a judgement of the 
proposals tends to be obscure, and in some cases it might be done subjectively. 
Thus a transparent franchising bidding system should be established; otherwise 
the influence and control by government officials tend to be strengthened through 
the assessment of the proposals. [6/UK, 7/DE] 
 
 
5.7.3 Results of the Aims  
 
The results of the aims of railway reform, which were studied in Section 5.4, are 
summarized as follows. 
 
5.7.3.1 Sweden 
 
(1) Since the railways have been put on an equal footing with other modes through 
the vertical separation, the government has actively invested into the 
infrastructure and its renewal.16 
(2) The government supports for the railway sector financially. Especially, the 
reform made it possible to keep and develop lines that have a high degree of 
socio-economic importance. 
 
The restructuring of the sector coincides with several improvements such as the 
increase of the traffic volumes. In addition, it was indicated that railway operations 
have become more efficient.17 Certainly some conflicts among different entities such 
                                                  
16  In February 2004, the government adopted Banverket’s action plan for the period 
2004-2015. The plan consists of investments in the infrastructure amounting to a 
total of SEK 108 billion and SEK 38 billion for maintenance. The increased 
investment framework is a clear indication on the part of the government that the 
railways are an important mode of transport.(Banverket, 2004a) 
17  Despite the increase of traffic performance, the number of employees has decreased 
since the reform, and labour productivity has increased accordingly. (CER, 2005) 
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as difficulties in timetabling and coordination among franchisees were 
indicated.[5/SE] But the initial aims appear to have been achieved by and large. 
 
 
5.7.3.2 UK 
 
(1) As a positive result since the reform involving the private sector, the traffic 
volumes both in the passenger and the freight sectors have increased sharply. 
(2) Despite the replacement of Railtrack with a not-for-dividend company in 2002, 
privatisation of BR was attained through vertical separation. And, competition 
‘in’ the market has become common in the freight sector, and competition ‘for’ 
the market is prevalent among private operators in the passenger sector.   
 
Similar to the results of the Swedish railways, the rail transportation volumes both 
in the passenger and freight sectors have increased since the railway reform. 
Certainly it needs further research to clarify it, but one or both of the following 
factors are expected to be the reason for the increase: 1) external reasons such as 
congestion of roads and state of the economy; and/or 2) operators’ efforts and 
appropriate marketing strategy such as adjusting tickets fares and so on. Along 
with the above-mentioned favourable changes, some disadvantages, most of which 
are coordination issues raised by the vertical separation, are also indicated. [6/UK] 
 
 
5.7.3.3  Germany  
 
(1) The transportation volumes both in the passenger and the freight sectors have 
increased since the reform and the liberalization of the railway sector. 
(2) Based on the open access regulation, at present the freight operators perform 
their operation in a commercial basis.18 Since the regionalisation in 1996, the 
                                                  
18  In the freight sector, rail transport performance of competitors of DB AG also has 
been increasing since the liberalization, although their market share remains around 
10 percent. (DB AG, 2005) 
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regional governments are responsible for the regional passenger rail transport. 
Behind the background of necessity for subsidy in the passenger sector, the 
regional governments are involved in providing the level of services in practice.   
 (3) Germany takes the basic approach in track access charges to cover the costs for 
the operational process, such as those for traffic management, maintenance, and 
salary. Thus DB AG has been financially viable since the reform.19 (ECMT, 
2005b)  
 
DB AG is regarded as a vertically integrated railway from the view-point of that it 
owns both infrastructure and operation. Accordingly, it was not indicated that so 
much coordination problems exist within DB AG compared with other vertically 
separated railways discussed in this chapter. Nevertheless, based on the regulation 
of open access, DB AG must grant third parties access without discrimination. It is 
expected that the increase of the number and the market proportion of the new 
competitive operators will change the characteristics of the railway sector as the 
relationships between DB Netz and the new entrants should be different from those 
within DB AG.  
 
 
5.7.3.4  France 
 
(1) Following EC Directives the infrastructure manager, RFF, started to be in 
charge of allocating infrastructure capacities on the national rail network to 
applicants since 2003. (CER, 2005 p.99) 
(2) Despite the intention to realize integrated control, the institutional reform has 
increased the internal works even within SNCF and RFF.  
 
Compared with the model in Sweden and UK, SNCF keeps operational autonomy in 
the respect that the main operator is in charge of making working timetable and 
infrastructure maintenance. Nevertheless, different from the initial intention, 
                                                  
19  “It is said that 60% of infrastructure expenditure (including loans and grants) is 
covered by charges.”(ECMT, 2005b p.99) 
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vertical separation has increased coordination problems even between SNCF and 
RFF. For example, now the procedure for timetabling takes more works and longer 
time compared with the former situation as described in Section 5.5. It was also 
indicated that this bureaucratic procedure makes it difficult to plan flexible 
timetabling such as setting special trains and should result in losing chances to get 
revenues.[8/FR] As described in Section 5.5.2, there are also conflicts concerning 
infrastructure maintenance between SNCF and RFF in spite of the contract 
between the two.  
 
The relationship between the new entrants and RFF would be different from that 
between SNCF and RFF. Thus, as it is also the case in Germany, it is expected that 
the increase of new competitive operators changes the current structure of the 
railway industry.  
 
 
5.7.3.5  Australia 
 
(1) Competition among freight rail operators is occurring on all principal parts of 
the ARTC network with at least two competing freight operators on each 
interstate corridor.[9/AU] Thus ARTC has been working as the National 
interstate rail network as it was initially intended.  
(2) Rail freight market share has significantly increased on long corridor. For 
example, on the corridor connecting Melbourne-Adelaide-Perth, the rail market 
share has increased from around 65% in 1997 to approximately 80% in 2005. 
[9/AU] 
 
As it was revealed above, the original aims have been attained. Establishment of 
ARTC has promoted rail investment, and most of its funds for the interstate 
corridors come from the Commonwealth Government through AusLink 
programme.20[9/AU] Much of the growth in the rail task since 1997 is considered 
                                                  
20  The recent infrastructure investment funding for the ARTC network is for AU $2 
billion over five years which is roughly the equivalent funding for the same network 
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attributable to the increased corridor capacity through the large investments and to 
introduction of on-track competition which, in turn, has led to a reduction in freight 
charges and improved service levels. [9/AU] 
 
 
5.8 Conclusion  
 
In European railways and ARTC, vertical separation was introduced mainly in 
order to promote competition among operators. In the freight sector of these 
countries competition ‘in’ the market has become common already. The transition of 
rail freight performance in France and that in the other further liberalized four 
railways are contrasting. Some interviewees indicated that on-track competition 
among freight operators has resulted in the increase of rail traffic 
performance.[5/SE, 9/AU] Although further research is required to prove it clearly, 
there are possibilities of validity that on-track competition is effective to improve 
the rail freight performance in certain circumstances.     
 
In the passenger sector, rail transport has improved after their liberalization and 
regionalization in these European railways. But, partly because the examples are so 
limited, the effectiveness of on-track competition has not been clarified. Behind this 
background, there is generally a need for subsidy for the passenger rail services. For 
example, in Germany even though open access is admitted by regulation, attempts 
at open access entry into the market have been very limited. It should be possible 
that competitive entry into the rail passenger market, such as an entry to only peak 
hours, reduces a part of the subsidised operator’s profit by ‘cream skimming’, and 
results in an increase of the amount of subsidy. Thus it appears that passenger 
franchising has more advantages to preserve an integrated network of rail services 
permitting tolerable cross-subsidy within the franchised network, whereby the 
operator avoids wasteful competition and makes the most of limited amount of 
subsidy.  
                                                                                                                                                  
over the preceding 20 years. [9/AU] 
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In Sweden, UK, France and Australia (ARTC), legally and financially independent 
institutions have become responsible for the infrastructure and operation 
respectively. Except the case in UK, where the privatized company was responsible 
for the infrastructure, the public sector has become responsible for the 
infrastructure. Certainly, this is advantageous for facilitating public investment 
into the infrastructure fairly as all the investment can be channelled to the 
state-owned infrastructure rather than to a specific operator, and this has been the 
case especially in Sweden and Australia (ARTC).21  
 
Nevertheless, the study also found that this type of separation changes the 
structure of the railway industry drastically and makes it complex. Accordingly, 
some conflicts between infrastructure and operation and those among operators on 
the same track have been raised in these railways. For example, at the time of 
timetabling the infrastructure manager faces many difficulties to coordinate a 
number of time-slots applications especially in case infrastructure capacity is 
limited.[5/SE, 6/UK, 9/AU] In addition to these coordination problems, the study 
identified that the reform has changed the staff ’s way of thinking, and the members 
of staff in separated institutions started to make efforts only for the institution they 
belong to. The interview found it is also the case in France, where the top manager 
(Gallois, L., 2002) had a strong intention to keep a close relationship between 
infrastructure and operation in the process of railway operation. [8/FR]  
 
In Germany, the main railway (DB AG) keeps a holding structure and intends to 
avoid coordination problems. Nevertheless, according as competitive new entrants 
take the share of the rail market, complete separation which infrastructure and 
operation are totally independent will increase. This is also the case in France, 
where the main operator (SNCF) currently takes responsibility for making working 
timetable and for maintenance and operation of the infrastructure as well.   
                                                  
21  It is also the case in UK since Railtrack was replaced by Network Rail, which is 
committed to achieving a substantial improvement in rail infrastructure.(Rail 
Freight Group, 2007 p.16) 
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The investigation found the possibility of validity that complete separation can lead 
to increase of the freight rail transport through promoting on-track competition. In 
the passenger sector, this model is the most appropriate for promoting new entry to 
the rail services through franchising. But it is also found that complete separation 
raises several coordination problems. Thus, upon introducing the form for 
within-rail competition22, full costs and benefits should be considered. 
 
22.  As investigated in the study, “on-track competition” is principally utilized for the 
freight sector and “franchising” is utilized for the passenger sector. In this thesis, 
especially from Chapters 8 to 10, without particular explanation in the sentence, 
“within-rail competition” refers both ”on-track competition” and “franchising” through 
operational separation between infrastructure and operation.  
136 
CHAPTER 6: 
RAILWAYS WITH VERTICAL SEPARATION FOR PASSENGER 
OR FREIGHT TRAFFIC  
- IRAN, JAPAN (JR FREIGHT) AND USA (AMTRAK) - 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter investigates the railway reform with vertical separation for passenger 
or freight traffic. Specifically, the author examines the railway reform in Iran (Raja 
Co.), Japan (JR Freight) and the United States (Amtrak). After reviewing the 
background and outline of the recent reform of each railway, it is examined in terms 
of the four key issues. 
 
In these countries, the railway in the prime market keeps an integrated structure 
and another railway in the smaller/minor market has become a tenant on the main 
railway. Table 6.1 shows passenger-km as a percentage of traffic units (combination 
of passenger-km and freight tonne-km). 
 
Table 6.1 Units of Traffic by Market Sector in the Three Countries 
Country Passenger-km (million) 
Freight tonne-km 
(million) 
Passenger-km  
/ Traffic units 
Iran 10,012 18,182 36% 
Japan 241,980 22,264 92%
USA 8,800 2,427,268 0.4%
Source: Author’s analysis of UIC statistics for 2004 
 
As Table 6.1 shows these three countries, especially Japan and USA, have 
particular characteristics that one of the sectors dominates in the rail transport 
market. 
 
 
6.2 The Background and Outline of the Recent Reform 
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6.2.1 Iran (Raja Co.) 
 
Since transport and communication are considered as a prerequisite in any 
economic development, Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI)’s authorities have paid special 
attention to the development of transport and communication especially through 
railways. The structure of the railway was changed in 1990 from that of a 
state-owned entity to a limited company affiliated to the Ministry of Roads and 
Transport. In 1996 Raja Passenger Trains (Raja Co.), which affiliates to Railways of 
the Islamic Republic of Iran (RAI), was established to manage and operate 
passenger rail services on the network of RAI. (Harris, K., 2003) As all shares of 
Raja Co. are owned by RAI, the two organizations belong to the same ownership.1  
 
Raja Co. is charged with the operation, marketing and ticketing of all passenger 
services on RAI’s network. “Its wide-ranging brief includes the development and 
upgrading of the passenger coaching fleet, including participating in the 
procurement of new locomotives and rolling stock, the development of domestic 
passenger service and facilities, managing the concessioning of train operations to 
private-sector companies, encouraging joint-venture projects to develop passenger 
rail transport in Iran [and neighbour countries].” (Harris, K., 2003 p.228) 
 
 
6.2.2 Japan (JR Freight) 
 
Different from most other countries, freight revenue has almost always been less 
than passenger revenue throughout the history of the Japanese National Railways 
(JNR). JNR’s freight business had accumulated such heavy debts that it threatened 
JNR’s financial viability as a whole. (Aoki, E. et al., 2000) 
 
In April 1987, JNR was reformed and split into six passenger companies and a 
single freight company (JR Freight). In the passenger sector, the division into the 
                                                  
1  Similar to DB AG, it appears the definition of vertical separation does not exactly 
apply to the type of separation in Iran. 
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six companies was considered as one of the indispensable factors of JNR’s reform in 
order to promote efficient management based on each region and to eliminate 
cross-subsidy among the different regions. In the freight sector, the operations 
became an independent entity covering a single nation-wide freight transport 
business. It was because, different from the passenger sector, generally the distance 
of conveyance is much longer and more than 60 % of rail freight transport is 
crossing the border among the divided passenger companies.(Kato, H., 2007) In this 
process, the unprofitable freight division was separated from the passenger division 
borrowing the trunk line sections of the passenger railway companies. 
 
In a few cases JR Freight also accesses the lines owned by the public sector or JR 
Freight itself. As these cases are exceptional, this paper focuses on the vertical 
separation where JR Freight accesses the six JR Passenger Companies’ tracks. 
 
 
6.2.3 USA (Amtrak) 
 
Similar to the cases in other countries, competition from automobiles and buses 
gradually eroded the rail market share in the US. Apparent losses on passenger 
service began to mount rapidly and, for many years, about half of the total net 
income from the private US freight railroad industry was being absorbed by losses 
on passenger services. Thus, the financial viability of many freight carriers and the 
entire railway industry was threatened. (Thompson, L., 2003b p.3) 
 
“In 1970, the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) was created by 
Congress to relieve the freight railroads of the burden of money-losing passenger 
operations and to preserve rail passenger service over a national system of 
Congressionally-designated routes.”(Amtrak Reform Council, 2002) Amtrak was 
created as a for-profit government corporation that was granted a monopoly to 
provide intercity rail transportation over its route system and was to receive 
Federal subsidies for the first few years, but then it was expected to make a 
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profit.(ibid.)  
 
Briefly, Amtrak operates in two different ways. On tracks of the private freight 
railways, Amtrak operates as an infrastructure separated tenant on them. Another 
way is on the Northeast Corridor where Amtrak, as an integrated railway, is the 
owner and a number of commuter operators and freight railways are tenants. This 
paper investigates the vertical separation where Amtrak accesses freight railways’ 
tracks based on the following reasons: 
1) This case is dominant in terms of track length covering the vast majority of lines 
in the US; 
2) Separation of the passenger sector from the freight sector was the central issue 
in the railway reform in the US. 
 
 
6.3 Aims of the Reform through Vertical Separation 
 
The three railways have introduced vertical separation for passenger or freight 
traffic in the process of their reform, and the aims are summarised in Table 6.2. 
 
Table 6.2 Aims of the Reform through Vertical Separation for Passenger or Freight 
Traffic 
Country (Tenant) Aims of the reform through vertical separation 
Iran (Raja Co.) 
 
(1) to promote private participation and investments in the 
passenger railway market through releasing the new 
entrants from the burden of infrastructure costs. 
(2) to specialize in operational management to improve 
market orientated service/management. 
Japan (JR Freight) 
 
(1) to ensure that the new Passenger Companies have a 
stable revenue base through the separation of unprofitable 
freight operations. 
(2) to release JR Freight from track maintenance for reducing 
its operational cost. 
USA (Amtrak) 
 
(1) to rescue freight railroads from passenger deficits. 
(2) to rescue passenger services from freight management. 
Source: ▪ Interviews to the three railways, RAI, JR Freight and Amtrak.[10/IR,11/JP,12/US] 
      ▪ Fukui, K.(1992) 
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In Japan (JR Freight) and USA (Amtrak), the background and aims for introducing 
vertical separation have common features to rescue the railway services in the main 
market from the deficits of those in the smaller market. For example, it was not 
possible for Amtrak to own its own right of way in most cases, as it typically only 
operates one train per day in each direction on most long distance lines. Also, on 
most lines, the freight railways are the dominant operator. Thus, as with JR Freight, 
it makes sense for Amtrak to be a tenant. [12/US] 
 
On the other hand, the main aim for establishing Raja Co. was to promote private 
participation and investments to the passenger railway market through releasing 
the new entrants from the burden of infrastructure costs, and to specialize in 
market orientated service and management. 
 
 
6.4 Forms and Implementation of the Vertical Separation 
 
6.4.1 Forms of the Vertical Separation 
 
Forms of the vertical separation in the three railways are summarised in Table 6.3. 
 
Table 6.3 Forms of the Vertical Separation for Passenger or Freight Traffic 
Country ( Tenant ) Forms of the Vertical Separation 
Iran (Raja Co.) Raja Co. accesses the RAI’s tracks. Some private operators also access them in cooperation with Raja Co. 
Japan (JR Freight) Only JR Freight accesses the tracks of the JR Passenger Companies. 
USA (Amtrak)  Amtrak accesses the tracks of the private freight railways as a sole inter-city operator.  
Source: Author, based on the interviews to the three railways. [10/IR, 11/JP, 12/US] 
 
 
In this type of separation, the main railway keeps an integrated structure in the 
prime market, and another operator, which operates in the smaller/minor rail 
market, accesses the track as a tenant. 
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6.4.2 Implementation of the Vertical Separation 
 
6.4.2.1 Organizational Structure and Management with Vertical Separation 
 
The results of investigation about the organizational structure with vertical 
separation and its management are summarised in Appendix 3. 
 
In these railways the dominant integrated railway owns and principally invests into 
its infrastructure. It also makes a timetable negotiating with a tenant, and controls 
traffics. In Japan and the US, the integrated railway practically enjoys its 
advantageous status. 
 
In Japan, timetables are coordinated through the regular meeting with JR 
passenger companies. In general, an infrastructure capacity on the main lines, 
which JR Freight operates, is approaching full by the passenger trains during the 
daytime. Thus JR Freight is obliged to operate its freight trains mainly in the 
night-time. Nevertheless, the coordination takes many efforts to be settled as the 
passenger companies have to perform infrastructure maintenance works at night. 
Despite the difficulties, the two sectors co-operate each other for the settlement, and 
they have not consulted with the Ministry for the coordination. Instead of 
consulting to the third parties, sometimes, JR freight itself invests into rolling stock 
or infrastructure to gain more time-slots or to increase the traffic capacity as 
explained in the next section.[11/JP] 
 
In the US, Amtrak trains have a long-standing schedule and are by law given 
schedule and dispatching priority. Nevertheless, this causes some problems on 
freight lines as Amtrak frequently faces difficulties to get time-slots because of the 
shortage of infrastructure capacity. As a general matter, Amtrak trains are not 
given proper priority on freight lines and the trains suffer serious on-time reliability, 
but Amtrak has very little power to force better treatment from the freight railways. 
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When Amtrak has trouble getting access to the slots they want, the Surface 
Transportation Board (STB), the main regulatory agency, can deal with conflicts 
between Amtrak and a freight railroad.2 [12/US]  
 
 
6.4.2.2 Relationship among Different Parties and Relevant Issues 
 
The results of interviews about relationship among different parties and relevant 
issues are summarized in Appendix 4. 
 
In Iran the tenant can negotiate with the dominant integrated railway at equal 
standing. Nevertheless, despite its stipulation it is difficult for Amtrak to consult 
with freight railroads in the same way. As the two cases show, the relationship 
between the integrated dominant railway and the tenant varies, and it appears that 
the differences are based on the background of introducing the vertical separation: 
Japan and the US had an intention to separate the unprofitable minor division from 
the profitable dominant division. On the other hand, as two divisions belong to the 
same ownership in Iran, diminishing cross-subsidy was not the main aim for 
separating into RAI and Raja Co.. 
 
Despite the relatively disadvantageous status of the tenant, in order to cope with 
the difficulty to operate within severely limited time-slots, for example, JR Freight 
has made efforts to get time-slots or to increase transport capacity by some 
measures such as [11/JP]: 
1. Speeding up the freight trains: In order to increase the number of freight trains, 
JR Freight invested in its rolling stock and electricity substation facilities for 
speeding up its trains. It is because JR passenger trains are usually faster than the 
freight trains, and speeding up freight trains makes it possible to operate more 
number of freight trains within severely limited time-slots; 
2. Making freight trains lengthened: JR Freight tried to lengthen its trains in order 
                                                  
2  In practice, the STB has rarely been involved, and they have had no real role in 
setting disputes over access or service quality. [12/US] 
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to transport more cargos by limited number of trains. 
 
This kind of relationship between the dominant railway and the tenant is largely 
different from that in European railways, where several operators are treated 
equally under the infrastructure manager and the regulator. 
 
 
6.5 Transition of Management of the Railways  
 
6.5.1 Iran 
 
6.5.1.1 Performance of RAI and Raja Co. 
 
“In 1994 the government had decided to increase rail’s share of the transport 
infrastructure budget to 30%. This resulted in 1,640 km route-km being built, with 
another 3,500 km of new line currently under construction. Many other options are 
under examination, and Iran is building more new railway than any country except 
China.” (Brice, D., 2005 p.282)  
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Accordingly, since the establishment of Raja Co. in 1996, in general, transport 
performances both in the freight and the passenger sectors have been increasing 
steadily along with the growth of real-term GDP as shown in Figure 6.1. 
         
 
6.5.1.2 Private Participation into the Transport Service 
 
The railway reform of RAI put special emphasis on promoting investment and 
participation from the private sector to reduce RAI’s investment budget. The tariff 
of track access is stipulated by laws, and it is aimed to allow private operators to 
access RAI’s tracks. It has been successful and investment from the private sector 
improved steadily both in the passenger and the freight sectors. [10/IR] 
 
The investigation found that the private investment has been promoted in each 
division, the passenger and the freight, as follows: 
 
1) Passenger Sector: Management Contract 
Some domestic passenger services are operated under management contracts or 
concessions let by Raja Co.. By the interview in September 2005, there were four 
private companies in the passenger sector, and it is expected that the number would 
increase in the future. The access charge is stipulated in order to promote private 
participation. In other words, it is set so as to guarantee some amount of profits of 
the new entrants. Based on this stipulation, the new operators do not need to pay 
access charges in the passenger sector at present. [10/IR] 
 
Two private companies, the Jupar Passenger Trains Company and Bonyad Eastern 
Railway own coaches, and the other two private companies, the Symorgh Ahanin 
Company and the Sabz Train Company, lease them from Raja Co.. In all the four 
cases, the private companies exchange a management contract with Raja Co., and 
in practice most of the essential factors of daily operation in the new companies are 
performed by RAI and Raja Co. based on the contract. For example, RAI or Raja Co. 
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dispatches the drivers to the private companies and performs timetabling, traction 
and train controlling. The private operating companies perform minor repairs such 
as those for wagon interior, but Raja Co. is responsible for overhaul and technical 
ones such as bogie repairs.[10/IR] The interviewee indicated that since a 
concession/management contract is exchanged on a regional basis and the private 
sector has entered to a part of railway system, regional passenger service reflecting 
local conditions has been achieved.[10/IR]  
 
During the past five years, considerable efforts have been made to transfer the fleet 
to the private sector. All passenger coaches have been transferred to Raja Co. 
already. RAI and Raja Co. aim to develop domestic passenger facilities and coaches 
by means of private-sector participation in the market. The majority of locomotives 
are owned by RAI, but recently Raja Co. has started to purchase new locomotives as 
well. [10/IR] 
 
2) Freight Sector: Transference of the Wagons 
As the aim is full transference of the fleet to the private sector, RAI has been 
promoting transference of its wagons as well. 
 
Private companies also invest in the fleet by themselves. Those who have invested 
in fleet are often ex-clients such as steel and automobile companies, and can be 
divided into the two groups: 
1. fully private companies active in freight transportation;  
2. the joint companies established by partnership with RAI.  
 
In order to promote private investment there are two methods of financing new 
wagons: 
1. Partial payment by RAI/Government 
A part of the capital is paid by a private company and the other parts are paid by 
RAI/Government in the form of long-term loans with a proper rate of interest.  
2. Loan credit by RAI 
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RAI offers credit to the bank which lends the necessary funds to a private 
company as shown in Figure 6.2. 
 
 
New wagons  
Bank  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Figure 6.2 A Private Company’s Procurement of Wagons through Loan Credit 
  Source: Author, based on the interviews to RAI. [10/IR] 
 
As the above cases show RAI actively supports private companies in their 
purchasing the wagons. 
 
RAI also has been transferring its existing wagons to private companies for 
promoting private investment. Up to the interview in September 2005, about 30 % 
of the existing freight wagons had been transferred to the private sector. The rest of 
freight wagons were also planned to be transferred to private companies in due 
course. They need to ask traction of wagons to RAI, who is the owner of locomotives. 
[10/IR] 
 
The maintenance works were also transferred to the private sector when the 
wagons were sold or leased out, and RAI intends to assign all the maintenance 
works to the private sector because the government has an intention to increase the 
role of the private sector in the railway industry. [10/IR] 
 
3) Future Prospects 
Until the interview, private participation had been achieved through coordination 
 
RAI 
Finance 
Credit Private company 
Ask a control of wagons 
Purchase of wagons 
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by the main operators, RAI and Raja Co.. Thus, there was no severe on-track 
competition among operators, and the above main operators coordinated railway 
operations including those of the new participants.  
 
Nevertheless, the bills which were approved in 1999 stipulate open access to the 
railway networks. Thus, even though there is no such competitive new participant 
at present, it has become possible for new entrants to access the networks 
competitively. The bills might change the current operation and management of the 
railways coordinated by the main operators. 
 
 
6.5.2 Japan (JR Freight) 
 
6.5.2.1 Performance of JR Freight 
 
Figure 6.3 compares the traffic output (freight tonne-kms) with the real-term GDP, 
and shows that the traffic output had been in serious down-turn trend since 1970’s 
until the reform in 1987 despite the rapid growth of the real-term GDP.  
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Nevertheless, the trend has been clearly changed during the period of JNR 
Restructuring and JR Freight has been keeping a steady performance since the 
reform. Although the government still owns the shares, JR Freight has become an 
independent company and keeps financial balance. And this statistical transition 
suggests the favourable managerial change and the active business operations as 
an independent company since the restructuring. 
 
Fukui, K. (1992 p.79) explains several reasons for this favourable change: 
1) The Japanese economy has experienced a steady growth since 1987 and this has 
increased the demand for transportation as a whole; 
2) Truck transport operates at full capacity and has limited prospects for 
increasing this capacity due to highway congestion and a shortage of 
long-distance truck drivers; 
3) JR Freight itself has endeavoured to design schedules which accommodate the 
needs of its customers and make services more convenient. 
 
The interviewee stressed managerial efforts as an independent company, the third 
reason in the above, as an essential reason for the favourable change. For example, 
the freight sector of JNR was engaged only in the freight railway transport before 
the restructuring. Thus it was common that freight customers also had to ask for 
trucks to transport from the sender to the marshalling yard. After the conveyance 
by railways, the different transport arrangement from another marshalling yard to 
the final destination was also frequently required. Certainly, the unfavourable 
results during the JNR era were partly because of regulatory limitation of the 
business scope imposed to JNR. Nevertheless, JR Freight has been actively engaged 
in the freight transport expanding the former business scope. JR Freight manages, 
as one-stop shop, transport services from the sender to the final destination 
including truck transportation. [11/JP]  
 
In addition, along with promoting one-stop shop services, JR Freight has also 
endeavoured to establish a highly efficient transport system shifting from freight 
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wagons to containers. JR Freight attained it through 1) increasing train speeds, 2) 
improving container capacity, and 3) advanced IT-system. As a result, the container 
transport has increased from 13.8 million tonne to 23.2 million tonne, and its share 
in JR-Freight has also increased from 25% to 63% in 20 years since 1987.(Ito, N., 
2008) 
 
This kind of active business attitude has become realizable as a result of 
corporatization of JR Freight.3 
 
 
6.5.2.2 Performance of JR Passenger Companies 
 
Figure 6.4 shows that, similar to the freight performance, the passenger sector had 
failed to improve its output until the JNR reform despite the growth of the economy.  
Nevertheless, since the period of the restructuring passenger traffic transported by 
the six JR passenger railway companies started to increase with much higher rate 
than before, and this implies improvement of the management of the railways 
through the reform and the active business performance by the companies since 
then. This growth rate is higher than that of other Japanese private railways, 
which had experienced higher rates than JNR before restructuring, and it has 
greatly exceeded the standards set by the Supervisory Committee before the JNR 
Restructuring. Government subsidies have declined substantially and the JRs pay 
large sums in corporate taxes, thereby contributing to the government finances. 
(Fukui K., 1992) 
                                                  
3   In Japan, although JR Freight is still a sole operator in the freight sector, 
corporatization in 1987 has improved its business attitude to more customer-oriented. 
  For example, it has negotiated with an automobile company, Toyota, and JR Freight 
started to operate dedicated freight train for the company. The train transports only 
Toyota’s automobile component between its two factories, and JR Freight succeeded in 
acquiring a new customer, which used to utilize trucks.(Transport Newspaper, 2007) 
   This case shows that a change of the organizational status of an operator can 
improve its business attitude. Furthermore, this example shows the customer also 
might have attained its aim to transport its own cargo more efficiently and 
economically rather than its direct entry into a rail transport service, which results in 
an increase of the number of operators raising some coordination problems within the 
sector. 
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Figure 6.4 Trend of Rail Passenger Transport in Japan *1 
  Source: Ministry of Land and Transport (1990 – 2006) 
International Monetary Fund (2008) 
*1: The figure includes the passenger transport of JNR and the six JRs. It does not include 
that of other private railways. 
 
 
Reflecting the expansion in transport volume, the operating revenues of the JRs 
have also increased. Following JR East and JR West, the whole shares of JR Central 
were listed in 2006, and these three JR Passenger Companies have been fully 
privatized already. This means that the reform through vertical separation had 
played a role to promote public listing of shares of the railways, even though it did 
not intended to introduce within-rail competition. Public listing of shares is 
regarded as one of the forms of private participation into the railway industry, and 
it can be attained without increasing the number of operators, which tends to 
increase coordination problems within the industry. 
 
 
6.5.3 USA (Amtrak) 
 
6.5.3.1 Performance of Amtrak 
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The establishment of Amtrak did succeed in shifting the passenger deficits to the 
(mostly Federal) public sector, and Amtrak has been supported by Federal capital 
and operating grants. Even after the expenditure of around US $25.6 billion to date 
funded through the Federal Railroad Administration in the US DOT, Amtrak has 
generated a continuing series of political and financial crises along with a number of 
different attempts at restructuring. (Thompson, L., 2003b p.5) 
 
Eliminating autos and trucks, Amtrak carries less than 1 percent of common carrier 
intercity passenger-km, with 71 percent carried by air and 22 percent by bus. As 
Figure 6.5 shows, Amtrak’s traffic in passenger-km has actually fallen below its 
peak in 1991. In the US context, Amtrak is not a significant factor in the overall 
passenger transport market, though it does play a role in some individual 
markets.(ibid.) 
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    Figure 6.5 Trend of Rail Passenger Transport in the US 
    Source: Thompson, L. (2003b) 
 
 
6.5.3.2 Performance of Freight Railroads 
 
Since the railway companies’ decision to pull out of the passenger market and to 
concentrate on the freight in 1970, “the railroads began by focusing their efforts on 
developing long distance heavy haul to kill off competition from the roads by giving 
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priority to bulk.” (Batisse, F., 2003 p.14) 
 
For example, “many lines have been down-graded to single track with very basic 
signalling equipment, long block sections and loop lines to avoid gradients to the 
detriment of speed. [Nevertheless, in the United States,] it is not train speeds that 
count but the robustness of the track to cater to 30 tonne axle-loads.”(ibid. p.14) The 
freight trains tend to be “2,000 metres in length, three times longer than the 
European maximum and, in particular, have an average charged weight of 2,650 
tonnes as opposed to the European 350 tonnes.”(ibid. p.17) “Freight traffic doubled 
between 1970 and 1998 as a result of 100 billion dollars worth of investment in 
infrastructure upgrading and new sophisticated rolling stock.” (ibid. p.15) 
 
As the above changes show, the American railroads turned to freight for their 
survival and prosperity since the introduction of vertical separation in 1970. 
Following partial deregulation through the Staggers Rail Act of 1980, the US rail 
market share (measured in ton-miles) bottomed out at 35 percent at the end of the 
1970s and has trended slowly upward after decades of steady decline. In 2004 
freight railroads move 42 percent of the nation’s intercity freight ton-miles, more 
than any other mode of transportation. Rail traffic volumes rose by 81 percent and 
rail productivity increased by 180 percent during the period between 1980 and 2004. 
Railroads also have been able to upgrade their systems, reinvest in productive rail 
infrastructure and equipment, provide higher levels of service, and improve safety – 
while at the same time sharply lowering rates for shippers. (Hamberger, E., 2004) 
 
 
6.6 Advantages, Disadvantages and Results  
 
During the interviews/questionnaires the following advantages and disadvantages 
were indicated for the vertical separation in the three railways. 
 
6.6.1 Advantages 
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1. Improving the focus on service efforts on either the passenger or the freight  
In all the three cases, the interviewee indicated that concentration on each 
transport market is an essential advantage.[10/IR, 11/JP, 12/US] Additionally, 
elimination of cross-subsidies between the two sectors was the primary objective 
of the vertical separation in Japan and the US. [11/JP, 12/US] 
 
2. Clear definition of the government’s role 
In the US, as the result of elimination of the cross-subsidies that brought the 
revival of the freight railways, vertical separation made the government define 
what Amtrak should do and what the government itself has to pay for. [12/US] 
 
3. Relieving one of the sectors of the infrastructure costs 
One of the sectors could be free from the burden of infrastructure costs. Thus, this 
sector’s condition could become similar to that of other modes of transport, whose 
infrastructure is generally supported by the government. RAI indicated this 
advantage as its passenger sector could be relieved of the infrastructure costs. 
[10/IR] Even though another dominant sector sustains the infrastructure, this 
type of vertical separation can lead to putting the tenant on equal footing with 
other transport modes.  
 
 
6.6.2 Disadvantages  
 
1. Loss of economies of scope 
The structure of this type is the combination of an integrated dominant railway 
and a tenant accessing it. As the passenger and the freight sectors are operated by 
different organizations and have some transaction costs between the two, RAI 
indicated that this model of vertical separation has a risk of leading into loss of 
economies of scope. [10/IR] 
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2. Damage of tracks 
RAI worries about the damage of tracks raised by ill-conditioned rolling stock 
since the introduction of vertical separation. RAI indicated a necessity to check 
rolling stock through appropriate means in order to keep the condition of tracks 
and prevent disputes among operators when several operators access the same 
track.4 [10/IR] 
 
 
6.6.3 Results of the Aims 
 
The results of the aims of the reform through vertical separation examined in 
Section 6.3 are summarized as follows. 
 
6.6.3.1 Iran (Raja Co.) 
 
(1) RAI has been in success in improving private participation to a transport service 
as examined in Section 6.5. 
(2) The interviewee regarded concentration on the business in each market as one of 
the main factors for improvement of the rail transport. [10/IR] 
 
Thus the interviewee recognizes that the aims of the reform through vertical 
separation were achieved by and large in Iran. [10/IR] 
 
 
6.6.3.2 Japan (JR Freight) 
 
(1) The management of the new JR Passenger Companies has been much better 
than that in the JNR’ era. Elimination of the cross-subsidies from the passenger 
sector to the freight sector has contributed to the improvement.  
                                                  
4  JR Freight inspects the wagons even if they are owned by other private companies, 
and this kind of measures contributes to prevent disputes with the dominant 
integrated operator.[11/JP] 
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(2) JR Freight had only about twelve thousand employees at the time of its 
establishment in 1987. Moreover, the number has decreased into less than eight 
thousand in 2005. It is impossible for JR Freight to perform track maintenance 
of wide rail network in Japan. The restructuring through vertical separation 
released JR Freight from track maintenance and the personnel for the works, 
and contributed to its balanced management. 
 
Consequently, the interviewee recognizes that the establishment of JR Freight has 
achieved its objectives. [11/JP] 
 
 
6.6.3.3 USA (Amtrak) 
 
(1) Separation of management and financial responsibility of the freight from the 
passenger services has been achieved, and US private railroads concentrated on 
the freight service since that time. 
(2) Cross-subsidies have been eliminated, and the result has been a clearer 
definition of what Amtrak does and what the government has to pay for. [12/US] 
 
Thus the interviewee believes that the establishment of Amtrak has achieved its 
objectives by and large, and does not think there have been many problems created 
by the separation of Amtrak from freight lines. [12/US] 
    
 
6.7 Conclusion  
 
This chapter has investigated the three railways with vertical separation for 
passenger or freight traffic. In these countries, the railway in the prime sector, 
either the passenger or the freight, retained an integrated structure and another in 
the smaller/minor sector had become a tenant. The results of the investigation are 
summarized: 
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▪ In all the three railways, the integrated dominant railway principally performs the 
essential factors of daily operation such as timetabling, train control, signalling, 
investment and maintenance of infrastructure; 
▪ Promoting private participation and investments was one of the most essential 
objectives of vertical separation in Iran, and it has been performed in the 
passenger sector as the new entrants were released from the burden of 
infrastructure costs.[10/IR] Nevertheless, as Raja Co. is in charge of private 
participation letting management contract or concession, this is not for within-rail 
competition with the incumbent operator;  
▪ In Japan and the US, elimination of the excess cross-subsidies between the two 
sectors was the primary reason for introducing vertical separation. Since the 
reform through separation, the integrated railway has improved at a higher rate 
than before. In Japan the reform has contributed to list the shares of the three 
large passenger companies. In the US it has also resulted in clearer definition of 
the government’s financial role for the tenant [12/US], and revitalized the 
management by the private freight railroads. In both cases, the reform has 
contributed to improve/retain the private participation into the railway industry; 
▪ In the US and Japan, in practice, the tenant faces some difficulties to get its time 
slots. This is expected to be derived from the background of introduction of the 
vertical separation to rescue the dominant railway. In Japan, in spite of its status 
as a tenant, management efforts as an independent company, focusing on its own 
market, have resulted in the increase of freight rail transport as well. [11/JP] 
 
In summary, as the three cases show, improving the focus on services in each 
transport market was an important objective/advantage for the reform through this 
type of vertical separation. Additionally, elimination of excess cross-subsidy 
between the two sectors has successfully worked for strengthening the competitive 
sector in Japan and the US.  
 
In these three cases within-rail competition is not aimed, and the laws concerned 
permit those operators to retain relatively exclusive track-access rights in general. 
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Based on this regulation, the incumbent/reformed operators continue their railway 
operation even after the reform.  
 
Generally, this type of vertical separation appears to be a very successful approach 
in case one of the sectors is dominant and profitable enough to sustain the 
infrastructure, and another sector takes the only small rail market. As the 
dominant railway keeps an integrated structure, in principle, coordination 
problems through the separation of infrastructure and operation, such as 
difficulties to get time-slots fairly, can be confined only to the small rail market. 
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CHAPTER 7:  
PRIVATE RAILWAYS WITH LONG-RUN ACCESS  TO 
INFRASTRUCTURE        
- MEXICO AND TWO NEWLY-ORGANIZED LINES IN JAPAN - 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter investigates private railways with long-run access to infrastructure. 
 
Firstly, the author examines the railway reform in Mexico, where significant 
changes in sectoral performances were brought about through long-run 
concessions.1 Long-run concessions have been widely adopted in railways in Latin 
America and some countries in Africa. In these countries the state-owned railways 
were privatized, and a railway operator as a private concessionaire manages the 
infrastructure whose ownership is retained by the government. In addition to the 
freight concessionaires, this chapter investigates the Mexico City Terminal Railway, 
which the above freight concessionaires access the marshalling yard and terminal 
facilities in Mexico City. 
 
Then, this chapter examines newly-organized lines with public investment in 
infrastructure in Japan focusing the two cases:  
1) New Shinkansen lines, which were constructed after the privatization of JNR;  
2) Aoimori Railway, which is a conventional line separated from a JR Passenger 
Company.  
Different from the former cases, vertical separation in these two cases is not for the 
reform of state railway itself, and public investment has been utilized for 
                                                  
1  Galenson, A. and Thompson, L.(1993 p.4) notes that “concessions are a form of lease 
in which the contractor agrees to make certain fixed investments and retains the use 
of the assets for a longer contract period.” 
In February 2006, the author had made a questionnaire to one of the freight 
concessionaires in Argentine, which had experienced a long-run concession as well. As 
the results of the questionnaire were, in general, similar to those in Mexico in terms of 
vertical separation, the author discusses only the case in Mexico as the case of 
long-run concessions. 
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constructing or sustaining a certain line. 
 
 
7.2 The Background and Outline of the Reform 
 
7.2.1 Long-Run Concessions in Mexico 
 
7.2.1.1 Freight Concessionaires: TFM, Ferromex 
 
Ferrocarriles Nacionales de Mexico (FNM) was an integrated monopolistic railroad 
controlled by the Transport Ministry. Following problems were present in the 
Mexican railway sector before the privatization process (Federal Competition 
Commission, 2001): 
▪ The rail services needed considerable public subsidies; 
▪ The track network had not been enlarged for decades; and 
▪ Infrastructure became out of date and poor quality. 
The Mexican government recognized the deterioration of its rail sector and 
considered that the financial drains in the sector were due to inefficiency and poor 
performance of it.2  
 
Nevertheless, despite the necessity to promote investment into the railway sector, 
as it was common with other Latin American countries which had introduced 
concessioning, economic conditions of the country were not good enough to continue 
spending a large amount of public expenditure into the sector. This was the impetus 
to seek private financing even into the rail infrastructure, and this background was 
different from that of some European countries, of which government had an 
intention to promote public investment into the sector actively for revitalizing 
railways.  
 
                                                  
2  In 1994, the outlook of Mexican railway was: 1) the market share in freight traffic 
was only 15%; 2) the average speed of the freight trains was no more than 26 km/hr; 
3) more than 1,000 operational accidents took place per year. (Federal Competition 
Commission, 2001) 
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After several institutional reforms within the existing system, in February 1995, 
the Mexican Congress approved to open opportunities for private sector investment 
within the railway system. A new sectoral law in May 1995 stipulated the general 
procedures for the investments into the railway sector and defined the conditions 
under which private participation in railways was going to be allowed. (Campos. J., 
2001 p.90) Shaw, N. et al. (1996 p.3) notes the characteristics of concessions as:  
1) A government defines and grants specific rights to a company (usually private); 
2) A concession has a defined term (generally 5 to 50 years);  
3) A concession is geographically delimited;  
4) An agreement describes the concession’s objectives and directly or implicitly 
allocates risk. 
 
Through the concession, despite the ownership of the infrastructure by the 
government, the public sector withdraws from daily operation of the rail services 
and the private sector performs it including below-rail functions. The case in Mexico 
is one of the typical examples of transition from state-railway to private-operated 
railway by means of concessions.  
 
In the reform the primary lines were divided into three geographical divisions, 
North-east, North-Pacific and South-east. The rest of the system formed the short 
lines. The three major railroad companies were chosen in such a way that they 
serve broadly parallel routes in order to enhance the following competition in major 
markets (OECD, 2003, p21):  
1) competition on parallel tracks;  
2) both source and end-market competition.  
In addition, this regional segmentation scheme had an intention to enhance 
competition with road focusing on regional market needs by diminishing cross 
subsidies between the routes. (Federal Competition Commission, 2001) 
 
The study focuses on the following three concessionaires3:  
                                                  
3  TFM and Ferromex operate the two largest railroads in Mexico. Their freight traffic 
as a percentage of total is 37.6 % and 46.2% respectively in 1996. (Campos, J.,2002)  
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1) the North-eastern Railroad (TFM), which has been acquired by the TFM 
consortium; 
2) the North-Pacific Railroad (Ferromex), which was acquired originally by Grupo 
Ferroviario Mexicano; and 
3) the Mexico City Terminal Railway (TFVM). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   Figure 7.1 Geographical Divisions of the Mexican Railway Network 
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7.2.1.2 The Mexico City Terminal Railway : TFVM 
 
As the three primary freight concessionaires access Mexico City, its rail terminal 
was formed into a separate company. The case of vertical separation in Mexico 
City’s terminal, of which characteristics are different from the freight 
concessionaires, is also examined in this chapter.  
 
The Mexican Government founded a neutral terminal access area for the Mexico 
City area, thus marshalling yard and terminal facilities in the Mexico City area are 
operated by an independent organisation, the Mexico City Terminal Railway 
(TFVM). TFVM has four owners: 25 percent each for the three main freight 
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concessionaires and 25 percent for the government. The government retains its 
share because it wants eventually to run commuter trains on one of the lines, and it 
would transfer the remaining 25 percent ownership to the concessionaire. Since 
April 1998 TFVM operates with total commercial autonomy and neutrality with 
respect to the owners. (Campos, J., 2001 p.94)  
 
 
7.2.2 Regulation and Operation in Japanese Railways 
 
7.2.2.1  The Japanese Railway Enterprises Act 
 
In order to investigate regulatory reform of the two cases in Japan, it is worth 
understanding the Japanese Railway Enterprises Act, which Japanese railway 
activities are based on. Thus the Act is investigated in this section. 
 
The division and corporatization of Japanese National Railways (JNR) on 1st April 
1987 also changed the framework of the railway business. The Japanese National 
Railways Act and the Local and Private Railways Act were abolished and the 
Japanese Railway Enterprises Act was newly established. (Kamata, S., 1997 p.186) 
The Act stipulates that a railway license is necessary for an entry into the railway 
service. The Act classifies the railway licenses into the categories: 
 ▪ Class 1: Enterprises that provide rail passenger and/or freight services while 
holding their own rail infrastructure; 
 ▪ Class 2 : Enterprises that provide rail passenger and/or freight services using 
rail infrastructure owned by another organization; and 
▪ Class 3 : Enterprises that own infrastructure only for renting it to a Class 2 
Enterprise.4 
 
                                                  
4  Actually, Class 3 also stipulates enterprises that build rail infrastructure for a sale to 
a Class 1 Enterprise. Nevertheless, the author does not deal with these enterprises in 
this paper as they have little relation to vertical separation defined in Chapter 2. The 
license for this case is applied to only construction process, and there are only a few 
examples in Japan at present. 
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Most railways in Japan are Class 1 Enterprises, but there is no one-to-one 
relationship between each rail enterprise and a type of license. As a licence is given 
to each line, it is possible for an enterprise to have different kinds of licenses. 
(Mizutani, F., 1999 p.256) 
 
The direct reason for implementing the system of classification is to accommodate 
JR Freight, which was created by the division of JNR. JR Freight does not own the 
railway infrastructure but uses the JR Passenger Companies’ infrastructure to run 
its trains. Thus it was designated as a Class 2 Enterprise. 
 
Another reason for legally separating the categories is to promote investment. 
Because railway facilities are much larger today and require vast amounts of 
capital for construction, it is necessary to separate the construction/ownership of 
these facilities from the business of operating them. This capital burden strains 
railway business management and makes it more difficult to launch new railway 
lines. Therefore, to construct and sustain railways, it has proved necessary to divide 
railway enterprises into entities that construct and administer the railway and 
those that operate it, and to alleviate the capital burden of construction from the 
operating entity as much as possible. (Kamata, S., 1997 p.188) 
 
In principle, the following combination of the enterprises can be regarded as 
“vertical separation” which is defined in Chapter 2. 
 Combination 1: A Class 2 Enterprise accesses the track of a Class 1 Enterprise. 
Combination 2: A Class 2 Enterprise accesses the track of a Class 3 Enterprise. 
 
An example of the Combination 1 is the relationship that JR Freight accesses the 
infrastructure of JR Passenger Companies.5  
 
An example of the Combination 2 is the relationship that JR West accesses the 
                                                  
5  In this case the JR Passenger Company only has a license of Class 1, and does not 
need to get a license of Class 3. Because a license of Class 3 is for the enterprises 
which do not provide rail passenger and/or freight services by themselves.  
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infrastructure which is owned by Kansai Rapid Railway, which has a licence of 
Class 3 Enterprise. JR West operates its passenger trains through its own network 
and Tozai Line, which is owned by Kansai Rapid Railway. JR West provides rail 
passenger service as a Class 1 Enterprise on its own network, and as a Class 2 
Enterprise on the network of Tozai Line.  
 
Fundamentally, the railway operation only by Class 1 Enterprises is not within the 
scope of “vertical separation” defined in Chapter 2. Nevertheless, in Japan there are 
several cases that one train provides passenger services going through different 
Class 1 Enterprises’ infrastructure.  
 
In order to comprehend the concept of “vertical separation” and to analyze it, it is 
essential to recognize the difference between “vertical separation” and “reciprocal 
running” among Class 1 Railway Enterprises. Thus, in the next section the author 
discusses train operation in the form of “reciprocal running” in Japan.   
 
 
7.2.2.2  Reciprocal Running among Class 1 Railway Enterprises  
 
1) Introduction  
In this paper, the author defines “reciprocal running” as a train operation where two 
or more Class 1 Railway Enterprises operate a train running through among them 
without vertical separation. In other words, “reciprocal running” is a through-train 
operation as a Class 1 Railway Enterprise.6 
 
Through reciprocal running the passengers can enjoy through-train services and 
reduction of travel time without inconvenience of changing trains. The concerned 
operators can achieve these advantages without heavy investment in the 
                                                  
6  Before the issue of the EU Directives, European railways have also established their 
own traditional rules of interoperability and they have had well-established 
cooperative relationship between state railways.(IRJ, 2003) This relationship among 
operators for cross-border operation is simply explained in Figure 5.1, and the 
traditional model of international railway transportation has similarity with 
“reciprocal running” in Japan. 
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infrastructure. Thus reciprocal running is useful for reducing terminal congestion of 
both passengers and trains. 
 
As Japanese passenger rail companies are eager to promote their transport services 
without huge investment, the cases of reciprocal running are expected to increase 
for promoting through-train operations with other rail companies. 
 
2) Characteristics of Reciprocal Running 
 (Revenue of fares and rent-fees for rolling stock) 
In the form of reciprocal running, the rolling stock of a Class 1 Railway Enterprise 
goes out of its own network and accesses the tracks of another Class 1 Railway 
Enterprise. Thus the relationship between the two railways is shown in Figure 7.2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Network of Railway A Network of Railway B 
Rolling Stock of Railway A 
   Figure 7.2  Reciprocal Running between Class 1 Railway Enterprises  
   Source: Author, based on the interview [15/JP] 
 
As it is shown in Figure 7.2, the fare for railway operation using Railway A’s tracks 
belongs to Railway A. Thus, in the form of reciprocal running, in general, it is not 
necessary for a certain railway to have ticket gates independent from another 
railway. For example, within a network of Railway A, the fare belongs to Railway A 
even if Railway A uses Railway B’s rolling stock. In case Railway A uses Railway B’s 
rolling stock, Railway A pays rent-fees of the rolling stock to Railway B. [15/JP] 
 
Rolling Stock of Railway B
 
Revenue of Railway A Revenue of Railway B 
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(Operational responsibilities) 
As railways permit the access of other railways’ rolling stock, the concerned 
railways negotiate, in advance of reciprocal running, mutually-agreeable terms 
regarding the condition of the access. They make serious efforts to this process. For 
example, they have to agree with each other about rolling stock performance such 
as gauge width, size of rolling stock, type of car body and bogie, standard for 
fire-resistance, electrical system, signalling apparatus, train-control system, weight 
of rolling stock, passenger capacity, brake performance, telecommunication system, 
safety measures, and so on. Usually, they promote unification of basic equipment 
standards for emergency repair of rolling stock. Close communication and 
understanding about an integrated schedule and rolling stock operation are also 
essential factors for avoiding problems and accidents. [15/JP]  
 
In the form of reciprocal running the responsibilities of train operation are clearly 
separated at the border, and each railway is fully responsible for the train operation 
on its own network. In general, the drivers change at the border station and they 
drive a train on their own network only.7 This is for securing the operational safety, 
and this kind of measures has become fundamental policy since a serious train 
accident on the network of Shigaraki Highland Railway in 1991. The train accident, 
which two trains crashed resulting in 42 people death and 614 people injury, had 
happened when the driver of a JR Company performed train driving out of his own 
company’s network, and lack of sufficient communication between the two 
companies was regarded as one of the important factors of the train accident.[15/JP] 
Since this accident, in order to secure greater safety, each railway company took 
measures to distinguish its own operational responsibility from that of other 
railways more clearly. These measures, such as changing drivers at the border 
station in reciprocal running, have become thorough not only in Shigaraki Highland 
Railway but also on other lines over Japan. In brief, in the form of reciprocal 
                                                  
7  As it is considered that the conductors can work beyond their own network without 
deteriorating safety level of train operation, they sometimes perform their services 
even after the train passes a border of the two railways. In this case one of the 
railways pays for the conductor’s services to another railway. [15/JP] 
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running each Class 1 Railway Enterprise takes responsibility of train operation 
within its own network. [15/JP] 
 
3) Summary 
Certainly, there are several examples of vertical separation in Japan, but Japanese 
railways have made efforts to promote their passenger through-train services by 
means of reciprocal running. In other words, in principle they tried to avoid vertical 
separation and have introduced reciprocal running instead.[15/JP] For example, 
most of the inter-company trains, such as those between JR Passenger Companies 
and those between a JR Passenger Company and a private railway, are operated in 
the form of reciprocal running. If the concerned railways agree on the conditions, 
reciprocal running can promote through-train services between them improving 
transport services. It is not necessary for them to invest huge amount of funds into 
the infrastructure, and it is prospected that reciprocal running will be utilized in 
more cases to develop seam-less rail transport services in Japan.  
 
In the form of reciprocal running the concerned railways cooperate for smooth 
operation and safety, and each railway takes necessary measures, such as changing 
the drivers at the border station, in order to bear safety responsibility. Nevertheless, 
they sometimes utilize vertical separation as well for some reasons. Even in the 
case of vertical separation, Japanese railway enterprises keep close cooperation 
among the concerned entities. For example, in addition to the facility condition they 
reach mutual understanding about communication methods, emergency measures, 
and other detailed operational issues for smooth and safe operation. They believe 
that close communication and cooperation among concerned parties, not only at the 
stage of getting a license but also in the daily operational stage after 
commencement of the train services, are pre-requisite for securing safety both in 
reciprocal running and in vertical separation. (JR East, 2003) 
 
 
7.2.3 Two Newly-Organized Lines in Japan 
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7.2.3.1 New Shinkansen Lines  
 
This section examines a new scheme for construction of the new Shinkansen lines 
after the privatization of JNR in 1987.  
 
Shinkansen lines are planned and constructed based on the Nationwide 
Shinkansen Railway Development Law. Shinkansen lines had been constructed 
with interest-bearing loans before the privatization of JNR. Thus it meant a 
precondition that the construction costs be paid back from sales revenue after the 
opening of operations. A construction and operation scheme for the new Shinkansen 
lines was established in 1989 reflecting the failure of JNR, and the lines built since 
then are constructed and operated based on this new scheme. Under the new 
scheme, Japan Railway Construction, Transport and Technology Agency (JRTT), a 
wholly government-financed entity, carries out the Shinkansen construction work. 
The precept is that as building a Shinkansen line has an impact on the entire 
community located along the new line, the projects are handled as a public works. 
The state and local governments bear the financial burden of the projects with the 
ratio of 2:1. (Koga, T., 2003 p.21) 
 
JRTT procures construction costs and owns the facilities that it has constructed. 
The JR Passenger Company leases those facilities from JRTT after the completion 
and pays the usage fees, which will be explained in Section 7.5.3. Operation of the 
new Shinkansen lines should not deteriorate the JR Passenger Companies’ financial 
results. Thus the agreement of local communities is also required to be confirmed 
with respect to the management separation from the JR Passenger Company of 
conventional lines parallel to new Shinkansen line segments. (JR East, 2004a) 
 
 
7.2.3.2 Aoimori Railway  
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As the last case of this chapter, the author investigates the management of a 
conventional line separated from the JR Passenger Company as a result of 
construction of the new Shinkansen line. 
 
Aoimori Railway was established in 2002. As it had been a conventional line 
running parallel to the new Shinkansen line segment, it was separated from a JR 
Passenger Company, JR East, based on the agreement of local communities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AOMORI PREFECTURE
Extension of New Shinkansen 
Line（Under Construction） 
 For Tokyo (JR East) 
Morioka 
Aomori
Hachinohe 
AOIMORI RAILWAY 
New Shinkansen Line 
Iwate Ginga Railway (IGR) 
Metoki
IWATE PREFECTURE 
JR Hokkaido
JR East 
JR West 
JR Tokai
JR Shikoku 
JR Kyushu 
Tokyo 
 
Conventional Line (JR East) 
      Figure 7.3  Aoimori Railway and its Surroundings 
      Source: Author 
 
Aoimori Railway was formerly a part of the JR East’s Tohoku Main Line. The 
separated Morioka – Hachinohe segment covers both Iwate and Aomori Prefectures, 
and Aoimori Railway is the section in Aomori Prefecture covering 25.9km at 
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present. 8  Aoimori Railway is the first case in Japan that a third sector, a 
joint-venture between the private and public sectors, had introduced vertical 
separation as a result of management separation from a JR Company. The segment 
in Iwate Prefecture is operated by the newly established Iwate Ginga Railway (IGR) 
as a Class 1 Railway Enterprise. An outline of the railways around Aoimori Railway 
is shown in Figure 7.3. 
 
As Iwate Prefecture had another third sector Class 1 Railway Enterprise, IGR was 
established as an integrated structure considering the equality with it. On the other 
hand, comparing with the section in Iwate Prefecture, there were not so many 
passengers in the part of Aomori Prefecture, and the average traffic density was 
expected to be only 1,700 daily passenger-kms / route-length.9 Thus it was clear 
that the separated conventional railway in Aomori Prefecture can not cover the 
initial infrastructure cost. In Japan if the planned management can not be 
financially viable, the government would not issue a license of Railway Enterprise. 
Thus Aomori Prefecture, as a Class 3 Railway Enterprise, bought and owned its 
infrastructure, and Aoimori Railway, which Aomori Prefecture invested 55% of the 
shares, took only a responsibility of train operation without investing the initial 
infrastructure costs. (Aomori Prefecture, 2001) 
 
The railway operator and infrastructure in the segment of Aoimori Railway and 
those in the surrounding regions are shown in Table 7.1.     
 
As it is shown in the table, rolling stock of IGR and JR East also accesses the 
segment of Aoimori Railway as a form of reciprocal running. But the relationship 
between Aoimori Railway and these two railways is not competitive. Three of them 
make serious efforts to reach mutually-agreeable terms regarding conditions of the 
reciprocal running. Similar to other Japanese railways, they believe that reciprocal 
                                                  
8  Upon a completion of the construction project of the new Shinkansen line’s extension 
segment between Hachinohe and Aomori, the conventional line between these cities 
will be also separated and transferred from JR East to Aoimori Railway. 
 
9  The actual traffic density in 2006 was 1,114 daily passenger-kms / route-length. 
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running, clearly distinguishing each railway’s responsibility, is more appropriate 
means for promoting through-train operation among them. The operation 
performed on the track of this segment is one of the typical examples of reciprocal 
running in Japan. 
 
Table 7.1 Railway Operators and Infrastructure in Iwate and Aomori Prefectures 
Prefecture Iwate Prefecture Aomori Prefecture 
Morioka-Metoki Metoki-Hachinohe*1  Section  
<Separation from JR> Until Morioka <The Separated Segment> 
After Hachinohe
Passenger operator 
(Type of a license) 
JR East 
(Class 1) 
IGR 
(Class 1) 
Aoimori Railway 
(Class 2) 
JR East 
(Class 1) 
Freight operator 
(Type of a licence) 
JR Freight  
(Class 2) 
Infrastructure owner 
(Type of a licence) 
JR East 
(Class 1) 
IGR 
(Class 1) 
Aomori Prefecture 
(Class 3) 
JR East 
(Class 1) 
IGR    - 
Aoimori 
Railway 
 
  
 
 - 
Reciprocal 
Running *2 
JR East     
*1: Parts of Underline: The segment of Aoimori Railway 
*2: Railways whose rolling stock accesses as a form of reciprocal running. 
1)              : Reciprocal Running 
                 Class 1 Railway Enterprise (segments in IGR and JR East); :2) Class 3 Railway Enterprise (segment in Aoimori Railway)  
Source: Author 
 
 
7.3 Aims of the Reform through Vertical Separation 
 
The aims for introduction of vertical separation in the four cases are summarised as 
Table 7.2. As it is summarized, the background of introduction of the vertical 
separation varies. Nevertheless, in these cases the private sector10 participates into 
the railway operation with long-run access to the infrastructure.  
                                                  
10  Aoimori Railway is a joint-venture between the private and public sectors as 
described in Section 7.2.3.2. 
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Table 7.2 Aims of Vertical Separation in the Cases in Mexico and Japan  
Railway Aims of the vertical separation 
Mexico (TFM, Ferromex) (1) to promote more investment in infrastructure. 
(2) to eliminate subsidies from the government. 
(3) to improve service efficiency utilizing Mexico’s main 
commercial partners. 
Mexico (TFVM) (1) to avoid monopolistic access in the country’s most 
densely used network. 
(2) to promote competition on parallel tracks. 
New Shinkansen Lines 
 
(1) to utilize public investment funds for construction of 
the infrastructure. 
(2) to keep independent management of the JR 
Passenger Company as an operator. 
Aoimori Railway  
 
(1) to utilize the local government’s funds to buy and own 
the infrastructure in order to alleviate huge amount 
of initial investment by the operator, Aoimori Railway.
(2) to clarify responsibilities of the regional government 
and those of the railway operator. 
Source:  ▪ Interviews/questionnaires to Mexico and Japan. [13/MX, 14/JP, 15/JP] 
▪ Campos, J. (2001) 
▪ Aomori Prefecture (2001) 
 
 
7.4 Forms and Implementation of the Vertical Separation 
 
7.4.1 Forms of the Vertical Separation 
 
The forms of vertical separation in the four cases are summarized in Table 7.3. As it 
is examined in the table, forms of vertical separation vary in the railways in this 
chapter. But in all the cases a private operator provides railway services on the 
infrastructure which is owned by the public sector. 
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Table 7.3 Forms of Vertical Separation in the Cases in Mexico and Japan 
Railway Forms of Vertical Separation 
Mexico (TFM, Ferromex) 
(*1) 
The infrastructure is owned by the government, and 
rail transport services are performed by the 
concessionaires. (*2) 
Mexico (TFVM) TFVM operates the infrastructure, which is owned 
by the government. The three freight concessionaires, 
which are the share-holders of TFVM, access the 
infrastructure.  
New Shinkansen Lines  Only one designated JR Passenger Company can 
access the infrastructure, which is owned by the public 
sector, JRTT. 
Aoimori Railway  Infrastructure is owned by the public sector, Aomori 
Prefecture. Aoimori Railway, along with JR Freight, 
operates rail transport services accessing the 
infrastructure.  
 
(*1)  Frequently, the long-run concessions, such as the case with the two Mexican 
freight concessionaires, have been referred as “vertically integrated railways” in 
many other papers. Nevertheless, based on the definition in Section 2.4.1 they are 
regarded as one type of “vertical separation” in this paper. 
 
(*2)  Sharp, R.(2005 p.7) notes that “over the 1990s, Mexico essentially eliminated rail 
passenger traffic prior to concessioning, passenger-km declining from 15 percent of 
the total passenger-km in the region to under 1 percent.” 
Several passenger services were assigned to the concessionaires bidding for the 
lowest subsidy. This process was only applied to routes that lacked an alternative 
traffic mode. (Campos, J., 2001 p.91) 
 
Source: Interviews/questionnaires to Mexico and Japan [13/MX, 14/JP, 15/JP] 
  
 
7.4.2 Implementation of the Vertical Separation 
 
7.4.2.1 Organizational Structure and Management with Vertical Separation 
 
The result of investigation about the organizational structure and management 
with vertical separation are summarised in Appendix 3. In all the cases, the private 
sector performs railway operation with long-run access to the infrastructure.   
 
In the Mexican freight concessionaires (TFM, Ferromex) and new Shinkansen lines, 
the railway operator performs the essential factors of daily operation such as 
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infrastructure maintenance, timetabling, traffic control, and rolling stock 
maintenance, and these factors are carried out with the operator’s financial 
responsibilities. The operator itself makes financial planning and investment in 
operations and infrastructure over the period which the infrastructure is leased. 
These railways are characterized by integration of the different functions/services 
retaining the ownership of the infrastructure to the public sector. 
 
In Aoimori Railway, Aomori Prefecture orders the maintenance works of 
infrastructure and is directly responsible for the planning and budget for the 
infrastructure maintenance.11 Nevertheless, different from European Railways, the 
railway operator, Aoimori Railway, makes a timetable. Thus, except the 
maintenance of tracks and infrastructure, Aoimori Railway performs the essential 
factors of daily operation. In this segment, the rolling stock of IGR and JR East 
accesses the tracks in the form of reciprocal running under the control of Aoimori 
Railway. As it was investigated in Section 7.2.2.2 and Section 7.2.3.2, reciprocal 
running is largely different from the vertical separation, which European Directives 
are trying to achieve. Despite separation of the financial responsibilities between 
infrastructure and operation, the operator is responsible for the most of operational 
factors including signalling and train controlling in this case as well. 
 
 
7.4.2.2 Relationship among Different Parties and Relevant Issues 
 
The outline of relationship among different parties and relevant issues are 
described in Appendix 4. This section mainly examines the measures to assign 
operational services to the private sector in each case. 
 
In the two Mexican freight concessionaires, the operation is assigned through the 
competitive bidding. Without the track-age right by other operators, the 
                                                  
11 Aomori Prefecture and Aoimori Railway worry about coordination problems between 
infrastructure and operation. At present, Aomori Prefecture plans to contract out the 
track maintenance to Aoimori Railway in order to decrease the coordination problems 
between them. 
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concessionaire controls both infrastructure and operation as if it were an integrated 
railway during the concession period. There are no subsidies or other financial 
transfers between the government and the freight concessionaires after the 
concessioning processes. 
 
In TFVM, the three freight operators, the share-holders of TFVM, can access the 
infrastructure with neutral conditions. Practically, it is not intended to open the 
infrastructure other than these three and the planned commuter concessionaires. 
Thus share-holding relationship practically stipulates the access to the 
infrastructure. 
 
In new Shinkansen lines, it is generally recognized by the public that only JR 
Passenger Companies can operate Shinkansen trains because of the operational 
and engineering abilities. In addition to this fact, the service on the new line should 
be linked to that on the existing line smoothly so as to maximize potential of the 
railway network. Thus a JR Passenger Company in the region is designated as an 
operator. 
 
In Aoimori Railway, as it is intended that ability and management efforts of the 
private sector should be utilized in the operating sector, a joint-venture between the 
private and Aomori Prefecture was established, which resulted in a share-holding 
relationship between infrastructure and operation. Thus the infrastructure 
manager has no intention to permit the track-age rights to other operators in the 
passenger sector. 
 
In each case the public sector owns the infrastructure and the tracks, and the 
private sector performs railway operation accessing them. But as it is investigated, 
the measures to stipulate the access to the tracks vary. In the case of two Mexican 
freight concessionaires and new Shinkansen lines, the assignment of the operation 
is stipulated by the contract or the law. On the other hand, in TFVM and Aoimori 
Railway, close share-holding relationship between infrastructure and operation 
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practically stipulates the access to the tracks. Based on the above-mentioned 
stipulation, the number of operators is limited to sole or a few. 
 
 
7.5 Transition of Management of the Railways 
 
7.5.1 Long-Run Freight Concessions in Mexico: TFM, Ferromex 
 
7.5.1.1 The Concession Bidding Processes 
 
The way to sell the rights for the usage of rail infrastructure varies depending on 
the countries. Some countries such as Argentina and Brazil sold the concession by 
itself. Mexico took the different procedure as follows (Thompson, L. et al., 2001): 
1)  The Mexican government divided the FNM into some regionally segmented 
companies to be sold with the rolling stock and concession.12 The government 
eliminated several unprofitable routes through this process; 
2)  The companies were converted into stock companies and they started to operate 
autonomously since April 1996; 
3)  The government sold the shares of the concessionaire companies through a 
competitive bidding to strategic investors.13 Firstly, the government sold 80 % of 
the shares of each company. Then, within 5 years of the initial transfer, the 
government sold the remaining 20% shares. Only the Mexican legal entities 
whose foreign capital share is below 49% were permitted to join in the bidding.  
 
In the case of Mexico, the awards were based simply on the best offer for shares of 
                                                  
12  The concession contains:1) indicators of efficiency and safety for the evaluation of 
the service; 2) the period of the concession; 3) the characteristics and amounts of the 
guarantees the firm has to commit to the government; 4) all the payments and the 
form of payment in which the concessionaire must pay. (Calva, L. 2001 p.13) 
 
13  There were three general approaches to sell the concessions/shares of the 
companies with concessions: 1)sealed bids; 2)public auction; 3)direct negotiation.  
The government in Mexico sold the shares through a sealed bid auction to be won by 
the highest bidding consortium, which might be the simplest awarding 
approach.(Thompson, L. et al., 2001) 
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the companies.14 The new investments were not either specified or evaluated in the 
process of the competitive bidding. The concessionaires were allowed to invest 
whatever they thought appropriate. [13/MX] 
 
This procedure is slightly different from the model of competitive bidding to win 
franchises in passenger rail services in Europe, where the winner is mainly based 
on the one who will pay the maximum premium or accept the minimum subsidy. 
 
The results of concession bidding of the two main freight railroad were indicated in 
Table 7.4. For the years prior to concessioning, FNM had been losing around 
US$400 million annually, which accounted for about 5 percent of Mexico’s internal 
debt. The concessioning has relieved this large amount of deficits of the 
state-railway because subsidies to the freight concessionaires have not been paid 
and those to passenger rail services have been suppressed. Instead of the former 
annual losses, in addition to the taxes paid by the private concessionaires, the 
government of Mexico has received from concession sales by the amount of US $2.4 
billion including short lines. (Thompson, L. et al., 2001) 
 
Table 7.4 Results of Concession Bidding of the Two Mexican Freight Railroads 
 Railroad (Concessionaire) Auctioned Assets 
Initial 
Transfer 
Value  
(million US $) 
Committed 
Investment 
(million US $)
North-eastern (TFM) 80 % shares Jun. 1997 1415 690
North-Pacific (Ferromex) 80 % shares Feb. 1998 524 334
Source: Campos, J. (2001) 
 
 
7.5.1.2 Transition of the Performance 
 
Before the restructurings, tariffs were not based on market conditions and had not 
                                                  
14  Each line or system to be concessioned had a “technical value”, which was estimated 
by the government. The government would not award the concession below that value 
that performed as a kind of “minimum value” of the concession. The technical value 
was kept secret and was unknown to the bidders. [13/MX] 
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reflected costs of providing the services. Nevertheless, in recognition of the severe 
competition from roads as well as competition between the tracks, the new sectoral 
law stipulated that rates may be regulated only in case effective competition does 
not exist in the transportation service. (Campos, J., 2002)  
 
After the restructurings, the freight concessions had stronger incentives to increase 
the traffic with liberalized railway management such as setting market-oriented 
tariffs.[13/MX-1, 2] These changes resulted in several advantageous effects. For 
example, in addition to the improvement of safety performance, revenue and traffic 
have been improved remarkably.  
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   Figure 7.4  Trends of Freight Rail Performance in Mexico 
   Source: World Bank Railway Database 
International Monetary Fund (2008) 
 
Federal Competition Commission(2001) explains that freight rail performance has 
increased because of a better attention to users, adoption of better equipment and 
modern operation system, as well as of a more aggressive trading strategy. Figure 
7.4 shows that the traffic output (tonne-kms) had increased 55.3% during the period 
between 1997 and 2005. Since the growth of the real-term GDP during the same 
period is 27.2%, the rail freight traffic has improved more remarkably than that of 
national economy.  
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This growth has been attained while the number of employee is decreased, as it is 
usual with other cases of railway concessioning. 15  Figure 7.5 shows that the 
productive efficiency of the concessionaires has improved remarkably since the 
concession is awarded. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 7.5  Trends of Employees and Productivity in Mexican Concessionaires 
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Federal Competition Commission (2001) concludes the effects of the reform in 
Mexico as follows: 
▪  The privatization scheme adopted in Mexico promoted investment and the 
development of railroad infrastructure; 
▪  New investments had enhanced efficiency, competitiveness, modernity and 
safety of a system which had significant deficiencies; 
▪ Unnecessary railroad stretches and some passenger services were eliminated 
                                                  
15  In order to cope with severity of labour cutbacks, strong coordination with labour 
union is essential. Thompson, L. and Budin, K.J. (1997) notes that a fair and 
effective program for dealing with redundant labour should be developed for the 
success of the concessioning.  
In the case of Mexico, in 1995 FNM had around 46,300 employees, but the number 
has decreased into 17,500 in 2000. (Federal Competition Commission, 2001) Mexico 
took the following approach: 1) The government calculated a safety net package based 
on the worker’s wage history, job security, employment potential, etc; 2) Every worker 
was paid this package after each concession was transferred; 3) The workers decided 
whether to accept any offers made by the new concessionaires. (Thompson, L. et al., 
2001) 
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whenever more efficient transportation alternatives existed. 
 
 
7.5.1.3 Challenges of the Long-run Concessions 
 
The railway concessioning in Latin America including the case of Mexico is 
reviewed that “concessioning has been successful overall in preserving and 
reviving railway operations on existing assets” (Sharp, R. 2005 p.4) and the 
process clearly addressed fiscal problems faced by the country. But it has 
identified the following challenges. 
 
1. Non-fulfilment of the promised/committed investments 
It is so difficult to specify long-run concessions allowing for changing 
circumstances, and there is a possibility that the concessionaire has an incentive 
to promise lots of investment but not to deliver it actually. [13/MX-1, 2] R. Sharp 
(2005) also indicates the failure of concessions to meet investment promises/ 
commitments as one of the controversy issues of long-run concessions. 
 
In particular, the interviewee stressed that the major investment issue for 
long-run concessions is infrastructure16 because: 1) it has long life and long 
payback period; 2) it is hard to borrow money against infrastructure. Sleepers 
and rail, once put into the ground, cannot be reclaimed if a borrower does not 
meet his obligations. Thus, potential investors are very cautious about making 
investments in infrastructure because the security value if things go wrong is 
very limited. Since the concessionaire does not actually own the infrastructure in 
long-run concessions, the security value only resides in the concession agreement 
and its profitability. This is usually limited and, in any case, unproven at the 
beginning.[13/MX-1, 2] Based on the above-mentioned background, private 
concessionaires often had difficulties to perform major infrastructure upgrading 
                                                  
16   On the other hand, freight wagons and locomotives are relatively simple to 
repossess in case they are for a standard gauge railway. In addition, the lifetime of 
rolling stock is somewhat shorter than that of infrastructure, thus the commitment in 
the investment is shorter as well.[13/MX-1,2] 
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even if traffic demand is favourable enough.  
 
In order to cope with this issue of infrastructure investment, firstly, Thompson, L. 
and Budin, K.J. (1997 p.7) suggests that concession term should be consistent 
with the government’s objectives regarding the private investment. This is 
because the private sector generally does not finance assets whose service life is 
significantly longer than the concession term. 
 
Secondly, the interviewee suggests, as the most reliable approach to settling the 
issue, that the government should identify the upgrading/expanding works which 
the government needs (for whatever reason) but are not profitable for the 
concessionaires, and then should invest into them directly since concessionaires 
generally make investments into the works profitable for themselves without 
being forced to do so. Nevertheless, they frequently fail to perform investments 
that are unprofitable even if the government wants them to do so, and even if 
they promised it in their initial bids. [13/MX-1, 2] 
 
2. Conflicts about access prices  
In the case of Mexico, in order to enhance competition among different regional 
railroads and to control monopoly power of the concessionaire, the track-age and 
haulage rights are also imposed to other concessionaires in certain key routes 
such as those in major urban and industrial areas and some ports.(Campos, 
J.,2001 p.93) Only fundamental principles are stipulated in the concessions, and 
the interviewee indicated there were conflicts regarding access prices which 
should be paid by other operators. [13/MX-1, 2] 
 
Although provisions in the concessions require the companies to negotiate 
track-age rights for certain critical areas and there was also pressure from the 
government to do so, the negotiations have not succeeded as each company 
wanted to charge a high price for its track-age rights, and the other company 
never wanted to pay. The government could intervene and force the 
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implementation of access charges for track-age rights, but it has not been done so 
far. [13/MX-1, 2] 
 
3. Controlling market power of the concessionaire  
Campos, J. (2002) indicates that how to control market power is one of the 
essential issues relevant to concessioning since the concessionaire would be the 
sole, at least dominant, licensed operator on the network. Even if competitive 
bidding could select an appropriate concessionaire, it will gain somewhat 
monopolistic status at least in the railway transport on the network, and its 
market power should be controlled by some means.     
 
 
Some of the above-mentioned potential problems appear to be derived from the 
fact that the concession contract covers a long-term and that the market 
circumstances and economic environment might change significantly over the 
period. It is needless to note that, at the initial stage of the structuring process, 
concession contract should be carefully designed based on a number of factors 
such as nature of the network, risk allocation, tariff and service specification, 
contract length, and so on. Nevertheless, it is practically impossible to predict the 
transition of country condition and that of concessionaire performance at the time 
of competitive bidding with certainty. Thus, Thompson, L. and Budin, K.J. (1997 
p.7) notes that “concessions inherently require continuing government 
involvement in regulating safety, monopolistic behavior, and compliance with the 
pricing and service requirements of the concession.” 
 
Despite the above-mentioned challenges inherent in long-run concessions, the 
results in the case of Mexico appear to have succeeded in introducing market 
mechanism into the railways, which is considered to be the main objective of private 
participation in the sector. 
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7.5.2 The Mexico City Terminal Railway: TFVM 
 
Since April 1998, TFVM apparently operates keeping commercial autonomy and 
neutrality with the shareholders. TFVM is now self-financing through its 
operational revenues. Additional equities have not been required from them besides 
the initial disbursements, mainly because of cost control and improved performance. 
(Campos, J., 2001 p.94) 
 
This type of vertical separation appears to be appropriate for attaining neutral 
access for certain operators exclusively. As TFVM has no reason to open the tracks 
to the operators other than share-holders, the share-holding relationship with 
limited number of operators was realizable, and this relationship contributes 
towards managerial cooperation between infrastructure and operation. The three 
freight operators apply the time-slots, and the infrastructure manager, TFVM, 
allocates the time-slots as it is similar to the process of the railways in Europe. 
What is different from the European model is that the infrastructure manager has 
close share-holding link with plural operators accessing the tracks. Due to relatively 
sufficient infrastructure capacity, TFVM has been successfully coordinating the 
timetabling so far. At present, the access charges paid by the freight operators also 
can cover the maintenance costs of the Terminal.17 In the case of conflicts between 
infrastructure and operation, the government could intervene. Nevertheless, it has 
not happened so far owing to the cooperative relationship based on the close 
share-holding link between them. [13/MX-3] 
 
In terms of the above point of views, despite the fact that the access rights are 
practically exclusive only to the shareholders, compared with the German model in 
                                                  
17   Although TFVM is now self-financing through its operational revenues, as a 
potential problem, Campos, J.(2002 p.94) indicates a long-run internal instability risk 
due to owners’ asymmetry. In TFVM, freight concessionaires are simultaneously the 
owners of it, and each of them has the equal voting rights and management decisions 
require a majority of 75 %. Nevertheless, there exists the owners’ asymmetry in terms 
of traffic volume, number of trains on the network and even in the price paid for their 
concessions. Once, for example, the decrease of cargo volume results in requiring 
additional capital, this might result in raising some conflicts among owners when 
they seek to re-negotiate their stakes. 
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which the main railway with infrastructure permits other operators’ access rights, 
the form of TFVM, which does not belong to a certain operator, is more likely to 
attain the neutral access by the concerned operators. 
 
 
7.5.3 New Shinkansen Lines 
 
Firstly, this section examines the usage fees paid by a JR Passenger Company, as it 
characterizes vertical separation in new Shinkansen lines. Then, management of 
the line is investigated. 
  
7.5.3.1 Usage Fees of the Infrastructure 
 
The amount of usage fees paid by an operator of new Shinkansen lines is an 
essential factor of the relationship between the JR Passenger Company and the 
public sector. 
 
Payment of the usage fees is now regulated by the Japan Railway Construction, 
Transport and Technology Agency Law. The Law stipulates that JRTT calculates 
the amount primarily based on the benefits received as an operator of the new 
Shinkansen lines after opening. Of those, the benefits received as an operator are 
calculated by comparing the following two amounts: 
1) the estimated revenues and expenses generated by the new segment of 
Shinkansen line and related line segments after opening; with 
2) the estimated revenues and expenses that would likely be generated by parallel 
conventional lines and related line segments if the new segment of the 
Shinkansen line were not opened.  
 
In brief, the expected benefits are the difference between the amount that the 
operator of the new Shinkansen line should receive as a result of operation and the 
amount that would be received if the new Shinkansen line did not commence 
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services. Specifically, the above benefits are calculated based on expected revenues 
and expenses over a 30-year period after opening. In addition, the taxes and 
maintenance fees are included in calculations of corresponding benefits as an 
expense of the operator of the new Shinkansen line after opening. Therefore, the 
burden of the operator is kept within the limits of the corresponding benefits. (JR 
East, 2004a) 
 
 
7.5.3.2 Management of the New Shinkansen Line 
 
The JR Passenger Company pays above-mentioned fixed usage fees of the new 
Shinkansen line. Thus, once the usage fees are settled, the JR Company does not, 
necessarily, need to negotiate with the third party, such as JRTT, the government 
and local governments, during the 30-year period regarding the operation of the line. 
Practically, the JR Company in the region can operate passenger rail services 
utilizing the infrastructure of the new Shinkansen line in almost the same way as 
an integrated railway. For example, the JR Company can make the timetables of 
the new Shinkansen line, and is only required to report them to the government 
along with those of other lines. 
 
Since the reform of JNR in 1987, three segments of new Shinkansen lines were 
opened under the new scheme. Because of its high-speed transport service, the 
traffic unit (passenger-km) of each segment is larger than that of the former JR 
Express Trains. Nevertheless, as it is explained above, whether the opening of the 
line is advantageous or disadvantageous for the JR Companies’ management 
depends on the difference between the actual benefits and calculated ones for fixing 
the usage fees. 
 
 
7.5.4  Aoimori Railway  
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7.5.4.1 The Operational Status 
 
Aoimori Railway and JR Freight access the network in the form of vertical 
separation and the fare belongs to each company. Some trains of JR East and most 
of the trains of IGR access the section of Aoimori Railway in the form of reciprocal 
running, and the fare earned by these trains on this section belongs to Aoimori 
Railway. Fare adjustment is performed by means of appropriate methods among 
concerned railways. For example, most of the JR East’s rolling stock accessing on 
the section are long-distance night trains, and usually JR East receives the total 
fare from the passengers. Then, fare adjustment is performed based on the 
passenger-km on the section of Aoimori Railway, and JR East pays the calculated 
amount to Aoimori Railway. [15/JP] 
 
As it is examined in Section 7.2.2.2, the main aim of reciprocal running avoiding 
vertical separation is to keep more reliable safety. This is the reason why, for 
example, rolling stock of IGR and JR East run through the line of Aoimori Railway 
by reciprocal running not by vertical separation. As it is usual in reciprocal running, 
the drivers of IGR change at the border station and they drive the trains only within 
their own company’s network. Regarding the maintenance of infrastructure, IGR 
and Aoimori Prefecture clarified the segment which each entity is responsible for, 
and they also negotiated and made an agreement about emergency measures such 
as mutual support for the recovery from accidents or troubles.[15/JP] 
 
 
7.5.4.2 The Management Status 
 
The newly established Aoimori Railway has made efforts to increase the number of 
passengers, and the number of trains within the section has increased excepting the 
former JR Express Trains. 
 
Nevertheless, Aoimori Railway had to raise the fares in order to maintain the 
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annual income. In addition to the change of fares, the passengers who pass through 
different railways have to pay the base fare each time they cross the border between 
the railways, Aoimori Railway, IGR and JR East. Even though the concerned 
railways introduced some discount of the base fare for those passengers, the total 
fare for the passengers has become more expensive than that in JR’s era. 
 
Before the managerial separation from the JR lines, unprofitable lines such as the 
segment of current Aoimori Railway used to be sustained by cross-subsidy within 
the JR Company. This means that the profits from Tokyo Metropolitan Area and 
existing Shinkansen lines had been utilized for sustaining the unprofitable lines. 
The management separation from the JR Company abolished this cross-subsidy, 
and this is one of the backgrounds why the management of Aoimori Railway has 
been difficult. 
 
In the following the author investigates management status both the infrastructure 
and operation sectors in the section of Aoimori Railway. Firstly, the author will 
investigate the management of Aoimori Railway, the operation sector. 
 
Originally, it was planned that the revenue and expenditure of Aoimori Railway 
would be balanced, and its management would be self-sustained without subsidy 
from the local government. Nevertheless, about 90% of the access charges have been 
remitted since the establishment of Aoimori Railway. Owing to this remittance its 
management had been balanced until 2004. Nevertheless, despite this remittance, 
the financial result has been in deficit since 2005. And it is prospected that the 
management in the coming years is also very difficult because of the transport 
market change in the region such as decrease of the number of high-school students, 
which dominate the train passengers. 
  
Secondly, the author investigates the infrastructure sector, Aomori Prefecture. It is 
originally planned that annual expenditures, most of which are the maintenance 
fees for the engineering contractor, should be covered by the access charges paid by 
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Aoimori Railway and JR Freight.18 
 
Before the management separation in 2002, JR Freight paid only avoidable costs to 
JR East. Nevertheless, JR Express trains were abolished at the opening of the new 
Shinkansen line segment. Thus, it had become impossible for Aomori Prefecture to 
cover all of the maintenance cost in case the Prefecture adopts the same stipulation 
of access charges as before. As a result of the negotiations among the concerned 
parties such as Aomori Prefecture and JR Freight, it was decided that JR Freight 
would pay revised access charges based on JR Freight’s track usage.19 
 
Based on the above-mentioned modification, Aomori Prefecture established the 
revised scheme that the access charges should cover the total maintenance costs 
necessary for sustaining the infrastructure. Nevertheless, because of the deficit of 
Aoimori Railway, its access charges have been remitted as described above. Thus, 
annually a certain amount of expenditure, which was unexpected at the 
commencement of railway operation, has been paid to its railway division within 
Aomori Prefecture. 
 
As it is investigated above, now it should be the time we admit that the passenger 
demand forecast and management prospects at the time of establishment of Aoimori 
Railway was too optimistic. It is getting to be clear that without unplanned 
subsidies as a form of remittance of access charges and so on, it is difficult to sustain 
the management of Aoimori Railway. 
 
Nevertheless, abolishing or continuing the operation of Aoimori Railway is not only 
the matter of its management issue. Alike other railways, Aoimori Railway plays an 
                                                  
18 Some amounts of rent-fees from Aomori Prefecture’s facilities are also the revenue to 
the infrastructure sector. (Aomori Prefecture, 2001) 
 
19 This modification of JR Freight’s access charges was applied only to the segments 
which management separation was performed at the opening of the new Shinkansen 
lines.  
As the increase of access charges to these segments might threaten the management 
of JR Freight, it was also decided that the government would pay the difference of the 
amount comparing with the former case to JR Freight. (Satou, T. 2004) 
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important role in the region. For example, students’ commuting mainly relies on the 
railway, thus without establishment of another appropriate transport, it would be 
difficult for them to continue punctual daily commuting.  
 
The issue is more serious in the rail freight sector, since it is still a segment of a 
trunk line and has been playing a vital role connecting Tokyo Metropolitan Area 
and the north part of Japan. Without the segment of Aoimori Railway the current 
rail freight transport which connects the above two regions can not be sustained. 
Thus, there is also an opinion that the government should recognize the role which 
JR Freight plays in the country, and should take some necessary measures in order 
that this managerially separated segment could be sustained. (Satou, T., 2004) 
 
In order to make future decisions they should also count social costs and benefits of 
the region in the passenger sector, and the government should do so in terms of the 
rail freight transport over Japan in the freight sector. 
 
 
7.6 Advantages, Disadvantages and Results  
 
7.6.1 Advantages  
 
In addition to the results of the aims of the reform, which will be studied in the next 
section, the study also clarified the related advantages such as the improvement of 
labour productivity in the long-run concessions.  
 
 
7.6.2 Disadvantages  
 
The following issues were also indicated as disadvantages of the vertical separation 
in each case. 
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(Freight concessionaires: TFM, Ferromex) 
1. Non-fulfilment of the promised/committed investments 
As it is examined in Section 7.5.1.3, there is a case that the concession contract 
did include a promise/commitment of lots of investments, and the concessionaire 
only made those investments that were actually profitable to the concessionaire 
after award of the contract. In this case, the government did not meet a number 
of commitments it had made, and the effect of the government’s failure was that 
at least some of the promised investments were no longer profitable. [13/MX-1, 2]   
 
2. Conflicts about access prices  
As it is also examined in Section 7.5.1.3, there were some conflicts about access 
prices between concessionaires. Issues about track-access and failure to develop 
cooperation between the railroads have also resulted in weakening the close 
inter-connection among their networks. [13/MX-1, 2]   
 
3. Inequality with other transport modes  
The concessionaires insist that trucks do not pay the environmental costs and 
other externalities, and this neglect leaves the railway sector disadvantageous 
status. They claim that equal-footing with other transport modes including 
external costs has not been realized in the current freight concession system in 
Mexico. [13/MX-1, 2] 
 
 (New Shinkansen Lines) 
1. Complexity of the infrastructure ownership 
In new Shinkansen lines, most of the infrastructure is owned by JRTT, and it is 
leased to the JR Passenger Company. Nevertheless, the JR Company itself can 
also invest its own funds to the infrastructure for the improvement of facilities 
after the operation. In this case, some parts of the infrastructure are owned by the 
JR Company while most parts are owned by JRTT, thus the interviewee indicated 
that the management of infrastructure assets tends to be complicated. [14/JP] 
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2. Difference from the expectation  
In new Shinkansen lines, the usage fees are settled, as it is described in Section 
7.5.3, based on the operator’s benefits calculated over a 30-year period after 
opening. Thus, in a case of drastic change of circumstances such as radical 
economic change, the operator’s actual benefit might largely differ from the 
original calculation. [14/JP] 
 
 
7.6.3 Results of the Aims 
 
The results of the aims of the reform through vertical separation examined in 
Section 7.3 would be summarized as follows. 
 
7.6.3.1 Freight Concessionaires: TFM, Ferromex 
 
(1) Amount of investment has been increased based on the concession contract.20 
(2) The government subsidies have been eliminated except for a part of rail 
passenger transport. 
(3) Efficiency has been improved as a result of the better management strategy 
diminishing the former bureaucracy, and reduction of unnecessary personnel 
and costs. [14/MX-1,2] 
 
As the above results show, the concessioning could change the trend of deteriorating 
state-owned railway, and the initial aims have been attained in general. Campos, J. 
(2002 p.16) also notes that “a wide majority of private investors and government 
officials agreed that …railroad restructuring through open auctions in Mexico 
constituted a fine example of transition from a model of public sector dominance to a 
system of private operation of an existing transport infrastructure.”  
 
                                                  
20 The amount of investment has been effectively promoted and it had increased 287.5 
million dollars per year during the period between 1997-2000.(Federal Competition 
Commission, 2001) 
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7.6.3.2 The Mexico City Terminal Railway: TFVM 
 
(1) The three main concessionaires access the rail infrastructure of the 
metropolitan area enhancing economy of density. 
(2) Sharing track access between concessionaires in this kind of essential area 
contributed towards promoting intra-modal competition in the case of Mexico. 
 
TFVM commenced its operation in 1998, and its management has been 
self-financed. Thus the aim of establishment of TFVM is assured. 
 
 
7.6.3.3 New Shinkansen Lines  
 
(1) Infrastructure of the new Shinkansen Lines has been constructed with public 
funds after the restructuring of JNR. 
(2) The JR Passenger Company keeps its managerial independence without 
deteriorating the financial status owing to the afore-mentioned usage fees. 
 
The aims have been achieved, and the new Shinkansen line has been operated as if 
it were one of the lines of the JR Passenger Company in spite of the public sector’s 
investment and ownership of the infrastructure. 
 
 
7.6.3.4 Aoimori Railway  
 
(1) The local government’s funds were utilized in order to alleviate huge amount of 
initial investment by the operator for sustaining its management.  
(2) Despite the aim to clarify responsibilities between the two sectors, actual 
management status differs from the initial intention because of the lack of 
revenue in the passenger sector. 
193 
 
As it was investigated in Section 7.5.4, despite the introduction of vertical 
separation to the segment, it has become clearer that the management of Aoimori 
Railway is not financially sustainable on the current basis. 
 
 
7.7 Conclusion  
 
In Mexico, as the main mechanism of the reform, the concession system was 
adopted and private operators have participated in the railway transport service. 
Fundamentally, only one freight concessionaire operates on a specific line with 
commercial management techniques performing most railway operation including 
all financial planning and investment in operations and infrastructure over the 
period. In brief, the concession worked as a mechanism for rail privatization, and 
utilization of private sector’s ability for efficient controlling both operation and 
infrastructure. Despite the several advantageous results, the study also revealed 
some challenges of concessioning such as non-fulfilment of the committed 
investments especially those into the infrastructure. 
 
The Mexico City Terminal is operated by an independent joint-venture in order to 
avoid monopolistic access to the country’s most densely used network. Apparently, it 
is not practical approach for each freight concessionaire to have its own marshalling 
yard and terminal facilities in Mexico City. Thus, in addition to promoting 
intra-modal competition between concessionaires, vertical separation in the case of 
TFVM has worked for economy of enhanced density. 
 
Because of the massive capital and a long investment recovery period the 
construction of a new railway line is an extremely large risk for railway operators. 
Thus it is very difficult, even in a country such as Japan with an extremely heavy 
passenger rail transport density, for a railway operator to promote railway 
construction by its own funds. New Shinkansen lines are constructed as public 
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works projects utilizing finances of the state and local governments. The JR 
Passenger Company in the region is designated as an operator, and it operates the 
line with its own financial and operational responsibilities, as if it were an 
integrated railway once the amount of usage fee is fixed based on the 30-year period 
expected benefits.  
 
Aoimori Railway was established when the management of the segment was 
separated from the JR Company as a result of the opening of the new Shinkansen 
line. Vertical separation was introduced in order to alleviate the initial financial 
burden from the newly-established operator. 
 
These four cases in this chapter have common characteristics that the private 
operator accesses the infrastructure which is owned by the public sector. In other 
words, vertical separation in these cases contributed towards involving the private 
sector in the railway operation. It has been achieved by way of certain measures:  
1) leasing the infrastructure to the private operator (based on the concession     
contract in the freight concessionaires in Mexico, and based on the law in new 
Shinkansen lines); and  
2) close share-holding relationship between infrastructure and operation (TFVM in 
Mexico and Aoimori Railway). 
 
From the different point of views, these cases have some contrastive aspects: 
1) Access right is permitted only to the incumbent/newly-established operator (new 
Shinkansen lines, Aoimori Railway) 
2) Access right is permitted also to the voluntary participant (the freight 
concessionaires in Mexico) 
Efficient railway operation is expected through the capability of the 
incumbent/newly-established operator utilizing the regulation of the government in 
the former type. On the other hand, it is expected to be achieved through the 
capability of other private operator utilizing the competitive tendering and 
concession contract in the latter type. Nevertheless, in all the cases, promoting the 
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within-rail competition is not the principal aim of introducing vertical separation21, 
and the above measures could confine the number of operators into a few. Compared 
with the type of complete separation investigated in UK, Sweden, Australia (ARTC), 
the operator in these cases performs the railway operation with the more integrated 
manner in the operational processes.  
 
21 The concession contract in Mexico is granted for a maximum of 50 years and 
renewable for another similar period. Thus, despite the initial open auctioning 
process that is essential for the success of privatization, the author regarded the main 
aim of the long-run concessions as utilization of commercial mechanism by the 
private sector. On the other hand, the structural design in Mexico was planned to 
promote intra-modal competition through “competition between the tracks”. 
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CHAPTER 8:  COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS Ⅰ:  
Forms, Operation and Finance 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
In the former chapters several kinds of vertical separation have been examined. 
Based on the study into each case, this chapter performs analytical comparison 
among them in terms of the following viewpoints: 1) forms and separation of 
operational responsibilities; 2) separation of financial responsibilities; 3) 
relationship among operators. The characteristics of each type of vertical separation 
would be drawn out through the above comparison and analysis.  
 
 
8.2 Forms and Separation of Operational Responsibilities 
 
This section examines the forms of vertical separation mainly in terms of the entity 
that performs the essential factors of daily operation, and the degree of operational 
separation is investigated comparing among the railways in the case studies. 
 
In order to investigate the implementation form of vertical separation, firstly, this 
section focuses on how the six essential factors of daily operation, which are defined 
in Section 2.4.2, are performed within the industry.  
 
Among the six essential factors of daily operation, this paper defines the former 
three factors following as the “below rail” functions: 
 1. Maintenance of track and infrastructure; 
 2. Capacity allocations and timetabling; 
 3. Route setting (daily traffic controlling and signalling). 
 
Similarly, the latter three factors listed below are defined as the “above rail” 
functions: 
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 4. Maintenance of rolling stock; 
 5. Daily operations of trains (train service running and crew rostering); 
 6. Service marketing and ticket sales. 
 
The investigation clarified that, in general 1 , these “above rail” functions are 
performed:1) by the main operator; or 2) by the tenant (Group 3: Iran; Japan; USA.). 
 
The investigation also clarified the entity that performs each factor of “below rail” 
functions, and categorized the type of vertical separation based on the entity 
operationally responsible for it. They are summarized in Table 8.1 according to the 
degree of operational separation between infrastructure and operation.  
 
Table 8.1 shows that a variety of forms of vertical separation exist in the railway 
sector, and the degree of separation varies to a large extent from the type of 
“integral” to “complete separation”. Characteristics of each type of separation are 
examined as follows: 
 
1. Integral (Both Markets) 
In an integrated railway such as IR, in addition to the ownership of the 
infrastructure, the railway operates both the passenger and freight services in an 
integrated manner including the “below rail” functions. As it was described in 
Section 2.2.1, this was the most common structure in the railway sector. 
Nevertheless, faced by severe competition with other modes, except very 
advantageous market for the railway sector, generally, most of the railways can not 
afford to bear sufficient amount of costs on the maintenance of track and 
infrastructure through its revenue. And, in many countries, it has become very 
difficult to sustain this type of organizational structure without subsidy; 
 
                                                  
1  Regarding the maintenance of rolling stock, a variety of cases exist and the details 
are described in Appendix 3-c. 
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       Table 8.1 Degree of Operational Separation between Infrastructure and 
Operation  
    
          Below Rail Functions * 
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Examples of the 
Country / Railway 
1. Integral (Both Markets) O O O India (IR) 
2. Integral (Only in the Primary Market) 
O O O 
Japan (Passenger Co.) 
USA (Freight Co.) 
Iran (RAI) 
3. Separation of Ownership Only O O O Mexico (TFM, Ferromex)New Shinkansen line 
4. Separation of Financial Support 
for Track Maintenance O’ O O 
Vietnam (VNR) 
Indonesia (PT.KA) 
Tunisia (SNCFT) 
5. Separation with Common 
Ownership (O) (O) (O) 
Germany (DB AG) 
Iran (Raja Co.) 
6. Separation with a Large 
Shareholding Relationship *1 O O 
Aoimori Railway 
7. Separation as a Shareholder of 
  Infrastructure Manager (O’) (O’) (O’) 
Mexico (TFVM) 
8. Separation of Slot-Allocation  O’ O√*2 O France 
9. Separation as a Tenant √ √ √ Japan (JR Freight) USA (Amtrak) 
10. Complete Separation 
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Notes: 
*: The below rail functions marked in the table are those for the country in the examples. 
O: The main operator performs the factor with its finance. 
O’: The main state owned railway performs the factor operationally, and the infrastructure 
owner is responsible for the factor financially. 
(O): The infrastructure manager, which is the common ownership with the operator, is 
responsible for the factor operationally and financially. 
(O’): The infrastructure manager, which has a share-holding relationship with the operator, 
is responsible for the factor operationally and financially. 
√:  The infrastructure manager (Group2: France, Sweden, UK, Australia) or the dominant 
integrated railway (Group3: Japan, USA), both of which are independent from the 
operator (Group2) or the tenant (Group 3), is responsible for the factor operationally and 
financially. 
 
*1:  Aomori Prefecture now contracts out the works to the engineering firms, but they are 
planned to be contracted out to Aoimori Railway for decreasing coordination problems. 
*2:  RFF is responsible for capacity allocation, and SNCF makes working timetable. 
Source: Author 
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2. Integral (Only in the Primary Market) 
 In the railways such as those in Japan (passenger), USA (freight) and Iran 
(freight), only the railway which operates in the primary market keeps an 
integrated structure. In this type of railway, the primary rail market is profitable 
and the integrated dominant railway can retain the cost of infrastructure. The 
another railway in the minor/smaller market accesses the infrastructure paying 
track-access charges;  
 
3. Separation of Ownership Only 
 In the freight concessionaires in Mexico (TFM, Ferromex) and the new Shinkansen 
lines, the infrastructure is not owned by an operator. Thus they are defined as 
vertically separated railways in this paper. The main difference between the two 
cases appears that the former operator is selected through a competitive bidding 
for the concession licence, and the latter one is designated by a law. In this type of 
separation, the operator performs all the essential factors of daily operation and 
infrastructure improvements with their own funds. The railway is operated as if it 
were an integrated one once after the concession is awarded or initial conditions 
are fixed. Except some track-age rights such as the case in Mexico, there is not a 
particular coordination problem between infrastructure and operation in the 
process of daily operation;  
 
4. Separation of Financial Support for Track Maintenance 
 Except very advantageous market to the railway sector, a railway operator can not 
afford to shoulder their maintenance costs of the infrastructure in these years. In 
this type of separation, the state-owned railway performs essential factors of daily 
operation including “below rail” functions with integration, while the government 
owns and invests into infrastructure and also finances the maintenance cost of it. 
The two entities, the railway and the government, make efforts for the smooth 
railway operation with close annual negotiation in order to lessen the coordination 
problems raised by the financial separation between them. As long as the 
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stipulated amount of compensation is paid by the government, through the 
interview/questionnaire, any particular coordination problems have not been 
indicated as only the state-owned railway performs the daily railway operation in 
practice; 
 
5. Separation with Common Ownership 
 In this type, “above rail” and “below rail” functions are performed by separated 
organizations, which belong to the same ownership. The study has investigated 
two types of separation. One is the case in Germany and another is that in Iran. 
 
 DB AG has an intention to integrate the above-mentioned two types of functions 
within the holding structure. Despite the fact that respective functions are 
performed by different organizations, coordination problems can be greatly 
reduced as they are controlled under the common ownership. 2  This type of 
organizational separation has been introduced in some European railways in order 
to follow the legislation in EU.  
 
In Iran, the “below rail” functions are performed by a dominant integrated railway 
(RAI), and the tenant (Raja Co.) performs only the “above rail” functions in the 
smaller rail market. Different from the case in Japan and the US, the tenant is a 
subsidiary of the dominant railway, and two entities try to co-operate each other as 
they operate in the different markets. As separated entities have become 
responsible for each market, they could specialise their transport services in their 
own market;  
 
6. Separation with a Large Share-holding Relationship 
                                                  
2  In contrast with the lower degree of coordination problems within the holding 
company, this model inherits the following disadvantageous characteristics with 
regard to a new entrant (Nash, C.A., 2007 p.75): 
▪ according as new operators win the greater segment of the market, the type of 
“complete separation” increases in practice; 
▪ new entrants need to go to a subsidiary of their greatest rival for track access. 
 Thus, there are severe criticisms that the holding company, which practically 
controls infrastructure, can keep advantageous status, and this prevents fair 
competition among operators. 
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 In this type of separation, the infrastructure and operation have a large 
share-holding relationship. Similar to the above type, the close share-holding link 
contributes towards managerial cooperation between the infrastructure and 
operation. In the case of Aoimori Railway, Aomori Prefecture has no intention to 
introduce competition among operators, and this led Aomori Prefecture to own the 
infrastructure and 55% of the Railway’s shares. The public sector became 
responsible for the infrastructure financially in order to alleviate the financial 
burden of the operator and to sustain its management. 
 
In the case of Aoimori Railway, at present Aomori Prefecture contracts out the 
maintenance works of the tracks directly to the engineering firms. Nevertheless, 
both Aomori Prefecture and Aoimori Railway have been worrying over 
coordination problems between infrastructure and operation. In order to decrease 
the problems among the two parties, they discussed and reached a plan that the 
track maintenance works should be contracted out to Aoimori Railway.[15/JP] This 
is regarded as one of the typical examples that in case they have no intention to 
introduce on-track competition, they could not find any reasonable reasons to 
separate these functions operationally even though they have to separate the 
financial responsibilities. They reached the belief that railway operation can be 
performed more smoothly in case the prime operator performs both the “below rail” 
and “above rail” functions with integration [15/JP]; 
   
7. Separation as a Share-holder of Infrastructure Manager 
In this type, similar to the above two cases, share-holding relationship between 
infrastructure and operation contributes to managerial cooperation between the 
two. In the case of the Mexico City Terminal Railway (TFVM), three 
concessionaires need to share the track-age rights to the infrastructure, and each 
concessionaire owns the stock of the infrastructure manager, TFVM. In case the 
infrastructure has enough capacity, through sharing the track-age rights, the 
operators could achieve their aim with far lower costs than providing their own 
facilities individually; 
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8. Separation of Slot-Allocation 
The railway in this type has an intention to keep integrated rail control under the 
main operator, but slot-allocation is separated to another entity following the 
regulation that aims to introduce on-track competition among operators. For 
example, in France the main operator, SNCF, is also responsible for most of the 
“below rail” functions based on the contract with RFF. Both of the public entities, 
SNCF and RFF, are independent without share-holding relationship. Despite the 
initial intention to achieve an integrated control, this institutional independence 
and each entity’s own interests sometimes lead to certain conflicts between the two 
entities as it was investigated in Chapter 5. Regarding the position of a new 
entrant, this type of separation also inherits the similar disadvantageous 
characteristics as the German model, which the type of “complete separation” 
increases according as new operators win the greater segment of the market; 
 
9. Separation as a Tenant  
 In this type, a tenant in a smaller market accesses the track which is owned by 
another independent railway. The dominant railway operates in the profitable 
primary market and keeps an integrated structure. The tenant could be free from 
the infrastructure maintenance and could specialize in the transport services in 
the smaller market. It was indicated that the managerial efforts as an independent 
firm have resulted in the favourable results in JR Freight.[11/JP] In the US, 
elimination of cross-subsidies between the freight and the passenger divisions was 
the primary objective for establishing Amtrak, and resulted in defining the 
government’s role for the passenger services.[12/US] Affected by the background of 
introduction of vertical separation as the structure of the industry, the tenant is in 
a relatively weak position regarding the access to the track; 
 
10. Complete Separation (Both Markets) 
 In this type, as studied in the case of Sweden, UK and Australia (ARTC), 
infrastructure manager and the operators are separated into independent entities. 
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The infrastructure manager performs the “below rail” functions, whereas 
operators perform the “above rail” functions only. Each entity is respectively 
responsible for the functions operationally and financially.  
 
This type of complete separation is regarded as the most appropriate to introduce 
new entrants to the railway market competitively “[as it has removed] all 
incentives for the infrastructure manager to favour one operator over another. 
[Nevertheless, it] also leads to problems in coordination between the 
infrastructure manager and the train operating companies in terms of planning, 
investment, timetabling and day to day operations.”(Nash, C.A., 2007 p.75) The 
study revealed that these problems are striking especially in a case infrastructure 
capacity is limited with dense traffic.3 
 
 
The above investigation into each type of separation revealed that the degree of 
operational separation between infrastructure and operation varies to a large 
extent, and identified that the railway industry has experienced various types of 
vertical separation.  
 
The examination into each case and the above comparative investigation into the 
different types revealed that in case it is not aimed to introduce within-rail 
competition4 through promoting new entry into the market, they have endeavoured 
to keep an integrated operation in order to decrease the coordination problems by 
certain measures such as follows: 
 
                                                  
3  The interviews showed that they have difficulties to coordinate timetable under 
limited infrastructure capacity such as application for the same slots of timetable and 
difficulties in securing time schedule for maintenance works. (Section 5.5.2.1) 
Furthermore, they also noted that many disputes are raised in a case of: 1) 
coordinating timetable under lack of infrastructure capacity; 2) setting train delays 
by compensation; and 3) sudden engineering works.(Appendix 4-b) 
 
4  As referred in the footnote in Section 5.8, in this thesis, without particular note in 
the sentence, “within-rail competition” refers both ”on-track competition” and 
“franchising” through operational separation between infrastructure and operation.  
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1. Assigning the below rail functions to the main operator:  
When the railway can afford the maintenance of the infrastructure, it can be 
operated performing “below rail” functions as well such as the case in long-run 
concessions in Mexico (TFM, Ferromex) and New Shinkansen Line. On the other 
hand, even though the government has become responsible for the infrastructure 
maintenance cost financially, in some railways such as the case in Vietnam, 
Indonesia and Tunisia, the main railway retains performing the essential factors 
of daily operation with integration in these cases; 
 
2. Close share-holding link between infrastructure and operation to attain 
managerial cooperation: 
Infrastructure and operation keep close share-holding relationship, for example, 
in the railways in DB AG, Iran, Aoimori Railway, TFVM in Mexico. In these cases 
operation of, at least, some of the essential factors of daily operation are 
separated. Nevertheless, the different entities, infrastructure and operation, 
have share-holding link and this relationship contributes to managerial 
cooperation between the different organizations;  
 
3. Confining operational separation only into the smaller/minor rail market: 
In the market where one of the sectors, passenger or freight, is dominant 
separation of the essential factors of daily operation can be confined only into the 
smaller sector. As a result, the main railway in the dominant sector can perform 
integrated railway operation without coordination problems through vertical 
separation. This is the case in Japan (JR Freight) and USA (Amtrak). 
 
 
Different from the above cases, it was also disclosed that, instead of a unique aim to 
introduce new entrants to the market competitively, the type of “complete 
separation” has separated all the “below rail” functions from the operator to the 
independent infrastructure manager which has no share-holding relationship with 
the operator even in the primary rail market. Thus obviously this is a distinct 
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characteristic of “complete separation”, which is significantly different from other 
types of vertical separation. 
 
The investigation into each case and the comparative analysis in this section clearly 
revealed the large difference in the form of vertical separation in terms of the 
operational responsibility for each essential factor of daily operation. The study also 
disclosed that the above large difference between the type of complete separation 
and other types mainly comes from whether they have an intention to introduce 
within-rail competition into the railway sector through vertical separation or not.  
 
This section has investigated into various types of vertical separation in terms of 
separation of operational responsibilities. The next section examines vertical 
separation from the view point of separation of financial responsibilities.  
 
 
8.3  Separation of Financial Responsibilities 
 
8.3.1 Type of Financial Bearing 
 
Traditional utility industries such as railways have “a structure in which a 
non-competitive component of the industry is vertically integrated with a 
potentially competitive component or activity.”(OECD, 2001 p.7) 
 
Regarding reform of the above-mentioned industries, Hori, M. (2004) notes that 
structural separation of a public entity has the following functions: 
1) Diminishing cross-subsidy by means of separating the accounts; 
2) Clarifying boundary between the commercial division and the social division. 
 
As vertical separation is one type of the structural separation5, it can play the above 
                                                  
5  Vertical separation can be compatible with other types of structural separation such 
as regionalization and separation by line-of-business management. Thompson, 
L.(2005 p.421) notes that “railways serve at least three distinct market segments: 
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roles, and Thompson, L (2005) stresses that it is essential to separate the 
operational and commercial function from social and policy aspects of the 
government’s role at the time of railway reform. This is because cross-subsidy 
between them weakens the commercial division, which has to compete with other 
private sector transport such as buses and trucks. It is also important to revitalize 
the commercial division through an appropriate manner such as public listing of 
shares (privatization), deregulation, private sector participation, and so on.  
 
Based on the above background, this section investigates how each type of vertical 
separation clarified the role of the government and that of the railway. Different 
from the former section, it will be investigated which entity, either the government 
or the railway, bears financial responsibility for each function of the railway 
operation.  
 
As most of the “above rail” functions, such as maintenance of rolling stock, daily 
operation of trains, service marketing and ticket sales, are financially borne by the 
railway, the study mainly focuses on the financial responsibility for “below rail” 
functions: 
a) Upgrading: Investment for upgrading the infrastructure. It does not include 
investment for construction of new lines as it is not ordinary rail operation.  
b) Maintenance: Maintenance of tracks, electrical and signalling facilities. 
c) Below-rail operation: Timetabling and route setting. 
 
Table 8.2 summarizes the result of investigation, and shows which entity bears the 
financial responsibility. The comparison reveals the following characteristics of 
financial bearings in each type. 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
freight, inter-city passengers and suburban or regional passengers. These have such 
different characteristics of demand, competition, regulation, subsidy and policy that 
no single management can successfully handle them.” 
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Table 8.2 Financial Bearing for the Factor of Railway Operation  
       
   Factors of Railway 
              Operation * 
         
 
Type of Financial  
Bearing 
a)
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Examples of the 
Country (Railway) 
1.  Self-financed Railway with 
Infrastructure R R R R 
India (IR) 
Japan (Passenger Co.) 
USA (Freight Co.) 
Iran (RAI) 
Mexico (TFM, Ferromex)
New Shinkansen line 
Mexico (TFVM) *1 
2.  Tenant Accessing the 
Self-financed Dominant 
Railway  
R’ R’ R’ R 
Japan (JR Freight) 
USA (Amtrak) *2 
Iran (Raja Co.) 
3.  Railways with 
Government’s Financial 
Support for Infrastructure 
Engineering Works 
√ √ R R 
Aoimori Railway*3 
Vietnam (VNR) *4 
Tunisia (SNCFT) 
Indonesia (PT.KA) *4 
4.  Railways with 
Government’s Large 
Financial Responsibilities 
for Below-rail Functions    
√ √ √  *5 R 
Germany (DB AG) *6 
France  
Sweden 
Australia (ARTC) 
(UK*7) D
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R : The railway is mainly responsible for the factor financially. 
R’: The integrated dominant railway is mainly responsible for the factor financially. 
√ : The government or a state entity is largely responsible for the factor financially. 
 
*1: Three concessionaires are responsible for the above-rail functions financially. 
*2: The government largely supports Amtrak financially. 
*3: As access charges are remitted, in practice the local government is responsible 
for the maintenance of its track financially. 
*4: The regulation stipulates that the railway can receive PSO in a certain case.  
*5: In some cases the (regional) government contributes to the (regional) passenger 
services financially. (Examined in Chapter 5) 
*6: DB Netz is responsible for the below-rail functions with active financial support 
from the government. ECMT (2005b p.99) notes that “it is said that 60% of 
infrastructure expenditure (including loans and grants) is covered by charges.” 
*7: In UK, firstly the private sector, Railtrack, was principally responsible for the 
below-rail functions. Since it is replaced by Network Rail, the government has 
been actively supporting the functions financially.  
 
     Source: Author 
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1. Self-financed Railway with Infrastructure 
▪ (Integral: both markets) Traditional monolithic integrated railway, such as the 
case in IR, is responsible for both the commercial and the social divisions when 
they do not receive subsidy from the government. Thus, it takes financial 
responsibility both for the below rail functions and for the above rail functions. 
               
▪  In this type, the railway takes the financial responsibilities both for above-rail 
functions and for below-rail functions. As the railway should be profitable enough 
to cover the cost of infrastructure as well, in some cases, such as those in Japan 
and Mexico, unprofitable lines and services were abolished during the process of 
the reform in order to realize financially balanced management of the remained 
services including infrastructure controlling. In the case of the US, the 
unprofitable sector (passenger) was separated, and the private integrated freight 
railroads had become financially viable including the costs for below-rail functions. 
This type can be sustained only in the market relatively advantageous to the 
railway sector in these years. 
 
2. Tenant Accessing the Self-financed Dominant Railway  
▪  In this type, the financial responsibilities for the smaller/minor rail market has 
been separated. As the main advantage of this type of financial separation, 
cross-subsidy is abolished between the passenger sector and the freight sector. 
Even under the common ownership, such as the case in Iran, financial 
responsibility of each organization has been clarified. In the prime rail market, 
the dominant railway principally retains financial responsibilities for the the 
below-rail functions as well. This type of financial separation, in a certain case, 
has an advantage to separate a railway into the commercial division and the 
social division. For example, in the US the government has become responsible 
for the social division, the passenger services, through its subsidy.  
 
3. Railways with Government’s Financial Support for Infrastructure Engineering 
Works  
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▪  In this type of separation, vertical separation clarified the government’s financial 
role for the infrastructure. The ownership of the infrastructure is transferred to 
the (local) government, and the (local) government started to take financial 
responsibilities for the construction, renewal, upgrading and maintenance of the 
infrastructure. On the other hand, financial responsibility of the railway has been 
confined to above-rail functions and below-rail operation such as signalling and 
route setting only. 
▪  One of the main advantages of this type is promoting active managerial efforts 
with advanced commercial freedom in the commercial division, which was 
separated from the social division.   
▪  In certain cases the regulation stipulates that the government is also responsible 
for the payment of PSO. This also clarifies the boundary between the commercial 
division and the social division within the above-rail functions as well. 
 
4.  Railways with Government’s Large Financial Responsibilities for Below-rail 
Functions  
▪  In this type, in addition to the financial responsibility for infrastructure 
engineering works, the independent infrastructure manager takes financial 
responsibility for the other below-rail operations such as timetabling and route 
setting as well.6 
▪  As examined in Chapter 5, in some cases, the (regional) government finances the 
(regional) passenger services. The commercial entity, the railway operator, can 
utilize the public finances through the contract, and the boundary between the 
commercial division and the social division is clarified through the contract.  
 
 
This section has investigated various types of vertical separation mainly in terms of 
the separation of the financial responsibilities. Along with the former section, the 
investigation revealed: 
                                                  
6  In France, RFF performs slot-allocation and contracts out other below-rail functions 
to SNCF. In Germany, although the infrastructure manager is one of the 
organizations under the holding company, following EU Directives, its account is 
independent from other organizations. 
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▪  In most of the cases, vertical separation has been introduced when it is not 
possible for a railway to sustain the infrastructure investment and/or its 
maintenance; 
▪ Vertical separation contributes to clarify the boundary of financial responsibility 
of the railway and that of the public sector; 
▪ The public sector can bear various scope of financial responsibility in the railway 
sector such as:  
1) only investment in construction stage (Ex. new Shinkansen line);  
2) operation in the minor market (Ex. Amtrak in the US);  
3) infrastructure engineering works (Ex. Vietnam, Tunisia, Indonesia); and  
4) all the below-rail functions (Ex. Sweden, Australia (ARTC)). 
▪ Only the type of “complete separation” has separated both operational and 
financial responsibilities for all the below-rail functions to the legally and 
financially independent entity even in the prime market; 
▪  In other types of separation, in spite of the separation of financial 
responsibilities, an integrated operation is intended in order to decrease the 
coordination problems through vertical separation at least in the prime market.  
 
 
8.3.2 Vertical Separation and Public Listing of Shares 
 
The above study showed that there are a variety of measures to divide a monolithic 
railway into the social division and the commercial division by way of vertical 
separation. Certainly, there are also other methods to extract the social division 
through railway reform such as separation of long-term liabilities, making PSO 
type contract between the government and the railway, and so on. But it was 
demonstrated that vertical separation, one type of structural separation, also can be 
utilized for this separation. 
 
Broadly speaking, there are two options to promote private sector participation into 
the railway services. One of the methods is permitting an access by a private 
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operator, and another method is public listing of shares. In the latter type, shares of 
the incumbent/reformed railway are listed in the stock exchange, and this method is 
also closely related with vertical separation.  
 
For example, diminishing excessive cross subsidies between the passenger and the 
freight sectors had played an important role to achieve the public listing of shares of 
the three profitable JR Passenger Companies in the main island (Honshu) of Japan. 
It also largely contributed toward sustaining and revitalizing the private freight 
railroads in the US. Aoimori Railway was established as a joint-venture with the 
private sector by means of transferring capital costs of the infrastructure to the 
public sector.  
 
As the above examples show, public listing of shares is one of the principal measures 
for private sector participation, and vertical separation can be utilized for one of the 
effective methods to achieve it. The financial burden of the integrated railway can 
be reduced by transferring a certain part of it, such as that for the infrastructure, to 
the government through vertical separation. Once the commercial division has 
become financially viable, it will have a possibility of public listing of shares.  
 
For example, in the case of Vietnam and Indonesia, vertical separation relieved the 
financial burden of the railways, and specified the commercial division making it 
financially balanced. Furthermore, organizational conversion into a corporation has 
been performed in accompany with vertical separation. ADB (2006 p.1.1) also notes 
that “[corporatization is] an emerging practice gaining momentum among 
government-owned railways, [and it] is often the first step towards divestiture 
either by sale of shares to the public or to strategic investors.” 
 
As public listing of shares does not increase the number of operators, it can attain 
private sector participation without increasing coordination problems among 
different entities in the railway sector. 
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8.4 Relationship among Operators 
 
This section investigates the relationship among operators under vertically 
separated railways. For discussing it, firstly, the author examines what kind of 
regulation/access agreement is applied for each operator so as to enter the rail 
services.  
 
1) Access Right for the Incumbent/Reformed Operator 
During the process of the railway reform, in some cases, only the 
incumbent/reformed operator can keep relatively exclusive track-access rights. The 
study revealed that they are based on the regulations such as follows. 
 
1-1. Legal Access Right 
In Vietnam, Indonesia and Tunisia, based on the regulations stipulated in the law, 
the state-owned railways perform operation accessing the government-owned 
tracks. In new Shinkansen lines, also based on the law, the JR Passenger Company 
in the region provides the rail services exclusively accessing tracks owned by the 
public entity. In the US, the tenant, Amtrak, accesses the network of the dominant 
railway based on the law. These examples show that the incumbent/reformed sole 
railway retains the exclusive legal access right to the tracks.  
  
1-2. Share-holding Relationship 
In the case of Aoimori Railway and the Mexico City Terminal Railway (TFVM), 
only the limited operators access the infrastructure. The operator is a joint-venture 
with the public infrastructure owner in the former case, and is a share-holder of 
the infrastructure manager in the latter case. In these cases it appears that strong 
share-holding relationship practically stipulates the access right to the 
infrastructure, and it is not intended to open the tracks to other operators. 
 
2) Access Right for Voluntary Participants 
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In contrast with the above cases, the study revealed that voluntary participants are 
permitted to perform transport services based on the following regulations. 
 
2-1. Franchising, Concessioning, Service Contract 
In some cases voluntary entry to the rail services was attained by means of 
franchising controlling only the operation or concession controlling both 
infrastructure and operation. For example, franchising is adopted in the passenger 
sector in Sweden, UK, and concessioning is adopted in the freight sector in Mexico. 
In the regional passenger services in Germany, an entry to the market has been 
attained by franchising as well as a service contract with negotiations. In these 
cases, in general, the number of operator in the same sector, especially in the 
passenger sector, is practically limited to one for avoiding unnecessary conflicts 
and minimizing the amount of subsidy. 
 
2-2. Open Access 
In the freight market in European railways and Australia (ARTC), a voluntary 
entry to the market has been attained based on open access, and it has become 
common that plural operators compete on the tracks in the same market sector.  
 
2-3. Permission by the Authority 
In some cases, an operator can obtain track-age rights through the permission by 
the authority. For example, in the US, the Interstate Commerce Commission often 
gives one railway the right to operate over another in order to create competition 
between the two. Chapter 7 investigated that the track-age/haulage rights are also 
imposed to other concessionaires in certain key routes for promoting competition 
between the tracks in the case of Mexico as well. 
 
2-4. Joint Venture, Management Contract with the Main Operator 
 Different from the above three types, this type of access right for voluntary 
participants is not for promoting within-rail competition. In the passenger sector of 
Vietnam, Tunisia and Iran, the private sector has participated in a transport 
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service in close cooperation with the state-owned railway through establishing a 
joint-venture or making a management contract. While the incumbent main 
operator continues to play a principal role in rail operation, it can also gain the 
benefit of introducing the private investment and expertise into the railway sector. 
 
 
As it is reviewed above, the study clarified characteristics of several regulations, 
which stipulate the track-age rights to enter into the transport services. Provided 
that access rights can be granted only to the incumbent/reformed operator, there is 
a risk that the primary operator is not efficient enough. For example, the 
re-organized state railway might succeed the problematic characteristics of the 
former state-owned railways.7 On the other hand, in a case that the access right is 
awarded for voluntary participation as well, there is a good chance that the private 
sector also can enter into a rail transport service with enough motivation to increase 
the revenue, which hopefully results in improving the efficiency of the railway 
operation. Besides the joint-venture and management contract with the main 
operator, the latter type of access right is also effective in promoting within-mode 
competition.  
 
The following section investigates the relationship among operators on the same 
track, and Table 8.3 categorizes the type of track-access in terms of the relationship 
among them.  
                                                  
7  The problems of state-owned railways are described in Section 2.3.3. 
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Table 8.3  Type of Track-Access and Possibilities of Coordination Problems 
among Operators 
Type of track-access Regulation 
Track-access by 
the incumbent/ 
reformed operator 
Track-access by 
voluntary 
participants 
Law 
 
Vietnam (VNR)  
Indonesia(PT.KA) 
Tunisia (SNCFT) 
New Shinkansen Lines 
France(SNCF) <P> 
 
Shareholding 
Relationship 
Aoimori Railway 
 
 
Concession  ▪Mexico (TFM, Ferromex)
Franchising  ▪UK <P> 
▪Sweden <P> 
1. Access by the Sole 
Operator 
  
Service Contract 
 
 ▪Regional passenger 
services in Germany *1 
Management 
Contract with the 
Main Operator 
 ▪Tunisia<P> 
▪Iran <P> 
2. Access through 
Voluntary Agreement 
with the Main 
Operator Joint-Venture 
with the Main 
Operator 
 ▪Vietnam<P> 
3. Limited Access to 
Another Sector 
Law USA <P> 
Japan <F> *2 
Iran <P> 
 
Shareholding 
Relationship 
Mexico (TFVM) 
 
 
Permission by 
the Authority 
 ▪Some routes in the 
US<F> 
▪Some key routes in 
Mexico<F> 
4. Limited Access to the 
Same Sector 
Franchises 
Overlap 
 ▪Some overlapping 
lines in UK<P> ＆ 
Sweden <P> 
5. Competitive Access in 
the Same Sector 
Open Access  ▪Sweden <F> 
▪UK<F>  
▪Germany<F>  
▪Australia<F> 
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Notes: 
 *1: In Germany, the regulation stipulates open access, but most of the regional 
passenger services are provided by a contract with Laender. 
*2: In Japan, there is no new entrant into the freight sector after the reform in 1987. 
But the regulation does not prohibit entering into the services.  
 
<P> Passenger Sector 
<F> Freight Sector 
 Source: Author 
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Based on the Table 8.3, the relationship among operators will be investigated 
according to the type of track-access.  
 
1. Access by the Sole Operator 
In this type of track-access, in general, the sole operator can perform operation 
without competitors in its own railway market even if other operators might 
perform the services within the different market. Thus the operator does not 
particularly have conflicts with other operators at least within the same market 
based on the exclusive access rights to the track.  
 
2. Access through Voluntary Agreement with the Main Operator 
In this type of track access, the new entrants are supportive to the main operator, 
and it was revealed that there is not a particular conflict among the operators. As 
the conflicts between them, if any, can be settled down by themselves, the 
regulator does not need to make many efforts to coordinate the relationship 
between the operators. Whereas most of the essential factors of daily operation 
are performed by the main operator, it also gains benefits of introducing capital 
and expertise from the new entrants.  
 
3. Limited Access to Another Sector 
In this type of track access, the two railways perform the operation in different 
markets, the passenger or the freight. Thus their relationship is not competitive 
even though it is necessary for them to coordinate some operational factors such 
as timetabling and each operator is obliged to make possible efforts to coordinate 
the railway operation.  
 
4. Limited Access to the Same Sector 
In this type, more than one operator in the same sector is permitted to access a 
certain segment of the network. For example, in freight railroads in the US, the 
Interstate Commerce Commission intended to create intra-modal competition and 
it often gives one railroad the right to operate over another. In the passenger 
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sector in UK, although it is not the main aim of the passenger franchising, 
because of overlapping franchisees there are some cases of on-track competition 
where a route has more than one passenger operator. In these cases, the 
relationship among operators tends to be competitive rather than supportive. 
 
5. Competitive Access in the Same Sector 
When the track is made available to all users on non-discriminatory terms by an 
independent infrastructure provider, as open access, the level of intra-rail 
competition becomes the highest.(Thompson, L. and Budin, K. J., 2001 p.5) The 
investigation into the rail freight sector in Europe and Australia showed that the 
relationship among operators is competitive, and that possibilities of coordination 
problems among operators would be, generally, also higher than other types of 
track-access. In order to coordinate the relationship among operators fairly it is 
required for a neutral infrastructure manager to perform some of the essential 
factors of daily operation such as capacity-allocations and route setting. In spite of 
these measures, the investigation revealed that there are certain conflicts among 
them especially in a case infrastructure capacity is limited or an accident/train 
delay happens. 
 
 
This section has examined various types of track-access and relationship among 
operators. Operation is limited to only the incumbent/reformed railway in a certain 
type of track-access, whereas new entrants can also access the tracks in the other 
types. The relationship among operators varies to a large extent depending on the 
type of access. According as the number of operators increases, in general, the 
possibilities of coordination problems become high. Although it also depends on 
other factors such as traffic density, in case several operators compete on the same 
track in the same market, possibilities of coordination problems among operators 
would become highest. In this case appropriate coordination by an independent 
regulator would become further more important. 
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8.5  Conclusion 
 
The study in this section examined the characteristics of various types of vertical 
separation in the railway sector in terms of:  
1) forms and separation of operational responsibilities;  
2) separation of financial responsibilities; and  
3) relationship among operators. 
 
In summary, the study clarified the following findings: 
 
▪  Degree of separation between infrastructure and operation varies to a large 
extent. In general, possibilities of coordination problems between them become 
high according as the degree of separation increases operationally. Additionally, 
when other operators access the same track especially in the same market, 
coordination problems among operators tend to become higher as well;  
 
▪  Despite the public sector’s investment in the infrastructure and its ownership, 
the railway is able to continue its operation as if it were an integrated railway, 
provided maintenance costs can be self-financed through the railway operation; 
 
▪  In case the maintenance cost cannot be self-financed by the railway, the public 
sector is required to support all or a part of the track maintenance cost and some 
coordination problems tend to be raised by the separation of financial 
responsibilities8. Nevertheless, in these cases, except the cases in Europe and 
Australia where the regulation aims to introduce within-rail competition, it is 
intended to keep an integrated operation by the main railway in order to 
minimize the coordination problems between the entities concerned. They 
endeavoured to achieve it through the following measures:  
1) assigning the below rail functions to the main operator;  
                                                  
8  They would be examined as Disadvantage D.2 in the next chapter. 
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2) retaining share-holding link between infrastructure and operation to attain 
managerial cooperation; and/or  
3) confining operational separation only to a small market.  
 
▪  The above item means that, without an aim to introduce within-rail competition, 
the main railway operator is responsible for the essential factors of daily 
operation or has share-holding relationship with the infrastructure manager at 
least in the primary railway market. On the other hand, “complete separation” 
has a unique exclusive aim to introduce within-rail competition through 
promoting new entry to the market, and this type has separated all the below rail 
functions to the infrastructure manager even in the prime market both 
operationally and financially; 
 
▪  Separation of financial responsibilities can be varied according to the expectation 
of the government for the railway sector. For example, the Swedish government, 
which has an intention to support the railway sector putting railways on an equal 
footing with roads, actively continues financial support to the social division of 
the railway sector, whereas the Mexican government released most of the 
financial responsibilities in the railway sector and the private concessionaires 
keep railway operation in the commercial division. Thus, in the process of 
separating the railway into the social and commercial divisions financially, the 
government can clarify the boundary between the two through defining their 
scope. 
 
220 
CHAPTER 9:  COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS Ⅱ:  
Advantages and Disadvantages and Relationship with the Form 
 
9.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter mainly investigates advantages and disadvantages of vertical 
separation and the relationship between these and the form of separation. In 
Section 9.2 and Section 9.3, advantages and disadvantages of vertical separation 
are investigated mainly based on the interviews/questionnaires. As introduction of 
within-rail competition is one of the advantages of vertical separation, competition 
issues in terms of vertical separation are also examined. Section 9.4 comparatively 
examines the relationship between these advantages, disadvantages and their 
forms of vertical separation. Then, Section 9.5 examines an appropriate form of 
vertical structure in terms of the market structure, and finally the analysis is 
synthesized. 
 
 
9.2 Advantages of Vertical Separation and Competition Issues 
 
9.2.1 Advantages of Vertical Separation 
 
The study clarified various kinds of the advantages of vertical separation of 
railways. The interviews/questionnaires presented evidence for the advantages 
which are investigated in Section 2.5.1, and revealed the additional advantages as 
well. They are summarized based on the afore-mentioned author’s main 
categorization: 
A.1) to facilitate public investment into infrastructure; 
A.2) to permit private sector involvement; 
A.3) to introduce competition; 
A.4) to promote specialization; 
A.5) financial arrangement among different entities. 
221 
 
In the following, the presented evidence and the newly revealed advantages are 
summarized along with further investigation into the advantages. 
 
A.1) To Facilitate Public Investment into Infrastructure 
A.1-1. Putting different modes on an equal footing within the transport industry. 
A government can support the railway sector for social objectives and to ensure 
competitive balance with other modes of transport clarifying relationship within 
the transport industry. Section 2.5.1 and Chapter 5 studied this kind of advantage 
especially through the case of Sweden. 
 
A.1-2. Utilization of external financial support for improving railway infrastructure 
through voluntary negotiation. 
Section 2.5.1 explained the case of Yamagata Shinkansen in Japan to explain this 
type of advantage. A third party such as a regional government receives external 
benefit which is generated by the railway services improved by the investment in 
the new infrastructure. As the private sector such as a real estate developer and 
firms beside the new lines also receive the external benefits, this type of vertical 
separation has a potential to promote the private sector’s investments into 
railway infrastructure as well. 
 
A.1-3. Financial support for sustaining an unprofitable operator by transferring its 
infrastructure to a third party. 
Vertical separation can be one of the effective means for sustaining unprofitable 
railways when they are socially beneficial. The financial burden of the railway can 
be alleviated by way of transferring the infrastructure and the related 
expenditures from the railway to a third party such as the (local) government. 
 
Vertical separation between the government and the state-owned railway in 
Vietnam, Indonesia and Tunisia is regarded as an example of this type. Another 
example is Aoimori Railway, which was investigated in Chapter 7. 
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A.1-4. Public investment into infrastructure keeping independent management of 
the incumbent operator. 
Despite strong demand for railways and their social benefits, undertaking a major 
rail project by the private sector or a railway operator is not financially viable in 
the most cases. Thus large investment into the railway sector, such as 
construction of new lines, should be performed without deteriorating independent 
management of the incumbent operator.  
 
In Japan it was decided by a law that JR companies should operate new 
Shinkansen lines, which would be constructed after the privatization of JNR. The 
infrastructure of new Shinkansen lines is owned by the public sector, and the 
operator of the new Shinkansen lines pays usage fees which were calculated based 
on the benefits received as an operator of the lines. Thus the burden of the 
operator is kept within the limits of the corresponding benefits. This case was 
investigated in Chapter 7. 
 
A.1-5. Development of infrastructure with authority of the state. 
The study in Tunisia indicated that, through transferring the responsibility from 
the state-owned railway to the government, it has become easier to promote 
infrastructure development projects taking up land with authority of the state. 
[4/TN] 
 
A.2) To Permit Private Sector Involvement 
A.2-1. Utilization of ability of the private sector through monopoly concession for 
achieving efficient controlling both infrastructure and operation. 
The government can establish a concession contract licensing to a sole/dominant 
concessionaire expecting efficient investment, maintenance and management of 
railway system while ownership of the infrastructure remains with the 
government. In this type of concession controlling both infrastructure and 
operation, the contract generally covers long-term period as the licensed 
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concessionaire should have enough incentives to invest into the infrastructure. 
Chapter 7 investigated this type in the case of long-run concessions in Mexico. 
 
A.2-2. Facilitating a private entry into a part of railway system separating sunk 
costs. 
The study revealed that new private participants have entered the rail transport 
market in Vietnam, Tunisia and Iran in close cooperation with the incumbent 
operator. These new participants have attained the entry to the specialized rail 
market without bearing infrastructure investments. As the management contract 
is made on a regional basis, it was indicated that transport services based on the 
local conditions have been achieved as well. [2/VN, 4/TN, 10/IR]  
 
A.2-3. Track-access based on voluntary agreement for economy of enhanced density. 
Mutual track access can be realized based on the commercial interests as the more 
traffic a rail line carries the lower is the unit cost. In general, regulatory power is 
not required to manage this kind of voluntary mutual access among the operators. 
Section 2.5.1 studied this kind of advantage through the case in the US. 
 
The investigation in Chapter 7 clearly revealed the difference between vertical 
separation and reciprocal running, both of which contribute to through-train 
services and economy of enhanced density based on voluntary agreement.  
 
A.2-4. Promoting convenience with through-trains. 
In addition to the advantages in the passenger sector examined in Section 2.5.1, 
this advantage can apply to the freight sector as well. Section 5.2.1 studied that in 
Europe it was thought that the failure of the railway industry in international 
traffic was partly due to the structure of the industry, where each national 
company operates the services only within the border. This is the background that 
the European Commission set about opening up the rail market for international 
freight, where the new entrants might offer through service competing with roads. 
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A.3) To Introduce Competition 
A.3-1. Encouraging intra-modal competition permitting track-age access to more 
than one operator. 
The European rail policy has an intention to introduce within-rail competition 
into the rail transport sector by separation of infrastructure and operation (at 
least in accounting sense)1, and by the progressive opening up of entry to the 
market for new operators. Chapter 5 studied that it has become common that 
several rail freight undertakings operate on the same tracks competing with each 
other under the regulation of “open access”. 
 
A.3-2. Creating competition among train operators by franchising out operational 
services. 
Chapter 5 showed that franchising is adopted as a regulation of track access in the 
passenger sector in Sweden and UK. Different from the above-mentioned “open 
access”, basically a sole operator has a right to access the track. Nash, C.A. 
(2005b) stresses that franchising is utilized to achieve competition throughout the 
rail market, especially in the passenger sector, avoiding wasteful competition. It is 
also utilized for preserving an integrated network of rail services, subsidized 
where necessary. 
 
A.4) To Promote Specialization 
A.4-1. Specialization of technical and managerial knowledge either infrastructure 
or operation.  
In the case of complete separation such as the case in Sweden, Australia (ARTC), 
the rail operators started to concentrate on providing satisfactory service to their 
customers, and the infrastructure manager also put greater focus on their own 
core businesses. [5/SE, 9/AU] 
 
Chapter 4 revealed that the private companies, which are good at tourism 
                                                  
1  Even if the incumbent operator keeps an integrated structure it is possible for other 
operators to access the tracks by regulation. Nevertheless, it is discussed that in the 
case of “complete separation”, any operator can access the tracks in equal conditions 
with other operators. 
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businesses, have participated into the rail services successfully attracting 
passengers for sight-seeing through marketing and investment into the rolling 
stock. As this example shows, this kind of familiarity with the market can also be 
a motive for the private sector to participate into the railway services. 
 
A.4-2. Concentrating the service efforts on either the passenger or the freight.  
In order to discontinue cross-subsidy between the passenger and freight sectors, 
in certain types of railway reform, the passenger and freight sectors have been 
separated into independent entities. Since they became independent, they have 
started to improve the services focusing on their own market.  
 
Chapter 6 showed the structure which the dominant operator owns infrastructure 
and another sector accesses the infrastructure in Japan, the US, and Iran. The 
study revealed that each operator started to focus on the services within its own 
market. [10/IR, 11/JP, 12/US] 
 
A.5) Financial Arrangement among Different Entities 
A.5-1. Dealing financial settlements among several companies.  
In a certain case, common ownership of the infrastructure is utilized for financial 
settlements among different railways. Section 2.5.1 investigated the case of 
Shinkansen Holding Corporation, which was established to attain this kind of 
advantage. 
 
A.5-2. Common ownership/management of the infrastructure for sharing accesses.  
Chapter 7 investigated this type of mutual access in the Mexico City Terminal 
Railway (TFVM), where the three concessionaires and the government are the 
shareholder of TFVM, and attained the mutual access to the dense rail 
infrastructure in the country. Through this kind of common ownership/ 
management of the infrastructure, each operator could achieve access to the 
infrastructure with much less costs than providing its own infrastructure. 
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A.5-3. Improvement of the accounting system and financial management.  
The investigation into VNR revealed that introducing the track access charges 
clarified the costs of each transport service and improved the accounting system. 
[2/VN] Similarly, the study about SNCFT showed that allocation of the 
infrastructure costs to each transport division resulted in tightening its cost 
control and financial management, and contributed to decreasing unnecessary 
maintenance costs. [4/TN] 
 
A.5-4. Separation of the social division and the commercial division of the railway.  
In the US, elimination of the cross-subsidies was the primary objective of the 
government in establishing Amtrak. In addition to the revival of the freight 
railways, vertical separation made the government define its role for the 
passenger sector.[12/US] Through the restructuring processes, it was also defined 
that the government should support necessary passenger rail transport in 
Australia, Mexico and some European regional services.[9/AU, 13/MX, 7/DE, 
8/FR] These cases show that the separation of financial responsibility clarified the 
boundary between the social and the commercial divisions within the railway 
sector. 
 
 
A particular example of vertical separation in a railway does not necessarily have 
only one of the above advantages, and several advantages can be utilized at the 
same time in order to attain a certain aim. For example, a number of the 
above-mentioned advantages of vertical separation would be utilized as 
complementary policies to promote private participation into the railway services.2  
 
Brooks, M. and Button, K.(1995 p.235) notes that “there has been, as part of what 
has been called a ‘general withdrawal of the state’, an almost universal move 
towards market liberalization and the transference of significant parts of transport 
                                                  
2  The following advantages play at least a certain role in private sector participation 
in the railway sector: A.1-1, A.1-2, A.1-3, A.1-4, A.2-1, A.2-2, A.2-3, A.2-4, A.3-1, A.3-2, 
A.4-1, A.4-2, A.5-2, and A.5-4. 
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supply from the public to the private sector.” Moyer, N. and Thompson, L. (1992 p.і) 
also generalizes regarding the private sector participation as “a monolithic railway 
does not function well in a market economy in competition with privately owned, 
properly (lightly) regulated competitors – especially trucking. All attempts to 
commercialize, corporatize, or increase the role of the private sector in railway 
activities have started with one or another form of reshaping the railway entity. 
Solutions will vary, but the universal objective as an economy becomes more 
market-driven is to make the railway more market-sensitive.” 
 
The above-referred indications mean that it might be possible to utilize vertical 
separation to reshape a monolithic railway and to make it more market-sensitive. 
 
 
9.2.2 Competition Issues 
 
Introduction of within-rail competition is one of the advantages of vertical 
separation. Thus, this section investigates how each railway faces competition 
which was described in Section 2.2.2.4. Especially, introduction of competition 
through vertical separation is examined, and the results of the investigation are 
summarized in Table 9.1.  
 
The study based on the table revealed that, through utilizing vertical separation, 
only railways in EU and Australia have an intention to introduce within-rail 
competition:  
▪ Type 1: competition for the tracks; and 
▪ Type 2: competition on the tracks. 
 
The study also revealed that only the freight sector in Mexico could have 
successfully introduced another following competition through vertical separation 
making a contract with different concessionaires: 
 ▪ Type 3: competition between the tracks. 
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Table 9.1  Comparison of the Types of Competition 
Within-rail Competition *  
    Type of Competition 
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India (IR)    c<P;F>  
Vietnam (VNR)    c<P;F>  
Indonesia (PT.KA)    c<P;F>  G
ro
up
 1
 
Tunisia (SNCFT)    c<P;F>  
Sweden (Banverket) C<P> C<F>*1  c<P;F>  
UK (Railtrak) C<P> C<F>*1  c<P;F>  
Germany (DB Netz) C<P>*2 C<F>  c<P;F>  
France (RFF)  C<F>  c<P;F>  G
ro
up
 2
 
Australia (ARTC) C<P> C<F>  c<P;F>  
Iran (Raja Co.-RAI)    c<P;F>  
Japan (JR Freight-JR Passenger)   c<P> *3 c<P;F> *4 
G
ro
up
 3
 
USA (Amtrak-US Freight)  c<F>*5 c<F>*5 c<P;F> c<F> 
Mexico (TFM, Ferromex) *6  C<F> c<P;F>  
Mexico (TFVM)    *7  c<P;F>  
New Shinkansen Lines    c<P;F>  G
ro
up
 4
 
Aoimori Railway    c<P;F>  
<P>: Passenger Sector 
<F>: Freight Sector 
 
C: Competition which was introduced as an aim of the reform through vertical 
separation. 
c:  Competition which was already existed even before the reform. 
 
* : Although “3. Competition between the tracks” and “5. Competition between 
companies on their own tracks” are also regarded as intra-modal competition, as 
noted in the footnote of Section 8.2, the term of “within-rail competition” refers to 
both “franchising” and “on-track competition” in this paper.   
 
*1:  In certain overlapping lines, different franchisees compete on the track in the 
passenger sector as well. Nevertheless, this was not an aim of the reform. 
 
*2:  Open access is stipulated in Germany. Nevertheless, in the passenger sector, 
examples of on-track competition are limited, and most of the services are operated 
based on a contract with subsidy.  
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*3:  Like US freight corridors, there are some examples of competition between a JR 
Passenger Company and a private passenger railway in Japan. 
 
*4:  The newly established JR Passenger companies face yardstick competition and 
profitability competition on the stock exchange to some extent. Nevertheless, this is 
not an aim of vertical separation. 
 
*5:  U.S. Interstate Commerce Commission often gave one railway the right to operate 
over another in order to create competition between the two. [12/US] 
 
*6:  The Mexican freight concessionaires face competition for the market at the time of 
bidding for a concession contract. Nevertheless, besides this type also controls the 
infrastructure, the period of the contract is 50 years and renewable for another 
similar period in the case of Mexico. Thus the author regarded the main aim of 
long-run concessions as utilization of ability of the private sector utilizing market 
mechanism. 
 
*7: Certainly, the three freight concessionaires access the network of TFVM. 
Nevertheless, the aim of establishment of TFVM is not for promoting on-track 
competition among concessionaires, but for 1) economy of enhanced density of the 
network avoiding monopolistic access to the country’s most densely used network; 
2) promoting competition on parallel tracks. 
 
Source: Author 
 
 
The above investigation demonstrated that introduction of a new type of 
competition through vertical separation of railways has been so limited except the 
afore-mentioned cases. Nevertheless, in some cases, vertical separation could have 
changed status of the railway in the transport market. For example, diminishing 
cross-subsidy between the freight and the passenger sectors strengthened 
competitiveness of the freight railroads in the US, and they have gained 
advantageous status against other transport modes. As this example shows an 
appropriate model of vertical separation can strengthen competitiveness of the 
railway sector, utilizing only the existing competition. 
 
As mentioned in Section 2.3, railways have lost the market share drastically over 
the past thirty years in many countries, and in most of the cases the government 
has an intention to develop railways in order to keep and develop preferable 
environment. Thus it is extremely vital for the railway sector to tackle the 
inter-modal competition, which is the most serious in common. Accordingly, it is 
essential to design an appropriate railway structure, which the railway sector itself 
can be efficient and can cope with this significant competition.  
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9.3 Disadvantages of Vertical Separation  
 
The research clarified various kinds of the disadvantages of vertical separation of 
railways. The interviews/questionnaires presented evidence for the disadvantages 
which are investigated in Section 2.5.2, and also revealed the additional 
disadvantages. They are investigated based on the afore-mentioned author’s 
classification: 
D.1) coordination problems due to vertical separation of entities performing railway 
operation; 
D.2) coordination problems due to separation of finance; 
D.3) coordination problems due to multiple operators. 
 
The presented evidence and the newly clarified disadvantages are summarized 
along with further discussion about the disadvantages which are investigated in 
Section 2.5.2. 
 
D.1) Coordination Problems due to Vertical Separation of Entities Performing 
Railway Operation 
D.1-1. Increase of the transaction cost between infrastructure and operation. 
For promoting competition on the tracks, in addition to the costs of necessary 
regulation for coordinating the complex relationship among different entities, the 
infrastructure manager is bound to compile annually a network statement 
explaining the network license conditions, the price structure, access conditions to 
the network, the rules for capacity allocation, etc. for accepting track-access. 
[5/SE] Regarding the competition for the tracks, the interviewees also indicated 
several challenges for the passenger franchising bidding system such as 
difficulties in assessing the franchising proposal.[6/UK, 7/DE] Even the two 
entities belong to the same ownership, the interviewee in Iran also indicated the 
risk of higher transaction costs through the loss of economies of scope. [10/IR]  
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D.1-2. Difficulty in clearly identifying the respective responsibilities of the different 
parties. 
As vertically integrated railways take full responsibilities of railway operation, 
they must bear all the liability for accidents as well. Thus, they will make efforts 
to find a cause of the accident in order to prevent the similar accident thereafter. 
Nevertheless, the separated entities tend to have difficulties to identify the 
respective responsibilities.[5/SE, 6/UK, 8/FR, 9/AU] 
 
RAI worries about the damage of tracks raised by ill-conditioned rolling stock, and 
believes that, without appropriate means to check the condition of rolling stock 
and tracks, risk for disputes among operators would be higher when several 
operators access the same track. [10/IR] 
 
D.1-3. Difficulties in acquiring broad knowledge for operation and safety measures. 
In addition to the difficulties in acquiring comprehensive knowledge about 
railway operation, the interviewee in France indicated a serious concern that 
strict separation of the operational responsibility would lose ‘railway-men spirits’ 
out of the employee, and results in inefficiency as a consequence.[8/FR] 
 
D.1-4. Difficulties to harmonize the technologies and to optimize train operation on 
the network.  
The results of the questionnaire to Australia stressed this potential problem of 
vertical separation indicating the risk of loss of control and specialist knowledge 
about the wheel/rail interface.[9/AU] The optimal train operation can be realized 
based on the harmonization of the technologies both for above rail functions and 
for below rail functions. Separation of these functions tends to make it more 
difficult, and the lack of harmonization results in a non-optimal train operation. 
 
D.1-5. Difficulties to achieve further technical development of the comprehensive 
railway system.  
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Chapter 6 revealed that the passenger sector in Japan and the freight sector in 
the US have greatly improved after the reform in each country. In both of the two 
cases the largely improved sector keeps an integrated structure, and their 
experience appears to support the common view that vertically separated railways 
have more difficulties to achieve further technical development of the railway 
system as a whole.  
 
D.1-6. Difficulties in planning certain works such as maintenance and 
unprecedented works. 
Sometimes, vertically separated railways have more difficulties than integrated 
railways in planning maintenance works. Some of the maintenance works, such as 
changing turnouts and exchanging long rails, require securing long time for the 
engineering works and, in some cases, abandoning planned train operations. 
Within integrated railways maintenance works can be planned by negotiation 
within an organisation, and a responsible person can make the ultimate decision. 
However, under vertically separated railways a final decision can be reached only 
after the negotiation and agreement between the two parties, and sometimes it 
takes longer time and large difficulties. [15/JP] ECMT (1996) also indicates that it 
is easier for integrated railways to manage in unprecedented circumstances 
through appealing to their hierarchical decision-making procedures.  
 
D.1-7. Difficulties to make coordinated managerial decisions.  
Some managerial decisions require sophisticated interaction between the 
infrastructure and operation. This can apply to non-technical issues as well. These 
managerial decisions also require close relationship between the infrastructure 
and the operator. 
 
For example, active affiliated businesses such as real estate developments around 
new stations are regarded as one of the main reasons of managerial success for 
Japanese integrated railways. If a railway company can internalize the external 
economies of its investment and provision of rail services, it greatly contributes to 
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increasing the income to the railway. Nevertheless, once the two have become 
independent entities, the separated parties tend to have more difficulties in 
reaching coordinated managerial decisions. [15/JP] 
 
D.2) Coordination Problems due to Separation of Finance 
D.2-1. Difficulties in planning and performing adequate investment in a railway 
system. 
When vertically separated railways try to make optimized investment for the 
improvement of railway operation, they have more difficulties than integrated 
railways as railway traffic is the result of interlinked production. The 
improvement of rail operation can be achieved, in most cases, through the 
simultaneous, comprehensive investment by both infrastructure and an 
operator.[6/UK] 
 
Once the financial responsibilities are separated into different entities, even 
though the railway operation is intended to be integrated, some coordination 
problems among concerned entities have been identified.[2/VN, 3/ID, 8/FR] 
 
D.2-2. Poor economic performance arising from monopolistic status of the 
infrastructure manager.  
Instead of efforts for the improvement of a railway, which is competing with other 
transport modes, it is also possible for the infrastructure manager to focus only on 
his own entity. This might result in harmful effects to a railway itself. The study 
through the questionnaire also indicated this disadvantage, and stressed that 
successful vertical separation requires a degree of maturity and a professional 
approach to ensure that all decisions are ultimately in the best interests of the 
overall rail industry. [9/AU] Chapter 5 studied that, in the case of UK, the rail 
regulator independently determined how much money the infrastructure manager 
needs so that the government shall appropriate funds for the railways. 
 
D.2-3. Conflicts raised by non-payment of the stipulated amount of compensation.  
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Railway operation faces serious problems in case payment of the stipulated 
amount of compensation is not fulfilled by the government. Chapter 4 has 
revealed that the government’s failure to pay the stipulated amount of 
compensation and the lack of stable allocation of necessary funds for maintenance 
of the infrastructure is considered as one of the most serious problems after the 
restructuring through vertical separation in Indonesia.[3/ID] Considering the 
British experience referred in the above item, a certain authority such as an 
independent regulator which retains the power to provide appropriate funding 
levels on the railway sector might be a solution to lessen the problem.   
 
D.2-4. Non-fulfilment of the promised investments and difficulty to specify 
long-term contract.  
In practice, concessionaires have an incentive not to make investments that are 
unprofitable even if the government wants them to do so, and even if they 
promised to do so in their initial bids for the contract. The investigation in 
Chapter 7 clarified the risk of non-fulfilment of the promised investments. 3  
Additionally, it is also very difficult to specify long-term contract, and the 
operator’s actual benefit might largely differ from the original expectation 
especially in the case of radical economic changes.[14/JP]  
 
D.3) Coordination Problems due to Multiple Operators 
D.3-1. Difficulty in slot allocation, timetabling and coordination among operators. 
The interviews also revealed that the infrastructure manager has difficulties to 
coordinate the operators’ slot-application especially in the following cases [5/SE, 
6/UK, 7/DE, 9/AU]: 
1) in a case infrastructure capacity is limited; 
2) in a case several operators apply the same slots of timetable; 
3) in a case time schedule for maintenance works is difficult to be secured. 
                                                  
3   The interviewee also suggested an alternative approach that the government 
identifies the desired investments and performs the payment for it.[13/MX] This 
approach appears to be similar to the case of new Shinkansen lines as the public 
sector invested in the infrastructure initially, and the operator can upgrade it in case 
it is prospected to be profitable. 
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Difficulty in coordination was indicated even though the number of operators is 
limited to a few as each operator tries to pursue its own interests. [13/MX] 
 
D.3-2. Lack of integration of prices and services.  
Chapter 5 studied that in Germany several pasenger operators perform railway 
operation on the same network under the regulation of open access. The 
interviewees indicated that it is difficult to integrate prices and services among 
the main operator and the new entrants.[7/DE] The interviewees in Sweden also 
indicated the lack of coordination in timetable scheduling at the border of the 
franchised networks.[5/SE] These cases show that this kind of coordination 
problems happens when plural operators access the network in the passenger 
sector. 
 
D.3-3. Loss of flexibility of controlling trains/crews.  
The interviews to European railways clarified that the increase of new entrant 
operators tends to result in some sub-optimisation and loss of flexibility. It was 
indicated that flexible operation, such as that for unprecedented issues, is one of 
the advantages for integrated or franchised railway where a single operator 
controls train operation on the network. [6/UK, 7/DE] 
 
D.3-4. Difficulties to provide sufficient information of other operators.  
It was indicated that in case several operators perform passenger train services 
based on open access, practically, it is difficult for the station staff to sell various 
types of tickets issued by different operators and to provide sufficient ticket 
conditions to the customers. [7/DE] 
 
 
In addition to the evidence, this study revealed a number of problems and 
disadvantages derived from vertical separation of railways. 
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Along with Section 9.2, the study investigated various kinds of advantages and 
disadvantages according to the author’s categorization. In the following section, 
relationship with these advantages/disadvantages and the form of vertical 
separation will be analyzed.  
 
 
9.4 Relationship with the Form of Vertical Separation 
 
 
Table 9.2 shows relationship between the main advantages/disadvantages and the 
forms of vertical separation. In the following, advantageous and disadvantageous 
aspects are investigated according to the type of vertical separation based on the 
table. 
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Table 9.2 Relationship between the Main Advantages/Disadvantages and Forms of  
    Vertical Separation 
      Advantages Disadvantages 
    Advantages and 
                Disadvantages 
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1) Integral    
Ex.)India 
        
2) Separation of Ownership Only 
   Ex.) New Shinkansen Line, Mexico(Freight)
√*1 √       
3) Separation of Financial Support for 
Track Maintenance   
Ex.) Vietnam, Indonesia, Tunisia 
√      √  
4) Separation with Share-holding 
Relationship*      
Ex.) Aoimori Railway, Mexico(TFVM) 
(√) (√)  (√) (√) (√) (√)  
5) Vertical Separation for Passenger/ 
Freight Traffic 
   Ex.) Japan, USA, Iran 
   √  √*2 √*2  
6) Complete Separation 
   Ex.) Sweden, UK, Australia (ARTC) √ √ √ √  √ √ √*3
 
* : Advantages and disadvantages depend on the cases and the forms of railways. 
 
*1: A.1) is applied only to the process of construction, such as the case of new 
Shinkansen line. 
 
*2: The disadvantages are confined to the smaller market where the tenant operates. 
 
*3: Multiple operators operate on the same track under open access. In the case of 
franchising, the number of operators is limited. 
 
Source: Author 
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1) Integral  
In this type of organization, only one operator performs the railway operation both 
in the passenger and in the freight including social services as well as commercial 
ones. The main advantage of this type of structure comes from the integration of 
the main stages of the production process. Trujillo, C.R.(2004 p.9) notes that the 
integration of the infrastructure and operation makes it easier to plan the 
long-term investment and to programme the operations. In addition, it is possible 
to retain a simple compatible tariff policy over the whole network and eliminate/ 
reduce any contract with other firms to a minimum.  
 
Nevertheless, the most cases of this type have been in public hands managed and 
operated by a public firm for avoiding the use of monopoly power. And this 
monolithic public organization tends to lose incentives to improve efficiency and to 
reduce the costs.[1/IN] Moreover, as it was investigated in Section 2.3.3, the 
state-owned railways generally have had several other disadvantages such as 
poorly defined goals mixing the commercial and the social divisions.  
 
Recent poor financial performance caused by severe competition with other 
transport modes has made this type of management financially difficult. 
Furthermore, accompanied with a general recognition to the inefficiency of public 
operations, many of this type have already been restructured and the many of the 
remaining ones are also facing management restructurings.  
 
2) Separation of Ownership Only 
In this type, public investment is limited in the construction process as studied in 
the case of new Shinkansen line. The railway can be, in general, self-financed in 
the operational process. Without permission of track-age rights by other operators, 
the number of operator is limited to one at least in the same market. Even though 
the ownership is separated and generally owned by the public sector, once after the 
concession contract is made or the condition of infrastructure leasing is fixed, the 
private sector can perform the rail operation as if it were an integrated railway 
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controlling both infrastructure and operation.  
 
As one of the (private) firms is selected to manage the publicly-owned 
infrastructure, the process of the selection, such as the transparent competitive 
tendering or designation with enough accountability to the tax payers, is essential 
for making this system functioned fairly. 
 
3) Separation of Financial Support for Track Maintenance 
In this type of separation, the railway itself cannot afford to sustain the cost of the 
infrastructure in the operational process either, and the government has become 
financially responsible for the track maintenance as well. Because of the 
separation of financial responsibilities, state-owned railways face some 
coordination problems with the government. However, the disadvantages are 
limited to a small extent as the sole railway operator practically performs the 
essential factors of daily operation including track maintenance works. This means 
that the coordination problems are endeavoured to be lessened by assigning the 
below rail functions to the main operator. In addition, the two entities cooperate to 
lessen them with mutual close negotiation. As studied in Indonesia, in case the 
government cannot make the payment of the stipulated amount of funds to the 
railway, the coordination problem between the two would become greatly enlarged, 
and results in difficulties of smooth railway operation.   
 
4) Separation with Share-holding Relationship  
Especially in case it is not intended to promote new entry into the market 
promoting within-rail competition fairly,4 close share-holding relationship between 
infrastructure and operation is utilized in several cases to attain managerial 
cooperation between the two. The study has investigated various types of 
share-holding link to attain a couple of aims. 
                                                  
4  Although the main railway (DB AG) in Germany accepts competition from other 
operators following the EU regulations, there are strong opinions that fair 
competition is difficult to be attained under the condition that the dominant railway 
controls the infrastructure. 
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In the case of Aoimori Railway, where the private sector has been introduced for 
revitalizing as the commercial division, the railway operation could not be 
self-sustained if it bears the cost of infrastructure. Thus the public sector has 
become responsible for the infrastructure financially. Despite the separation of 
financial responsibilities, infrastructure and operation are linked with a large 
share-holding relationship, which practically stipulates the exclusive track-access 
and contributes towards managerial cooperation between the two.  
 
The aims and structure are somewhat different in the case of the Mexico City 
Terminal Railway (TFVM). Although the track access is practically exclusive to the 
share-holders (concessionaires) alike the above case, vertical separation was 
introduced in order to share track access among them. 
 
The study also examined the case in DB AG and Iran as examples of share-holding 
relationship between infrastructure and operation. In each of the above cases, 
share-holding link contributes to managerial cooperation between the two entities. 
 
5) Vertical Separation for Passenger/Freight Traffic 
In this type of separation, the dominant railway, which provides services in the 
larger railway market, keeps an integrated structure and the tenant operating in 
the smaller market accesses the track of the dominant railway.  
 
The main advantage of this type is promoting specialization focusing on its own 
rail market as it is examined in the railways in Japan, the US and Iran. Abolition 
of the excessive cross-subsidy between the passenger and the freight sectors 
secures investment funds for the prime sector where the railway retains 
competitiveness in the transport market.  
 
The study revealed that the termination of the excessive cross-subsidy worked for, 
especially, the improvement of the traffic performance of the dominant railway 
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such as the case in the passenger companies in Japan and the private freight 
railroads in the US. And, as a consequence, it has resulted in the improvement of 
the railway sector as a whole. Thus this type of separation between passenger and 
freight is effective in case one of the sectors is dominant and potentially profitable 
enough to sustain the infrastructure. 
 
Even though a tenant accesses the tracks, the relationship between the two 
operators is not competitive as their markets are different. The dominant 
integrated railway is only required to coordinate some operational factors such as 
timetabling with the tenant. In practice, the tenant tends to face some 
coordination problems due to separation of entities performing railway operation 
and those due to separation of finance, but they are confined only into the 
smaller/minor rail market. In the case of the US, another effect of the separation is 
defining the government’s financial role for the tenant.  
 
6) Complete Separation 
European countries and Australia follow the regulation, which intends to open up 
the rail market to the new participants. In order to attain the aim to introduce 
within-rail competition, this type has separated all the below rail functions from 
the operator to the infrastructure manager both operationally and financially.5 
 
Nash, C.A.(2007 p.75) notes that “this approach undoubtedly makes new entry 
easiest by removing all incentives for the infrastructure manager to favour one 
operator over another, but also leads to problems in coordination between the 
                                                  
5 The study examined the type of “separation of slot-allocation” in the case of France 
and “separation with common ownership” in the case of Germany, both of which were 
introduced to follow the EU transport policy. There are strong opinions that fair 
competition is difficult to be attained under the condition that the dominant railway 
controls the infrastructure. In addition, despite the intention of keeping an integrated 
control by the main incumbent railway through these types, the new entrants face 
“complete separation” in their market as well. Thus, the type of “complete separation” 
increases in the market according as the new entrant participates in the segment of 
the market.(Nash, C.A., 2007). Based on this background, in this part, only the type of 
“complete separation” would be discussed as a type for introducing within-rail 
competition. 
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infrastructure manager and the train operating companies in terms of planning, 
investment, timetabling and day to day operations.” In the case of open access, 
increase of the number of operators tends to lead coordination problems among 
them as well. 
 
As it was examined in the case of Sweden, UK and Australia (ARTC), under this 
type of separation, the degree of the coordination problems becomes greatly 
enlarged especially in case the infrastructure capacity is limited with a number of 
trains and operators. Thus the benefits of the within-rail competition need to 
compensate for the costs of the above-mentioned coordination problems in order for 
there to be a case for this type of separation. 
 
 
In this section advantages and disadvantages of vertical separation have been 
investigated according to the type of separation. The study showed that, generally, 
each type of vertical separation has certain advantages and disadvantages at the 
same time, and the most of them are commonly shared by more than one type of 
vertical separation. In addition, it was also identified that only the type of complete 
separation, different from other types, has the advantage of introducing competition 
and the disadvantage due to multiple operators particularly. 
 
The study also identified that whether within-rail competition is aimed or not is one 
of the essential factors for determining the outline of vertical structure of the 
railway. This is because without this intention, in general, there are reasonable 
motives for integrating the “below rail” and “above rail” functions into the main 
operator operationally even though the financial responsibility is separated. On the 
other hand, the intention to introduce within-rail competition leads to separate the 
“below rail” and “above rail” functions not only in finance but also in operation in 
order to promote new entry into the market fairly. 
 
This also means that without an intention to introduce within-rail competition, 
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since integrated operation is intended with reason at least in the main market, the 
essential aim of introducing vertical separation is separating the railway into the 
social division financed by the public sector and the commercial division financed by 
the railway in many cases.  
 
Compared with subsidizing the railway without separation to cover its deficit, 
vertical separation has increased transparency in terms of identifying how the 
public money is used in the railway sector, whilst it leaves more management 
freedom to the railway as the commercial division. As it is also the case in the type 
of “complete separation”, the above-mentioned advantage to provide greater 
transparency is found to be common in most of the other types of separation. 
 
Besides clarification of financial responsibility and making the usage of public 
funds transparent, the study identified that vertical separation 
accompanied/resulted in other advantages such as liberalization, private sector 
involvement, specialization of the operation and so on.  
 
The case study in the former chapters compared the growth of rail traffic 
performances and that of the real-term GDP in order to distinguish the impact of 
the reform through vertical separation from that of the transition of national 
economy. Although it was shown that they follow the similar trends, the comparison 
also identified some cases that the period of reform has clearly changed the trend of 
rail traffic performance and picked it up, which can not be explained by the 
transition of the GDP. Since the study also identified this kind of cases even among 
the railways which have experienced railway reform without introducing 
within-rail competition, it is possible that the above-mentioned reform through 
liberalization, private sector involvement, specialization of the operation has 
contributed toward the improvement of the railway performance. This means that 
the stagnated railway can improve its operation by means of railway reform 
through vertical separation even without introducing within-rail competition. 
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9.5 Appropriate Form depending on Market Structure  
 
Based on the study performed, this section discusses and proposes an appropriate 
form of vertical separation depending on several kinds of market structures. The 
study clarified that whether it is aimed to introduce within-rail competition or not 
outlines the structure of vertical separation, thus the form is investigated in each of 
the two directions.  
 
9.5.1 Forms utilizing the Capabilities of the Incumbent/Reformed Operator 
 
This type of reform aims to improve efficiency of the railway through revitalizing 
the incumbent/reformed operator. This type does not intend to introduce within-rail 
competition through the reform, and the way of reform tends to be moderate 
compared with another form, which accompanies within-rail competition. 
Nevertheless, as studied in the cases of Vietnam, USA and Japan, it is also possible 
to revitalize the stagnated railway through utilizing this type of reform. 
 
This type is expected to be appropriate in the following conditions: 
a) the incumbent operator retains high engineering and management capabilities, 
and it is reasonable to utilize its ability and exploit its potential for further 
improvement rather than relying on the capability of other new entrants. 
b) the government does not have either enough knowledge or expertise for utilizing 
the capabilities of other new operators. 
c) private participation in the market is not expected for some reasons such as 
immaturity of the railway industry, insufficiencies in regulations, and so on. 
 
An appropriate form is investigated depending on the different types of market 
structures in the following. 
 
1) Passenger/Freight Dominated Market 
In case the dominant sector can afford the cost of infrastructure, as investigated in 
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the cases of Japan and USA, the study found vertical separation for 
passenger/freight traffic can be an appropriate structure. In this type, large 
coordination problems through vertical separation are confined into the 
minor/smaller market. If the railways can be profitable, as the main three JR 
Railways have been privatized, it is possible for them to promote private 
participation through public listing of shares. On the other hand, if the tenant is 
not profitable as investigated in the case of USA, it leads to introducing public 
sector’s finance to it. 
 
Nevertheless, in many cases, if the operator bears the costs of infrastructure the 
dominant rail transport market is not profitable either, and the public sector is 
obliged to play a certain financial role for the railways. Even if the infrastructure 
is owned by the public sector, the railway can be operated with the integrated 
manner in case the operator can afford the maintenance costs of it.6 In case the 
operator can not afford the maintenance cost of the infrastructure, in addition to 
the ownership, the public sector is required to take a certain responsibility for the 
infrastructure maintenance financially.7 In these cases, the public infrastructure is 
utilized for the incumbent/reformed operator. Thus in this type without 
competitive bidding, it is possible that certain kind of transparency/accountability 
is required for the access by the private sector. Further accountability appears to 
be requested when the public finance for the infrastructure maintenance is 
required regularly for the private railway’s operation. 
 
2) Railways where neither passenger nor freight is dominant  
In this kind of market where the railway is required to reform, different from the 
former type, in general it is difficult that only one of the sectors, the passenger or 
the freight, bears the infrastructure costs. When the railway becomes deficit as a 
whole and is still required to operate for some reasons, the third party such as the 
public sector should bear a certain financial responsibility. The study investigated 
                                                  
6   This type was studied in the case of new Shinkansen lines. 
7   This type was studied in the case of Aoimori Railway. In this type, in spite of 
separation of financial responsibility, as Chapter 7 examined, coordination 
problems through vertical separation are lessened by some means. 
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that the government owns the infrastructure and finances its maintenance in the 
cases of Vietnam and Tunisia. The cases showed that operation and management 
of the incumbent/reformed railways have become more market-oriented through 
the reform. The study revealed that, in addition to the change of vertical structure, 
various measures, such as corporatization, private participation, decentralization, 
line-of-business management, contributed to the revitalization of the railway 
management. Thus the study found that this kind of relationship between the 
railway and the government is effective in this kind of market as a form of vertical 
separation. 
 
Even though some private companies have joined in the transport services in the 
above cases, they are not for promoting within-rail competition. The reforms have 
been performed mainly through revitalizing the incumbent/reformed operator.  
 
 
9.5.2 Forms utilizing Competition / Capability of a New Participant 
 
Different from the above type, in order to improve efficiency of the railway transport 
services this type promotes within-rail competition or utilizes capability of other 
professional operators to a large extent. In some cases, such as the cases in UK and 
Mexico, the former state-owned railway is disbanded and new operators commence 
their operation through competitive bidding or open access. From this viewpoint, 
the way of reform tends to be more radical than the former type. 
 
This type is expected to be appropriate in the following conditions: 
a) the incumbent operator has serious problems, and it is reasonable to utilize 
engineering and management capabilities of other professional operators for the 
development of rail transport services. 
b) the government has knowledge or can obtain professional support for utilizing 
the capabilities of new operators.  
c) private participation in the market can be expected with a mature rail market, 
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appropriate regulations, and so on. 
 
An appropriate vertical structure of railways is investigated depending on the three 
types of railway transport market in the following. 
 
1) Passenger Dominated Market 
The study showed that, compared with the open access competition, competitive 
tendering has particular advantages as a way of introducing competitive pressures 
into the rail passengers services. As competitive tendering does not presuppose 
operational separation of infrastructure management, there are two distinct ways 
to promote private participation into the railway market through the tendering: 1) 
concession controlling both infrastructure and operation; 2) franchising controlling 
only operation. The study revealed that coordination problems between 
infrastructure and operation increase according as the degree of operational 
separation between them increases. Considering the market structure which the 
passenger sector is dominant, concession controlling both infrastructure and 
operation appears more advantageous especially for decreasing coordination 
problems in the dominant market.8  
 
2) Freight Dominated Market 
The study showed that there are two typical ways for professional operators to 
enter into the rail freight market: 1) open access; 2) concession.  
 
The results of open access have been witnessed only in the rail freight markets in 
Europe and Australia, both of which have distinct characteristics.9 The case in 
Australia (ARTC) showed that the freight transport has improved in this kind of 
freight dominated market. But the study also found that open access is beneficial 
only in the market where the benefits of introducing on-track competition can 
                                                  
8   An appropriate access condition in the freight sector varies depending on the 
network and market characteristics in the sector, and it is discussed in the following 
types. 
9  Section 5.2.3 summarizes the similarities of the background and characteristics of 
the market in the two regions. 
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compensate for the costs derived from the fragmented organizational structure.  
 
Whereas the incumbent operator can also continue its operation under open access, 
concession is more radical way to promote private-sector involvement. Thompson, 
L. (2005 p.421) explains that “private-sector involvement has particular value 
when the existing railway is inefficient, financially burdensome, or unresponsive 
to market forces (often all three)”. The study in the case of Mexico showed that the 
freight transport has improved in the freight dominated market through 
concession. As the concessionaire operates both below rail and above rail functions, 
in spite of the transaction costs of establishing the terms of concessions, this form 
does not raise coordination problems through vertical separation. Thus concession 
is especially adaptable to the network where infrastructure capacity is limited. 
 
3) Railways where neither passenger nor freight is dominant   
The study investigated this type of market in the case of railways in Europe, where 
the regulation stipulates that the body which is independent of any transport 
operator should be responsible for path allocation. In addition, to secure 
non-discrimination among operators, this type also ensures the account for 
transport service and one for railway infrastructure kept separate. The study 
revealed that this type of separation raises coordination problems, and these 
problems would be greatly enlarged when infrastructure capacity is limited. 
 
In the freight sector, Europe has introduced open access and, certainly, it appears 
that the policy has contributed to increasing the transport. The study also found 
that the increase of the freight transport has occurred under the particular 
circumstances, where on-track competition promoted by new entry could develop 
the new rail market that used to be untapped. Thus it is essential to understand 
that the benefits of on-track competition need to compensate for the costs of 
operational separation in order for there to be a case for introducing open access in 
other markets. 
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Regarding the passenger sector, Section 5.6.2.2 investigated that competitive 
tendering has particular advantages as a way of introducing competition rather 
than the open access competition. This can be adaptable to other markets for 
preserving an integrated network of rail services as well. 
 
Through the investigation, the author expects the validity of another form of 
railways in this kind of market structure. Because of the above-mentioned 
regulation, European Railways have introduced vertical separation with 
franchising controlling only operation in the passenger sector.10 Nevertheless, 
considering the fact that “in Britain calls for a return to vertical integration have 
been made by a number of train operating companies” (Nash, C.A., 2007 p.76), it is 
worthwhile to take account of the coordination problems derived from the 
operationally separated structure in order to plan an appropriate form of railways 
in other markets. 
 
Gómez-Ibáñez, J.A. (2003 p.338) explains that unboundling is least attractive for 
passeger rail services because of : 1) their high percent of infrastructure costs 
critical to coordination; 2) less homogeneous/standardized services. He also explains 
that unboundling is more difficult in the passenger services than the freight 
services as the former requires coordination through negotiations, congestion 
pricing, or auction regime to a larger extent. Therefore, instead of European model 
which the infrastructure manager is independent from both sectors, concession with 
integrated passenger operation along with rights of access for freight operators is 
expected to be another candidate model for this kind of market structure where the 
railways do not need to follow the EU regulations. Even if access neutrality between 
the two sectors is required to be secured by stronger regulation, this type should 
reduce coordination problems within the passenger sector, which require more 
coordination than the freight. 
 
The investigation in this section is summarized in Figure 9.1. 
                                                  
10  Chapter 5 investigated there are diversified types such as “separation with common 
ownership” adopted in Germany and “separation of slot-allocation” adopted in France. 
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9.6 Conclusion  
 
This chapter examined various advantages and disadvantages of vertical separation 
of railways, and investigated them according to the type of separation. An 
appropriate form is also discussed and investigated based on the different market 
structures. Results of the comparative study are summarized as follows. 
 
▪  Advantages and disadvantages of each type of vertical separation vary to a large 
extent depending on the type of vertical separation. This means that the 
appropriate form of vertical separation is widely different according to the specific 
aim to achieve. 
 
▪  Introducing within-rail competition is only one of the various advantages of 
vertical separation of railways. Most of the other advantages can be achieved even 
under integrated operation by the main railway. Even if the ownership and/or 
financial responsibility of the infrastructure is separated to a different entity, 
without an intention to introduce within-rail competition, in general, the sector 
takes measures to keep an integrated control with reason. It is because the 
integrated operation decreases coordination problems between the below rail and 
the above rail functions. 
 
▪  Certain disadvantages are caused by the conflicts among different operators as 
well. Thus introducing new operators or separating into independent operators 
should have certain aims/advantages which can compensate the disadvantages. 
The potential advantages are:  
1) introducing on-track competition among operators;  
2) abolishing cross subsidies among different divisions such as between the 
passenger and the freight;  
3) concentration on the services within each market;  
4) introducing private participation with investment;  
5) sharing the track-access for economic reasons.   
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▪  The advantageous results of introducing within-rail competition are expected to 
largely depend on the circumstances of the railway industry such as existence of 
the rolling stock leasing companies and the untapped rail transport market. The 
derived costs of operational separation are also expected to largely depend on 
individual conditions such as traffic density. In addition to the coordination 
problems through vertical separation, the costs for the necessary regulation and 
those for the franchising/concession contract should also be taken account of. As 
the outcome of the reform through vertical separation should be evaluated 
including its advantages as well as disadvantages, the benefits of within-rail 
competition need to compensate for the derived costs in order for there to be a case 
for introducing it. 
 
▪  Among various forms of vertical separation, the form of “complete separation” 
has a unique form in which all the below rail functions in both sectors are 
separated into the different institution operationally and financially. Whereas it 
has particular advantages to foster neutrality among operators, the study also 
revealed that “complete separation” generally faces larger degree of coordination 
problems even in the primary market compared with other types of vertical 
separation.  
 
▪  Besides the intention whether within-rail competition is aimed or not, an 
appropriate form of railways also largely depends on the rail market structures. 
Based on the case study and succeeding analysis, the appropriate forms are 
proposed depending on the different kinds of market structures.11  
 
11  Based on the examination in this study, an appropriate form of vertical structure is 
summarized in Figure 9.1. Although the study did not find the case, the investigation 
referred the validity of the concession with integrated passenger operation along with 
rights of access for freight operators for the market where neither passenger nor 
freight is dominant. 
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CHAPTER 10:  
CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER 
RESEARCH 
 
10.1 Introduction 
 
Without subsidy from the government, nowadays, the number of profit-making 
integrated state-owned railways has become limited to a few. In addition to the 
deterioration of financial condition of railways caused by severe competition with 
other modes, many of the state-owned railways also face some problems such as 
lack of incentive to be cost-effective or to respond flexibly to the changes in user 
demand. They often had poorly defined goals and continued cross-subsidy between 
the social division and the commercial division. 
 
In order to reform these stagnated state-owned railways, the railway sector has 
experienced various forms of vertical separation as a part of the restructuring 
process. Despite the abundant forms of vertical separation of railways, sufficient 
analysis has not been done partly because of the limited opportunities to share or 
obtain information due to scattered geographic locations in the world. 
 
Based on the above background this thesis has examined various types of vertical 
separation, which the railway sector has experienced in the last few decades. The 
research has investigated them in terms of the four key issues: 
1) aims of railway reform through vertical separation; 
2) forms and implementation of vertical separation; 
3) advantageous effects of vertical separation; and 
4) disadvantageous effects of vertical separation. 
 
Firstly, the study has investigated into each group of railways with a similar type of 
vertical separation. In order to distinguish their characteristics they are compared 
analytically among different types of vertical separation especially in terms of 
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operational responsibilities and financial responsibilities. Advantages and 
disadvantages are also examined in each case and compared among the different 
types. In addition to identifying the above-mentioned four key issues of each type of 
vertical separation, the investigation and comparison in the thesis resulted in 
clarifying the characteristics of each type of it. Then discussions and studies are 
performed to find out an appropriate form in different market structures. 
 
As a conclusion of this research, this chapter summarizes the findings through the 
study and suggests the directions for further research based on the results of the 
study.  
 
 
10.2 Summary of Findings 
 
The main findings of the research are summarized as follows. 
 
(Forms and implementation of vertical separation) 
▪  The study revealed that there are a number of different forms of vertical 
separation in the railway sector. The investigation clarified forms and 
implementation of each type of it, and demonstrated that the degree of operational 
separation between infrastructure and operation varies to a large extent.1 
 
▪  The study identified a number of reasons to introduce vertical separation. 
Without an intention to promote new entry into the rail market through open 
access or competitive bidding, the incumbent/reformed operator continues railway 
operation as a main operator. Lack of intention to introduce within-rail 
competition makes it easier to keep exclusive track access by the limited number 
of operators. In these types, even though railways require financial support 
through vertical separation, the study revealed that they endeavoured to lessen 
the coordination problems derived from vertical separation. The investigation 
                                                  
1  This is examined in Section 8.2 and summarized in Table 8.1. 
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clarified that it is performed through:  
1) assigning the below rail functions to the main operator;  
2) share-holding link between infrastructure and operation to attain managerial 
cooperation;  
3) confining operational separation only to the smaller/minor rail market. 
 
▪  In case it is aimed to introduce within-rail competition promoting new entry into 
the market, it leads to separating responsibility for below rail functions, as the 
infrastructure manager should be non-discriminatory to any operator 
operationally (at least in slot-allocation) and financially. The study showed that in 
the type of “complete separation” below rail functions and above rail functions are 
performed by legally and financially independent institutions even in the prime 
market. The study revealed that, compared with other types, this type forms the 
highest degree of separation in terms of both financial and operational 
responsibilities.2  
 
▪  Whether the reform aims to introduce within-rail competition or not largely 
outlines the way of railway operation as well as its form. The study showed typical 
comparative examples: the European railways introduced vertical separation in 
order to create on-track competition especially for cross-border rail operations, 
whereas Japanese railways tried to avoid vertical separation and have been 
promoting their passenger through-train services by means of reciprocal 
running.3 This is because on-track competition is not intended in the latter case 
and they believe that close communication and cooperation between 
infrastructure and operation are pre-requisite for secure operation. 
                                                 
 
(Aims, advantages and disadvantages of vertical separation) 
▪ The study showed that several reasons for failures inhere in monolithic 
state-owned railways, and that vertical separation has been utilized through the 
process of the reform along with some kinds of liberalization such as 
 
2  This is summarized in Table 8.1 and Table 8.2. 
3  This is studied in Section 7.2.2.2. 
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corporatization/privatization of the railways. The aims of introducing vertical 
separation vary to a large extent depending on various factors such as the 
government’s principle for transport, its financial condition, status of the railways, 
transport market structure, and so on.  
 
▪  The study clarified that vertical separation has a number of advantages and can 
attain certain aims of the reform. The author categorized them into the five 
advantages, and examined them.4 The study also revealed that the advantages 
vary to a large extent depending on the type of vertical separation, and that the 
principal exclusive aim in the type of “complete separation” is to introduce 
within-rail competition fostering neutrality even between the passenger and the 
freight. 
 
▪  The study revealed that vertical separation raises a number of disadvantages as 
well, and the author categorized them into the three types of coordination 
problems and examined them. 5  It is revealed that disadvantages of vertical 
separation also vary to a great degree depending on the type of separation. 
 
▪  Vertical separation, as one type of the structural separation, has an advantage to 
abolish cross-subsidy between the commercial and the social divisions of the 
railway. The study showed that abolition of cross-subsidy between them 
contributed to revitalizing the activity of the former division improving its 
competitiveness against other transport modes.  
 
▪ The study showed that possibilities of coordination problems between 
infrastructure and operation can be investigated in terms of: 1) the degree of 
operational separation.6 and 2) the degree of financial separation.7 The study also 
showed that possibilities of conflicts among operators are likely to increase 
according as their relationship becomes competitive especially in the same 
                                                  
4  Section 9.2 examined the advantages of vertical separation. 
5  Section 9.3 examined disadvantages of vertical separation. 
6  The study is summarized in Table 8.1. 
7  The study is summarized in Table 8.2. 
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sector.8  
 
▪  The investigation verified the common view9 that, within the type of “complete 
separation”, coordination problems would be greatly enlarged when capacity of 
the infrastructure is limited with dense traffic. The study also showed that most 
of the disputes in this type are raised:  
1) in a case of coordinating timetable in limited infrastructure capacity;  
2) in a case of settling train delays by compensation; and  
3) in a case of sudden engineering works. 
 
▪  The study revealed that, despite the fact that the type is the most appropriate for 
introducing new participants to the transport services to promote within-rail 
competition, “complete separation” makes coordination problems through vertical 
separation to the most extent even in the prime market. The study also disclosed 
that the benefits of within-rail competition need to compensate for the costs in 
order for there to be a case for introducing the form for it since, in general, other 
advantages can be also attained through different types of vertical separation.  
 
(Forms of entry and private participation into a transport service) 
▪  How to regulate access right is essential for performing the railway operation. 
The study showed that certain types practically permit infrastructure access only 
for the incumbent/reformed operator. Other types permit it for voluntary 
participants promoting within-rail competition.10 And the study revealed that, in 
certain circumstances, traffic performance has been improved under franchising 
in the passenger sector and open access in the freight sector. 
 
▪  The study showed that vertical separation serves for private participation, which 
plays a role to improve a rail transport service and make it more market-oriented. 
Some forms of private participation are attained in cooperation with the 
                                                  
8  The study is summarized in Table 8.3. 
9  As examined in Section2.4.3, Campos, J. and Cantos, P.(2000) and Drew, J.(2006) 
also indicated this issue.  
10  Section 8.4 studied various types of track access and summarized in Table 8.3. 
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incumbent main operator.11 The other forms are performed in competition with 
the incumbent operator or after dissolution of the former state-owned railway.12 
The study showed that vertical separation also serves for public listing of shares, 
which is also one of the methods for private participation.13  
 
(Other findings through the study) 
▪  The study identified that vertical separation separates the railway into the social 
division financed by the public sector and the commercial division financed by the 
railway. The investigation showed the public sector bears various scope of 
financial responsibility, 14  and that the clarification of the responsibility also 
accompanied/resulted in other advantages such as liberalization of the main 
operator, private sector involvement and specialization of the operation. In 
addition, compared with subsidizing the railway without separation, vertical 
separation has increased transparency in identifying how the public money is 
used in the railway sector, whilst it leaves more management freedom to the 
railway as the commercial division. 
 
▪  The study comparing the growth of rail traffic performances and that of the 
real-term GDP identified certain cases that the period of reform has clearly 
changed the trend of rail traffic performance and picked it up, which can not be 
explained by the transition of the GDP. The study also confirmed this kind of cases 
even among the railways which have experienced railway reform without 
introducing within-rail competition. This supports the fact that the stagnated 
railway can be improved by means of railway reform through vertical separation 
even without introducing within-rail competition. 
 
▪  An appropriate vertical structure is discussed and investigated based on the 
                                                  
11  Private participation through the management contract in the passenger sector in 
Tunisia and Iran, and that through joint-venture in Vietnam are examples of this 
case. 
12  The study showed these forms in the railways in Europe, Australia, and Mexico. 
13  Aoimori Railway and JR Passenger Companies in Japan are examples of this case. 
14  Table 8.2 summarizes the results of investigation. 
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different market structures.15 The investigation identified that an appropriate 
form of railway largely depends on: 1) the intention whether within-rail 
competition is aimed or not; and 2) the rail market structures. 
 
For the most part, this thesis discussed the issues regarding vertical separation of 
railways mainly in terms of qualitative aspects rather than quantitative viewpoints. 
Nevertheless, the study clarified the characteristics of each type of vertical 
separation, and found that it accompanies varied advantages as well as 
disadvantages depending on the types. This represents that the appropriate form of 
vertical separation is influenced by the circumstances and objectives. Thus the 
results of this study lead to the conclusion that, facing regulatory reform through 
vertical separation, it is essential to clarify the specific aims for introducing it into 
the railway sector. This clarification makes it possible to design an appropriate 
railway structure suitable for conditions so as to attain the aims of the reform and 
avoid unexpected disadvantages. 
 
 
10.3 Further Work based on the Research Outcomes 
 
This thesis provides a significant contribution to the understanding concerning 
vertical separation of railways. For the further improvements of the related 
knowledge in the railway operation, the following directions in further works are 
suggested based on the results of the study. 
 
▪  The freight sector has had relatively rich experiences of private sector 
participation by means of both long-run concessions and open access. 
Nevertheless, the characteristics of the market and railway operation are largely 
different between the passenger and the freight sectors, and the passenger sector 
did not have abundant experiences of open access. The background is that most of 
the rail passenger services are not commercially attractive, and competitive 
                                                  
15  The study is summarized in Figure 9.1. It proposes the appropriate form of railways 
depending on the market structure. 
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tendering is considered to be more beneficial than open access competition due to 
some reasons such as preservation of an integrated network of service and 
minimizing the need of subsidies.(ECMT, 2005b) The study in the case of 
Germany also showed that open access competition in the passenger services may 
worsen the overall pattern of fares and services, and that the behaviour of “cream 
skimming” might result in increasing the need of subsidy. As the issue is 
significant in the sector, it is of value to examine the results of open access in the 
passenger sector more in detail to clarify its effects.  
 
▪  In addition to the above clarification, further research comparing long-run 
concessions controlling the infrastructure and franchising without controlling the 
infrastructure appears to be of great value for future decision making in the 
passenger sector. This is because competitive tendering does not presuppose 
operational separation between below-rail and above-rail functions. It should be 
investigated more in detail in terms of efficiency, advantages, disadvantages, 
suitable market conditions, appropriate length of the contract, and so on. 
 
▪  The type of “complete separation” appears to be more appropriate than other 
types to promote new entry to the railway market in that: 1) the infrastructure 
manager can be neutral to any operator in both the passenger and the freight 
sectors; 2) it is possible for an new operator to enter into the new market without 
large sunk costs or controlling infrastructure. Nevertheless, the study also 
revealed that this type raises coordination problems between infrastructure and 
operation, and the separated entities have more difficulties in planning 
investment, timetabling, and other daily operations. Since the type has both 
distinct advantages and disadvantages, it is essential to investigate into the 
nature of the coordination problems such as transaction costs among the 
separated entities. It is also of value to make a study for finding out effective 
regulation to overcome these problems. 
 
▪  The investigation could not be performed into the form of the integrated 
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passenger operation through concessions along with rights of access for freight 
operators. If the above study finds out that it is difficult to overcome coordination 
problems raised by operational separation, it is reasonable to adopt integrated 
operation in the passenger sector, which requires more coordination than the 
freight sector. Therefore, even if the stronger regulation is needed in order to 
secure access neutrality between the passenger and the freight than the type of 
“complete separation”, this form appears to have a potential to function in practice 
under the market which neither passenger nor freight is dominant. Therefore, it is 
of value to examine appropriate terms in the concession contract and necessary 
regulation to carry out this form of railway operation effectively. 
 
▪  This thesis has not investigated operational efficiency at length in terms of 
ownership of the operators. Nevertheless, this is considered to be one of the most 
important factors which influence the management of railways. Even if the 
vertical structure is similar, it is expected that efficiency is so different between a 
state-owned railway and a private railway. For example, one of the most crucial 
reasons for the improvement of the railway performance in Japan and Mexico 
might be a change of the legal status of the operator, from the public to the private. 
If this factor is greater than other factors such as within-rail competition, the 
results would be influential for future decision making. This would mean that 
even a stagnated state-owned railway has a potential to improve its efficiency by 
means of private sector participation through public listing of shares as well as 
through concessions.  
 
▪  In some cases, it might not be worthwhile to introduce within-rail competition 
practically, as it is premised on certain market conditions. For example, on-track 
competition practically requires enough infrastructure capacity and the rolling 
stock leasing industry, and franchising is in need of several potential bidders 
which can perform railway operation more efficiently than the incumbent operator. 
In case preferable results can not be expected through within-rail competition, 
some other means to improve efficiency of the incumbent operator should be 
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sought. Additionally, if a certain franchised operator continues its operation 
efficiently enough, it is not necessarily required to perform competitive tendering 
again at the end of the contract period as the tendering itself takes costs, and it 
has also some risks that a less efficient operator might succeed to the incumbent 
efficient one. Thus the following research areas about regulations appear to be 
beneficial to attain the better solutions in certain cases: 
  1) fare regulations which would provide railway operators with incentives to 
improve their efficiency. For example, price-cap regulations or fare regulations 
based on yard-stick competition might attain the aims;  
  2) regulations which can make it possible to enter into a service contract with a 
private operator with sufficient accountability other than competitive bidding. 
A certain objective bench-marking concerning operational efficiency and service 
evaluation might lead to the solution. 
 
▪  In general, there are two options to promote private sector participation into the 
railway services keeping integrated operation controlling both infrastructure and 
operation. One is inviting a private concessionaire making a concession contract, 
and another is promoting public listing of shares of the incumbent railway. 
Despite their similarity in respect of the integrated operation, there are also large 
differences between them mainly in that the former is regulated by the concession 
contract and the latter is done by the government regulation. Thus it is of value to 
investigate advantages and disadvantages of each type further-more both in the 
freight sector and in the passenger sector. It is also beneficial to find out the 
underlying conditions for selecting the suitable type. 
 
▪  The study showed that the rail freight transport has increased after introducing 
open access regulations in Europe and Australia. Nevertheless, it appears to be 
beneficial what kind of more specific factors have contributed to the increase. 
Under their traditional operation, the rail freight transport which crosses the 
border of countries/states was performed by more than one operator, and quality 
of the transport service had been worse in case their link were not smooth. In this 
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point of views, there are possibilities that service improvements by 
through-operation have contributed towards the increase. Another reason might 
be in the improvement of business attitude derived from the change of the 
organizational status of the operator.16  In addition to the effects of on-track 
competition, these factors might have greatly contributed towards developing the 
untapped market. Therefore, it is of value to examine what kind of specific factors 
have practically increased the rail freight transport in these regions, and 
discriminate their effects. The results of examination should contribute to finding 
out whether the similar regulation to introduce on-track competition is beneficial 
to other regions or not. 
 
In the above directions, it is expected that the study relating with this thesis would 
be developed further in the future research work. 
 
 
10.4 Final Remarks 
 
Based on the close examination into each case, this research has analysed various 
types of vertical separation of railways, and this thesis has made significant 
contributions to the understanding of vertical separation in the railway sector. The 
findings and lessons are summarized as follows. 
 
▪  The study clarified the form and implementation of various types of vertical 
separation in the railway sector and showed that their degree of separation varies 
to a large extent. The study categorized various types of vertical separation in 
terms of the degree of operational separation between infrastructure and 
operation. On the other hand, the study also demonstrated that the public sector 
bears a different scope of financial responsibilities depending on the type of 
vertical separation. Therefore, vertical separation can be also classified in terms of 
the degree of financial separation between the railway and the public sector, and 
                                                  
16 An example of the improvement of business attitude through corporatization was 
also discussed in the case of JR Freight in Section 6.5.2.1.  
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it can play a role to abolish cross-subsidy between the commercial and the social 
divisions. Thus, facing regulatory reform through vertical separation, it is vital to 
determine what part of the rail industry is aimed to revitalize as the commercial 
division. 
  
▪  The comparative study demonstrated that whether it is aimed to introduce 
within-rail competition through vertical separation or not largely stipulates the 
outline of the industry structure. Without the above aim, the sector has a 
reasonable reason to retain an integrated operation by some means at least in the 
prime market since integrated operation lessens coordination problems between 
below rail and above rail functions.  
 
▪  The research showed that only European Countries and Australia aimed to 
introduce within-rail competition into the railway industry by way of separating 
the below rail functions (at least slot allocation) and the account for them. Despite 
this unique aim, compared with other types of vertical separation, their form 
tends to raise a larger degree of coordination problems behind the background of 
its high degree of operational and financial separation. Furthermore, the 
effectiveness of within-rail competition has not been clarified yet sufficiently in 
other rail markets, and it is expected that the results vary to a large extent 
depending on the local circumstances of the railway industry such as existence of 
rolling stock leasing companies and capacity of the infrastructure. Thus, facing a 
railway reform especially where the EU and Australian regulations are not forced 
to adopt, the outcome of promoting within-rail competition and the cost for it 
should be deliberately taken account of. 
 
▪  In general, it is recommended to develop and operate railways based on a social 
cost-benefit analysis, and many governments have an intention to realize better 
environment by making the most of the railways. In case external costs of other 
transport modes are not fully taken account of, there is a good reason for the 
government to subsidize its railway in many cases. In order to achieve their 
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intention it is required to maximize efficiency of the railway while preserving 
enough accountability for the subsidy and/or access to the public infrastructure. 
This research has disclosed that the appropriate structure of the rail industry for 
this purpose varies depending on certain conditions such as: 1) whether 
within-rail competition is aimed or not; 2) market structure of the rail transport. 
In addition, lessons learned from other countries’ experiences, which are closely 
investigated in this thesis, would be of great value for future decision making.    
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APPENDIX 2: STRUCTURE OF QUESTIONNAIRES 
 
The interviews/questionnaires were held based on the following questions. 
 
Questionnaires 
 
Q.1  Please answer the following questions about outline of vertical separation. 
1-1. How has the vertical separation been introduced? 
       Ex). Which sector, freight or passenger, has the vertical separation been introduced? 
1-2. What are the aims of railway reform through vertical separation in your 
railways? 
 
Q.2  Please answer the following questions about the infrastructure. 
2-1. Who is the owner of it? 
2-2. Who invests in the infrastructure for new lines? 
2-3. (Relating 2-2) How is it planned? 
2-4. Who invests in improvement of the current lines? 
2-5. (Relating 2-4) How is it planned? 
 
Q.3  Please answer the following questions about the maintenance works of 
infrastructure and tracks. 
3-1. Who orders the works, and who performs them? 
3-2. How is it planned? 
3-3. Who takes the responsibility for quality of the works and how? 
Ex) The performance of the works is checked: 
 1) on the site 2) by report or 3) by other means. 
3-4. Do you think vertical separation contributed to improvement of quality of the 
works and lowering maintenance costs?   
Why? (Please describe how it has been done so.) 
 
Q.4  Please answer the following questions about rolling stock. 
4-1. Who is the owner of them? 
4-2. Who invests in them, and how is it planned? 
4-3. Who maintains them and how is it planned? 
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Q.5  Please answer the following questions about the timetable and daily 
operation. 
5-1. Who makes the timetable? 
5-2. How is the timetable planned? Are there some difficulties for the planning of  
the timetable?  
  (if “yes”) What are the difficulties? 
5-3. Who controls daily train operation and signalling? 
 
Q.6  Please answer the following questions about operators on the track. 
6-1. How many operators are on the same track? 
6-2. How are the operators selected? What kind of regulation is stipulated for the 
railway market? 
Ex) Franchising, Concession, Open access, License, Law, etc. 
 (If “franchising” or “concession”, please answer questions 6-3 and 6-4) 
6-3. How many years is the term of franchising / concession? 
6-4. What is the criterion of selection of a railway in the franchising/ concession? 
Please describe briefly. 
Ex) amount of proposed subsidy / proposed payment of premiums, 
 amount of planned investment, number of planned operating trains, etc. 
6-5. Have there been new entrants after the introduction of the vertical separation? 
(If “yes”) How is it attained?  
(What kind of regulation is stipulated for the new entry?) 
(If the number is more than one in 6-1, please answer questions 6-6 and 6-7) 
6-6. Are there some disputes between operators on the same track? 
（If “yes”) What are the disputes between them, and how are they resolved? 
6-7. How is the relationship coordinated in terms of timetabling, fares, daily 
operation, information exchanges, etc. among operators? 
 
Q.7 Please answer the following questions about the relationship between 
infrastructure and operator. 
7-1. What is the outline of access charges? Please describe briefly. 
7-2. Are there some disputes between the two?  
 (If “yes”) What are the disputes? 
7-3. How are they resolved? 
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Q.8  Please answer regarding safety. 
8-1. How is responsibility for accidents determined? 
8-2. How are disputes over accidents resolved? 
8-3. Do you think the vertical separation is good for safety of railways?  
Why do you think so? 
 
Q.9  Please answer the following questions about the result of vertical separation. 
9-1. (Relating Question 1) Have the aims been attained? 
 (If “no”) Why have they not been attained?  
Please explain by figures, if possible. 
9-2. Has vertical separation helped promote rail investment?  Why? 
9-3. Has it helped improvement of the performance of the railway operation? 
 (i.e. ton-kilometers and passenger-kilometers)   
Why? 
9-4. Are there other advantages, which have been brought by the vertical 
separation?  
What are they? 
9-5.  What are the problems / disadvantages, which have been raised by the vertical 
separation? (Please explain them by figures, if possible.) 
 
 
In order for the better perception, I need the past and the current data of your 
railways such as structure of the organization, financial results (revenues and costs), 
length of lines, number of staffs, train in tracks (passenger-kms, tonne-kms), 
regulation by the government, subsidies, and so on. 
Therefore, I will be pleased if you could provide me the information of them such as 
the annual reports of past several years. 
 
Thank you very much for your cooperation for the questionnaires. 
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APPENDIX 3: Organizational Structure and Management of Railways  
 
APPENDIX 3 -a: Infrastructure (1) 
The owner 
Group Country (Railway) Description 
India (IR) IR [1/IN] 
Vietnam (VNR) Government [2/VN] (*1) 
Indonesia (PT.KA) Government [3/IN] (*2) 
Group 1 
Tunisia (SNCFT) Government [4/TN] 
Sweden (Banverket) Banverket (BV) [5/SE] 
UK (Railtrack) Railtrack [6/UK] 
Germany (DB Netz) DB AG (DB Netz) (*3) [7/DE] 
France (RFF) RFF [8/FR] 
Group 2 
Australia (ARTC) ARTC [9/AU] 
Iran (Raja Co.) RAI (*4) [10/IR] 
Japan(JR Freight) Passenger integrated railway companies [11/JP] Group 3 
USA (Amtrak)  Freight integrated railway companies [12/US] 
Mexico(TFM, Ferromex) Government [13/MX-1,2] 
Mexico (TFVM) Government [13/MX-3] 
New Shinkansen Lines JRTT [14/JP] 
Group 4 
Aoimori Railway Aomori Prefecture [15/JP] 
 
(*1)   Government owns infrastructure including land, civil structures, track, stations, 
signalling and telecommunication systems. 
 
(*2)   Government owns civil structures, track, signalling and telecommunication systems 
and the land for them. Nevertheless, PT.KA retains the ownership of stations, depots, 
workshops and land for them. 
 
(*3)  There was a serious discussion about State’s responsibilities in the railway 
infrastructure in planning the railway reform in Germany. It had reached the 
conclusion that the ownership would be transferred to DB AG, but it also made a 
regulation stipulating that the government owns more than half of the shares of the 
institution (DB Netz). Thus State’s important responsibility for the railway 
infrastructure is one of the characteristics of railway reform in Germany, and this is the 
background of a State’s important role in investment into the railway infrastructure. 
(Sakurai, T., 1996) 
 
(*4)   Government invests into railway projects, and the infrastructure is delivered to RAI 
after completion of the construction project. [10/IR] 
 
285 
APPENDIX3 -a: Infrastructure (2) 
Investor for new lines 
Group Country (Railway) Description 
India (IR) Investment in new lines is made through internal 
generation of funds by IR as well as by the Government. 
Some lines which are strategic in nature are funded by 
the Central Government. [1/IN] 
Vietnam (VNR) Government [2/VN] 
Indonesia (PT.KA) Government [3/ID] 
Group 1 
Tunisia (SNCFT) Government [4/TN] 
Sweden (Banverket) Banverket (BV) (*1) [5/SE] 
UK (Railtrack) Railtrack (*2) [6/UK] 
Germany (DB Netz) Government finances most of the investment for the 
new lines, which contribute to public benefits. [7/DE]  
France (RFF) Public sector along with RFF (*3) [8/FR] 
Group 2 
Australia (ARTC) Funding arrangements vary. (*4) [9/AU] 
Iran (Raja Co.) Government [10/IR] 
Japan(JR Freight) Passenger integrated railway companies (*5) [11/JP] Group 3 
USA (Amtrak) Freight integrated railway companies (*5) [12/US] 
Mexico(TFM, Ferromex) Concessionaires [13/MX-1,2] 
Mexico (TFVM) TFVM [13/MX-3] 
New Shinkansen Lines National government and local governments invest 
based on the Nationwide Shinkansen Railway 
Development Law. [14/JP] 
Group 4 
Aoimori Railway Aomori Prefecture (*6) [15/JP] 
 
(*1)  The State finances the most of BV’s investment. There are small proportion of 
contribution from EU and local authorities. [5/SE] 
 
(*2)   Railtrack undertook investment at first, but the government took the place of the role 
then. [6/UK] 
 
(*3)   Large part of the project is financed by the public sector. RFF invests some parts of the 
project based on the negotiation with the public sector. [8/FR] 
 
(*4)   The most recently constructed new line was from Alice Springs to Darwin opened in 
2004. This was undertaken as a PPP (Private-Public Partnership) between the 
Commonwealth, South Australian and Northern Territory Governments and the 
private sector consortium including financiers, major construction companies and a rail 
operator. [9/AU] 
 
(*5)   In some cases, where Amtrak needs more capacity on a freight line, Amtrak pays at 
least a share of the costs. This situation is also the case in JR Freight. [11/JP, 12/US] 
 
(*6)   As Aomori Prefecture has an intention to refrain from further investment, it has not 
done large investment since the establishment of Aoimori Railway. But it is planned 
that the Prefecture would buy the further segment of conventional line from JR East as 
described in the footnote in Section 7.2.3.2.[15/JP] 
 
286 
APPENDIX 3 -a: Infrastructure (3) 
Way of planning for investing in new lines 
Group Country (Railway) Description 
India (IR) New lines are planned by IR in conjunction with the 
Ministry of Finance, Central Government and Planning 
Commission. They are planned in response to demands 
from users or from IR’s internal demand forecasting 
process. But most of the big projects are in response to 
demands by various user groups like state governments 
requesting IR to set up new lines for reasons of 
socio-economic development. [1/IN] 
Vietnam (VNR) Government and VNR make annual plans based on the 
long-term plan “the Master Plan on the Development of 
Vietnamese Railway Transport Sector Till 2020”. [2/VN] 
Indonesia (PT.KA) Government makes plans with PT.KA, and the plan is 
authorized by Parliament. [3/ID] 
Group 1 
Tunisia (SNCFT) Government makes plans based on “10th Five-year 
Economic and Social Development Plan (2002-2006)”. The 
plan stipulates that Government will invest 200 million US 
Dollars on its railways, and Government and SNCFT 
negotiate the budget each year. [4/TN] 
Sweden (Banverket) BV performs most of the planning, such as feasibility 
study and so on. [5/SE] New investments are carried out 
based on the 10-year investment plans set by the 
government.(Bylund, B., 2002 p.19)      
UK (Railtrack) Railtrack performed most of the planning. [6/UK] 
Germany (DB Netz) DB AG performs most of the planning, and submits the 
plan to the government for the approval. [7/DE] 
France (RFF) At least three parties negotiate each other until reaching 
an agreement. (*1) [8/FR] 
Group 2 
Australia (ARTC) After extensive feasibility studies covering market 
demand, engineering, operational, financial and 
environmental considerations, a decision is taken at a 
political level. [9/AU] 
Iran (Raja Co.) Government proposes a plan to the Assembly within the 
framework of a 5-year Development Programme.(*2) [10/IR]
Japan(JR Freight) Passenger railways plan the investment. (*3) [11/JP] Group 3 
USA (Amtrak) Freight railways plan the investment. (*3) [12/US] 
Mexico(TFM, Ferromex) Concessionaires plan based on the demand forecast and 
the contract with Government. [13/MX-1,2] 
Mexico (TFVM) TFVM plans in negotiation with the operators 
(share-holders). [13/MX-3] 
New Shinkansen Lines Nationwide Shinkansen Railway Development Law 
stipulates the future plan of the network. [14/JP] 
Group 4 
Aoimori Railway Aomori Prefecture plans with Aoimori Railway and the 
plan would be passed to the council to be approved.[15/JP] 
 
(*1)   Before the reform of SNCF, only the two parties, the public sector and SNCF negotiated 
each other to reach an agreement. Nevertheless, after the reform RFF has become 
responsible for the infrastructure. And the public sector needs to understand how the 
train operation will be performed by SNCF after the completion of the project. Thus, the 
negotiation for the planning of the construction projects takes longer time and has 
become complex among three entities, the public sector, RFF and SNCF. [8/FR] 
 
(*2)   The Programme envisages detail scheme such as acquisition of locomotives, wagons, 
coaches, construction of specific lines and necessary costs for them. 
 
(*3)   Same as the Item (2). 
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APPENDIX 3 -a: Infrastructure (4) 
Investor for improvement of the current lines 
Group Country (Railway) Description 
India (IR) IR [1/IN] 
Vietnam (VNR) Government [2/VN] 
Indonesia (PT.KA) Government [3/ID] 
Group 1 
Tunisia (SNCFT) Government [4/TN] 
Sweden (Banverket) Banverket (BV) (*1) [5/SE] 
UK (Railtrack) Railtrack (*1) [6/UK] 
Germany (DB Netz) The government invests along with DB AG [7/DE] 
France (RFF) RFF [8/FR] 
Group 2 
Australia (ARTC) ARTC (*2) [9/AU] 
Iran (Raja Co.) Government [10/IR] 
Japan(JR Freight) Passenger railways (*1) [11/JP] Group 3 
USA (Amtrak) Freight railways (*1) [12/US] 
Mexico(TFM, Ferromex) Concessionaires [13/MX-1,2] 
Mexico (TFVM) TFVM [13/MX-3] 
New Shinkansen Lines A JR Passenger Company [14/JP] 
Group 4 
Aoimori Railway Aomori Prefecture (*1) [15/JP] 
 
(*1)  Same as Item (2) 
 
(*2)  ARTC receives funding both from its internally generated income (access charges) and
from specific interest-free grants from the Australian Government through the 
Government’s AusLink land transport programme. [9/AU] 
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APPENDIX 3 -a: Infrastructure (5) 
Way of planning for investing in the current lines 
Group Country (Railway) Description 
India (IR) It is through an internal planning process of IR. All 
improvements to the current lines are funded through 
the budgetary mechanisms of IR.  
The regional administrations request the funds in 
advance of the projects, and the railway board allocates 
the funds.[1/IN] 
Vietnam (VNR) Same as that for new lines described in Item (3). 
VNR selects critical parts of the infrastructure, which 
require investment. [2/VN] 
Indonesia (PT.KA) Same as Item (3) [3/ID] 
Group 1 
Tunisia (SNCFT) Same as Item (3) [4/TN] 
Sweden (Banverket) The planning procedure is similar to Item (3). 
In case the investment work is not so large and does not 
need land procurement/environmental assessment, the 
government’s approval is not required. [5/SE] 
UK (Railtrack) Railtrack performed most of the planning. It was 
originally planned that a project should be financed by 
Railtrack utilizing the access charges. [6/UK] 
Germany (DB Netz) The planning procedure is similar to Item (3). [7/DE] 
France (RFF) The planning procedure is similar to Item (3). (*1) [8/FR]
Group 2 
Australia (ARTC) It is planned on the basis of an extensive audit of 
infrastructure condition, studies including network 
simulation and input from rail operators and users. It is 
performed based on a medium-term plan. [9/AU] 
Iran (Raja Co.) Same as that for new lines described in Item (3). [10/IR]
Japan(JR Freight) In general, passenger railways plan. [11/JP] Group 3 
USA (Amtrak) In general, freight railways plan. (*2) [12/US] 
Mexico(TFM, Ferromex) Concessionaires invest voluntarily for profitable 
projects. Some investments are stipulated in a 
concession contract. [13/MX-1,2]  
Mexico (TFVM) TFVM plans in negotiation with operators. [13/MX-3] 
New Shinkansen Lines A JR Passenger Company plans. [14/JP] 
Group 4 
Aoimori Railway Aomori Prefecture plans with Aoimori Railway, and the 
council approves the plan. [15/JP] 
 
(*1)   As many of large stations belong to SNCF, it also plays a key role not only as a railway 
undertaking but also as an infrastructure manager in some station development 
projects. [8/FR] 
 
(*2)   Amtrak has the right to ask for permission to invest in the track of a freight railroad, 
and they have often actually made such investments: the actual work has been done by 
the owning railroad, and then charged to Amtrak. The problem has been: 1) Amtrak 
believes that the freight companies charge too much for the work done on Amtrak’s 
behalf; 2) Amtrak has little or no control over costs. In addition, it takes time to reach 
mutual agreement because there has been the difference between what the freight 
railroad needs and what Amtrak requires. For example, freight carriers want slow 
service with very little super-elevation in the tracks: Amtrak wants higher quality track 
with more super-elevation. Each wants the other to pay. [12/US]    
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APPENDIX 3 -b: Maintenance Works of Infrastructure and Tracks (1) 
The entity who orders the works and the entity who performs them.  
Group Country (Railway) Description 
India (IR) The works are planned and performed by the 
Engineering department of the various regional railway 
administrations of IR. [1/IN] 
Vietnam (VNR) VNR performs the works utilizing the government’s 
finance. [2/VN] 
Indonesia (PT.KA) PT.KA performs the works utilizing the government’s 
finance. [3/ID] 
Group 1 
Tunisia (SNCFT) Government and SNCFT share the cost of maintenance 
works based on their transit scheme for the future. 
SNCFT performs the works.[4/TN] 
Sweden (Banverket) The five regional divisions of Banverket contract out the 
works to engineering companies. [5/SE] 
UK (Railtrack) Railtrack ordered the maintenance works, and 
contracted out all the works to specialized companies 
formed during the break-up of British Rail’s 
infrastructure services. [6/UK] 
Germany (DB Netz) DB Netz contracts out the works to engineering 
companies. [7/DE] 
France (RFF) RFF orders all of the maintenance works to SNCF based 
on the contract between the two. [8/FR] (Explained in 
Section 5.3.4) 
Group 2 
Australia (ARTC) ARTC contracts out the works to engineering 
companies. [9/AU] 
Iran (Raja Co.) Regional divisions of RAI contract out the works to 
engineering companies. [10/IR] 
Japan(JR Freight) JR Passenger Companies contract out the works to 
engineering companies. [11/JP] 
Group 3 
USA (Amtrak) Freight railways contract out the works to engineering 
companies. [12/US] 
Mexico(TFM, Ferromex) Concessionaires contract out the works to engineering 
companies. [13/MX-1,2] 
Mexico (TFVM) TFVM contracts out the works. [13/MX-3] 
New Shinkansen Lines A JR Passenger Company contracts out the works to 
engineering companies. [14/JP] 
Group 4 
Aoimori Railway Aomori Prefecture contracts out the works to 
engineering companies. (*1) [15/JP]  
 
(*1)  As described at the footnote in Section 7.4.2, Aomori Prefecture plans to contract out 
the track maintenance to Aoimori Railway in order to decrease the coordination problems 
between them.[15/JP] 
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APPENDIX 3 -b: Maintenance Works of Infrastructure and Tracks (2) 
The way of planning 
Group Country (Railway) Description 
India (IR) The works are planned by the regional railway 
administrations. The Engineering dept., which is 
responsible for the maintenance, proposes the works. 
After an analysis of demands from all over the railways, 
the works are approved by the railway board. [1/IN] 
Vietnam (VNR) VNR calculates the maintenance fee based on the 
annual programme. Provided full amount of the fee is not 
approved by Government, VNR revises the maintenance 
program of the year and re-calculate it for further 
negotiation with Government. [2/VN] 
Indonesia (PT.KA) PT.KA calculates the maintenance fee, and requests it 
to Government. But full amount of the fee could not have 
been approved by Government because of shortage of 
Government’s funds. (Explained in Section 4.7.2) [3/ID] 
Group 1 
Tunisia (SNCFT) SNCFT calculates the maintenance fee based on its 
annual program. [4/TN] 
Sweden (Banverket) The five regional divisions of BV plan the works. [5/SE]
UK (Railtrack) Railtrack planned the works considering the requests 
from TOCs. [6/UK] 
Germany (DB Netz) DB Netz plans the works reflecting the requests from 
other operating dept. in DB AG and other private 
operators. [7/DE] 
France (RFF) RFF only stipulates the quality of the works, and 
practically all the works are planned and performed by 
SNCF. [8/FR] 
Group 2 
Australia (ARTC) ARTC plans the works. [9/AU] 
Iran (Raja Co.) RAI plans the works. [10/IR] 
Japan(JR Freight) Passenger railways plan the works.[11/JP] Group 3 
USA (Amtrak) Freight railways plan the works.[12/US] 
Mexico(TFM, Ferromex) Concessionaires plan the works.[13/MX-1,2] 
Mexico (TFVM) TFVM plans the works.[13/MX-3] 
New Shinkansen Lines A JR Passenger Company plans the works.[14/JP] Group 4 
Aoimori Railway Aomori Prefecture plans in negotiation with the 
contractor and Aoimori Railway.[15/JP] 
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APPENDIX 3 -b: Maintenance Works of Infrastructure and Tracks (3) 
Responsibility of the Maintenance Works 
Group Country (Railway) Description 
India (IR) Though most of the works are contracted out, the 
responsibility for the quality of works is taken by the 
Engineering department itself.[1/IN] 
Vietnam (VNR) VNR takes responsibility for the works. [2/VN] 
Indonesia (PT.KA) PT.KA takes responsibility for the works. [3/ID] 
Group 1 
 
Tunisia (SNCFT) SNCFT takes responsibility for the works. [4/TN] 
Sweden (Banverket) BV is responsible for the works. [5/SE] 
UK (Railtrack) Railtrack was responsible for the works.  
Nevertheless, Railtrack lost the ability to check the 
performance of tracks carried out by other specialized 
companies. (*1) [6/UK] 
Germany (DB Netz)  DB Netz is responsible for the works. [7/DE] 
France (RFF) SNCF takes responsibility for the works fundamentally. 
In general, a member of staff in RFF does not check the 
performance on engineering site.[8/FR] 
Group 2 
Australia (ARTC) ARTC is responsible for the works. [9/AU] 
Iran (Raja Co.) RAI takes responsibility.[10/IR] 
Japan(JR Freight) Passenger railways take responsibility.[11/JP] Group 3 
USA (Amtrak) Freight railways take responsibility.[12/US] 
Mexico(TFM, Ferromex) Concessionaires are responsible for the works. 
[13/MX-1,2] 
Mexico (TFVM) TFVM is responsible for the works. [13/MX-3] 
New Shinkansen Lines A JR Passenger Company is responsible for the works. 
[14/JP] 
Group 4 
Aoimori Railway Aomori Prefecture is responsible for the works as an 
executing agency. (*2) [15/JP] 
 
(*1)  Network Rail brought the maintenance work back in-house by July 2004, enabling it cut 
costs and to exercise far greater control.[6/UK] 
 
(*2)  Aomori Prefecture does not have engineers who work on site, and Aoimori Railway has 
only 30 staff and does not have on-site engineers either. Thus the practical works 
including the on-site engineering management are contracted out to a different company, 
Hachinohe Rinkai Railway. (Aomori Prefecture, 2001) 
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APPENDIX 3 -b: Maintenance Works of Infrastructure and Tracks (4) 
Quality of the maintenance works after the introduction of vertical separation
Group Country (Railway) Description 
India (IR) / 
Vietnam (VNR) Maintenance quality seems to be improved with the 
active supports from Government. [2/VN] 
Indonesia (PT.KA) Maintenance quality seems to be stable or to be 
deteriorating because of lack of sufficient funds for 
maintenance. [3/ID] 
Group 1 
Tunisia (SNCFT) Maintenance quality seems to be improved in essential 
commercial lines partly because each division of SNCFT 
has been making efforts such as speeding up trains and 
developing service levels to increase the revenue. [4/TN] 
Sweden (Banverket) Since 2002, BV has increased its efforts in connection 
with preventive maintenance and investments. 
Maintenance cost has increased about 45 % over the 
period 2001-2004. This resulted in positive effects on the 
condition of BV’s railway network. For example, the 
number of train hours that follow on from the functional 
disruptions was a significant downswing during the 
period. (Banverket, 2004a) 
UK (Railtrack) Once quality of tracks had become poor condition. (*1) 
[6/UK] 
Germany (DB Netz) The quality of the works has been stable as they have 
been undertaken in accordance with established 
engineering standards for many years. [7/DE] 
France (RFF) Practically, SNCF has been observing the track 
condition as an infrastructure manager. For example, 
when the condition of the track is below the standardized 
level, SNCF proposes necessary measures such as 
lowering the train speed. [8/FR] 
Track condition largely depends on the amount of 
finance for the maintenance. But in 2005 the Swiss 
Federal Institute of Technology in Lausanne published a 
report that notes the amount of finance on the network 
infrastructure is not enough to keep stable condition. (Le 
Figaro, 2005) 
Group 2 
Australia (ARTC)  In general, the quality of the works has been stable as 
they are undertaken in accordance with established 
engineering standards for many years. (*2) [9/AU] 
Iran (Raja Co.)  The situation has not changed much as tracks have 
been maintained by RAI as before. (*3) [10/IR] 
Japan(JR Freight) The situation has not changed so much as the works are 
performed based on the technical standards. [11/JP] 
Group 3 
USA (Amtrak)  Vertical separation did not have unfavourable impact on 
quality of the work or the maintenance cost.[12/US] 
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Mexico(TFM, Ferromex) The quality has improved with less number of workers, 
partly because well-trained members of staff were hired 
by the concessionaires.[13/MX-1,2] 
Mexico (TFVM)  The tracks have been maintained in fair condition. 
[13/MX-3] 
New Shinkansen Lines A JR Passenger Company manages the works based on 
technical standards like other lines.[14/JP] 
Group 4 
Aoimori Railway  The works are performed based on the technical 
standards stipulated. [15/JP] 
 
(*1)  More money is being spent on maintenance and renewal than ever before, and the 
subsidy has also gone up. Nevertheless, the interviewee thinks it was for the management 
of Railtrack and not for the vertical separation. He regards the reasons as follows [6/UK]: 
     1)  The private company, Railtrack, lost important engineering knowledge. 
     2) It failed to manage quality controls of the engineering works performed by 
sub-contractors. 
     3) It failed to control financial management as well. 
 
(*2)  Vertical separation has increased the focus on efficiency of managing and maintaining 
the infrastructure, particularly in relation to minimizing track occupation times so that 
there are minimal impacts on “above rail” operators. The result has been considerably 
increased maintenance productivity. Much focus has also been placed on means of 
extending the life of track components by greater attention to formation, drainage and 
ballast condition, use of improved fastenings and rail grinding. [9/AU] 
 
(*3)   RAI expressed that it has become difficult to keep the condition of tracks because of 
other operators’ ill-conditioned rolling stock, as studied in Section 6.6.2.[10/IR] 
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APPENDIX 3 -c: Rolling Stock (1) 
The owner 
Group Country (Railway) Description 
India (IR) IR           [1/IN] 
Vietnam (VNR) VNR (*1)     [2/VN] 
Indonesia (PT.KA) PT.KA       [3/ID] 
Group 1 
Tunisia (SNCFT) SNCFT (*1)   [4/TN] 
Sweden  Varieties of entities. (*2) [5/SE] 
UK  3 Rolling Stock Companies (ROSCOs) [6/UK] 
Germany  Each operator in general. [7/DE] 
France  Trains for long-distance lines: SNCF 
Trains for regional lines: Regional governments [8/FR] 
Group 2 
Australia  Each operator in general. (*3) [9/AU] 
Iran (Raja Co.) Till 2000 nearly all the rolling stock was owned by RAI. 
From the beginning of the 3rd development plan in 2000, 
RAI became authorized to assign its rolling stock 
including locomotives, wagons and coaches to the private 
sector. (Explained further in Section 6.5.1.) [10/IR] 
Japan(JR Freight) JR Freight owns the rolling stock and standardized 
wagons. Private freighters own wagons specialized for its 
specific commodities. [11/JP] 
Group 3 
USA (Amtrak) Amtrak (*4) [12/US] 
Mexico(TFM, Ferromex) Concessionaires (*5)  [13/MX-1,2] 
Mexico (TFVM) TFVM also has some locomotives. [14/MX-3] 
New Shinkansen Lines JR Passenger Companies [14/JP] 
Group 4 
Aoimori Railway Aoimori Railway (*6) [15/JP] 
 
(*1)  In the appendix, each case of VNR and SNCFT itself is described. The cases of private 
companies are described in Section 4.6.2. 
 
(*2)  County Public Transport Authorities (CPTAs) provide their contacted operators with the 
necessary rolling stock for the railway services. ASJ (the remains of the business 
administration of SJ) also makes lease contracts of the rolling stock. Freight operators 
generally have to get their own rolling stock, with the exception of locomotive power. (CER, 
2005 p.46) 
 
(*3)  However, in recent years, an active rolling stock leasing industry has developed in 
Australia that provides locomotives and freight wagons to rail operators on both a long and 
short term (casual) hire basis. [9/AU] 
 
(*4)  Rolling stock is often leased rather than owned. [12/US] 
 
(*5)  Some rolling stock is leased by the concessionaires. [13/MX-1,2] 
 
(*6)  As it is explained in Section 7.2.3.2, most of the trains are operated in the form of 
reciprocal running with IGR and JR East. In these cases, the rolling stock is owned and 
maintained by each railway. In 2006, Aoimori Railway owns only 2 trains. Aoimori Railway 
and IGR cooperate to have the same type of rolling stock considering the operation and 
maintenance works. IGR does the maintenance works of the rolling stock of Aoimori 
Railway as well. [15/JP] 
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APPENDIX 3 -c: Rolling Stock (2) 
The entity who invests and maintains  
Group Country (Railway) Description 
India (IR) (Investment) The planning is done in a centralized 
manner by the railway board. [1/IN] 
(Maintenance) The Mechanical & Electrical Engineering 
dept. of IR is responsible for the maintenance of 
locomotives, coaches and wagons. [1/IN] 
Vietnam (VNR) VNR (*1)  [2/VN] 
Indonesia (PT.KA) PT.KA (*2) [3/ID] 
Group 1 
Tunisia (SNCFT) SNCFT(*3) [4/TN] 
Sweden  (Investment) The owners [5/SE] 
(Maintenance) The owners in general [5/SE] 
UK  (Investment) ROSCOs  [6/UK] 
(Maintenance) Train operator or ROSCOs order 
maintenance works based on the contract. [6/UK] 
Germany  Each operator [7/DE] 
France  The owners described in Item (1). (*4) [8/FR]  
Group 2 
Australia  Generally, the railway operators (*5) [9/AU] 
Iran (Raja Co.) The private sector started to invest in/maintain rolling 
stock. (Explained further in Section 6.5.1.) [10/IR] 
Japan(JR Freight) JR Freight. The private sector also purchases its own 
wagons. The private sector, often, maintains its own 
wagons. In these cases JR Freight checks quality of the 
maintenance works. [11/JP]  
Group 3 
USA (Amtrak) Amtrak (*6) [12/US] 
Mexico(TFM, Ferromex) Concessionaires [13/MX-1,2] 
Mexico (TFVM) TFVM does for its own locomotives. [13/MX-3] 
New Shinkansen Lines JR Passenger Companies [14/JP] 
Group 4 
Aoimori Railway Aoimori Railway [15/JP] (*7) 
 
(*1) Government provides VNR with preferential loans from the Fund for Development 
Support to purchase new locomotives and rolling stock. Government shall also be a 
guarantor of VNR for obtaining the ODA funds to purchase them. However, this support is 
limited. [2/VN] 
(*2) In exceptional cases, Government buys rolling stock, for example with ODA funds, and 
transfers the assets to PT.KA. This is one type of subsidies from Government.[3/ID] 
(*3) Some suburban trains are bought by Government as suburban rail transport is regarded 
as social obligation. [4/TN] 
(*4) Regional governments contract out the maintenance for their rolling stock to SNCF. [8/FR]
(*5) It is getting to be common for operators to lease rolling stock, both for long and short 
periods, including casual hire sometimes for as short as one day. The type of rolling stock 
must be approved by ARTC before it can be operated on the ARTC network. [9/AU] 
The rail operators either undertake routine maintenance using their own staff or may 
have a contract with an experienced service provider to undertake the work. [9/AU] 
(*6) Rolling stock is often leased rather than owned. [12/US]  
(*7) As indicated in the footnote in the item (1), Aoimori Railway contracts out the 
maintenance works to IGR. [15/JP]  
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APPENDIX 3-d: Timetable and Operation (1) 
The entity who makes a timetable  
Group Country (Railway) Description 
India (IR) Operating department of IR. [1/IN] 
Vietnam (VNR) VNR makes a timetable without interference from 
Government. [2/VN] 
Indonesia (PT.KA) PT.KA makes a timetable and Government approves it. 
[3/ID] 
Group 1 
Tunisia (SNCFT) SNCFT makes a timetable and Government approves it. 
[4/TN] 
Sweden (Banverket) Banverket [5/SE] 
UK (Railtrack) Railtrack [6/UK]  
Germany (DB Netz) DB Netz [7/DE] 
France (RFF) RFF is in charge of allocating infrastructure capacities. 
(*1) [8/FR] 
Group 2 
Australia (ARTC) ARTC [9/AU] 
Iran (Raja Co.) RAI makes a timetable negotiating with Raja Co. 
[10/IR] 
Japan(JR Freight) JR Passenger Companies make a timetable negotiating 
with JR Freight. [11/JP] 
Group 3 
USA (Amtrak) Freight operators make a timetable negotiating with 
Amtrak. [12/US] 
Mexico(TFM, Ferromex) Concessionaires [13/MX-1,2] 
Mexico (TFVM) TFVM [13/MX-3] 
New Shinkansen Lines A JR Passenger Company [14/JP] 
Group 4 
Aoimori Railway Aoimori Railway [15/JP] 
 
(*1)  The Transportation Decree of 7 March 2003 states that “RFF is in charge of allocating 
infrastructure capacities on the national rail network and paths to applicants.” (CER, 
2005 p.99) The procedure for timetabling is discussed in Section 5.5.2. 
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APPENDIX 3-d: Timetable and Operation (2) 
The way of planning and problems 
Group Country (Railway) Description 
India (IR) Timetable planning is a coordinated exercise once a year 
where all the regional railway administrations send their 
timetable experts. The timetables of trains which have 
their journey beginning and ending in more than one 
railway administrative zones are decided by mutual 
consultation. [1/IN] 
Vietnam (VNR) VNR makes a timetable independently and there is no 
particular problem relating vertical separation. [2/VN] 
Indonesia (PT.KA) PT.KA makes a timetable. 
(Problems) Timetable depends on the condition of 
maintenance and investment. PT.KA often wishes to 
shorten traveling time to increase the revenue, but 
sometimes it can not be achieved because of insufficient 
maintenance and safety reasons. [3/ID] 
Group 1 
Tunisia (SNCFT) SNCFT makes and coordinates timetables by itself and 
there is no particular problem relating to vertical 
separation. [4/TN] 
Sweden (Banverket) The train traffic control unit of BV coordinates the 
timetable based on the application from each operator. 
Usually, the meetings for planning timetable are held 
twice a year at the time of changing the timetable. 
At the time of fixing timetable, different operators insist 
on getting their own time slots. BV has difficulties to 
coordinate the operators’ application especially in the 
following cases[5/SE]: 
1) in a case infrastructure capacity is limited; 
2) in a case several operators apply the same slots of 
timetable; 
3) in a case time schedule for maintenance works is 
difficult to be secured. (described Section 5.5.2)   
UK (Railtrack) Railtrack coordinated the timetable based on the 
application from each operator.  
(Problems) The same as Sweden. (*1) [6/UK] 
Germany (DB Netz)  DB Netz coordinates the timetable based on the 
application from each operator and train operating 
departments within DB AG.  
(Problems) The same as Sweden. [7/DE] 
France (RFF) Based on the slot allocation made by RFF, SNCF makes 
detail timetable called “working timetable”. Thus, 
information flow has become more complicated compared 
with the situation before the reform. [8/FR] 
Group 2 
Australia (ARTC) Each rail operator applies time-slots to ARTC. Then 
ARTC allocates train paths in accordance with decision 
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 rules that ARTC is required to abide by.  
(Problems) The same as Sweden. [9/AU]  
Iran (Raja Co.) The timetable is set up on the priority of passenger 
trains. As RAI and Raja Co. plan the timetable in 
cooperation, there is no particular problem relating 
vertical separation. [10/IR] 
Japan(JR Freight) The timetable is planned by a JR Passenger Company 
in negotiation with JR Freight.  
In many cases, infrastructure capacity is limited 
because of a number of passenger trains and 
maintenance works. Thus, JR Freight frequently faces 
large difficulties to get time slots for the trains. [11/JP] 
Group 3 
USA (Amtrak) The timetable is planned by the freight railroads in 
negotiation with Amtrak. 
Amtrak trains’ long-standing schedules cause some 
problems on freight lines that are approaching capacity. 
(*2) [12/US] 
Mexico(TFM, Ferromex) Concessionaires plan the timetable centrally.  
<Problems> There are some difficulties in case other 
operators have track-age rights.[13MX-2] 
Mexico (TFVM) TFVM plans the timetable. [13/MX-3] 
New Shinkansen Lines The timetable is planned by a JR Passenger Company 
without interference from the (local) government. Along 
with the timetable of other lines, it is only required to 
report to the government based on the Railway Business 
Law. [14/JP] 
Group 4 
Aoimori Railway Aoimori Railway plans it in close negotiation with the 
maintenance contractor and other railways such as 
JR-Freight, IGR and JR East. [15/JP] 
 
(*1)  For example, if a certain operator tries to operate a faster train it means to reduce the 
infrastructure capacity. In order to achieve this, sometimes other operators were forced to 
cut some slower trains. An operator can appeal it to the Regulator, and this happened 
sometimes in UK. [6/UK]   
 
(*2)  “By law, freight railroads must grant Amtrak access to their track upon request and give 
priority status to Amtrak trains over other customers.”(AAR, 2006 p.8) Nevertheless, as a 
general matter, Amtrak trains are not given proper priority on freight lines and they 
suffer serious on-time reliability. [12/US] 
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APPENDIX 3-d: Timetable and Operation (3) 
The entity who directs trains and controls signalling 
Group Country (Railway) Description 
India (IR) Operating department of IR. [1/IN] 
Vietnam (VNR) VNR [2/VN] 
Indonesia (PT.KA) PT.KA [3/ID] 
Group 1 
Tunisia (SNCFT) SNCFT [4/TN] 
Sweden (Banverket) Banverket (BV) [5/SE] 
UK (Railtrack) Railtrack [6/UK]   
Germany (DB Netz) DB Netz [7/DE] 
France (RFF) SNCF [8/FR] 
Group 2 
Australia (ARTC) ARTC [9/AU] 
Iran (Raja Co.) RAI [10/IR] 
Japan(JR Freight) JR Passenger Companies [11/JP] Group 3 
USA (Amtrak) Freight railroads provide access to the track. [12/US] 
Mexico(TFM, Ferromex) Each concessionaire [13/MX-1,2] 
Mexico (TFVM) TFVM controls within its territory. [13/MX-3] 
New Shinkansen Lines A JR Passenger Company. [14/JP]  Group 4 
Aoimori Railway Aoimori Railway contracts out these works to IGR (*1) 
[15/JP] 
 
(*1)  Aoimori Railway contracts out the controlling and signalling because of the following 
reasons: 
     (1)  Most of the trains run through the network of Aoimori Railway and IGR in the 
form of reciprocal running. 
(2)  The control centre is in the facility of IGR, and the control systems of the two 
railways are actually integrated. 
         Aoimori Railway plans to have its own control system at the time of line extension 
to Aomori City. (Aomori Prefecture, 2001) 
 
 
 [Source for Appendix 3] 
▪Author, based on the interviews/inquiries to the railway. [1/IN, 2/VN, 3/IN, 4/TN, 5/SE, 
6/UK, 7/DE, 8/FR, 9/AU, 10/IR, 11/JP, 12/US, 13/MX, 14/JP, 15/JP] 
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APPENDIX 4: Relationship Among Different Parties and Relevant Issues  
 
APPENDIX 4:-a: Relationship between Operators on the Same Track (1) 
The main operator and Regulation for the selection 
Group Country (Railway) Description 
India (IR) (Passenger and Freight) IR  
Vietnam (VNR) (Passenger and Freight) VNR 
<Regulation> Railway Act in 2005.  
Indonesia (PT.KA) (Passenger and Freight) PT.KA 
<Regulation> Railway Act. 
Group 1 
Tunisia (SNCFT) (Passenger and Freight) SNCFT  
<Regulation> The laws in 1998 stipulating the railway 
reform.  
Sweden (Banverket) SJ holds monopoly on profitable inter-regional lines. 
Operators are completely independent from 
infrastructure. 
UK (Railtrack) Operators are completely independent from 
infrastructure. 
Germany (DB Netz) DB AG keeps holding structure with infrastructure. 
France (RFF) SNCF maintains and controls infrastructure based on a 
contract with RFF. 
(*1) 
Group 2 
Australia (ARTC) Operators are completely independent from 
infrastructure.  
Iran (Raja Co.) (Passenger) Raja Co.  
(Freight) RAI 
<Regulation> Raja Co. was established based on the law 
stipulated in 1996. (*2) [10/IR] 
Japan(JR Freight) (Freight) JR Freight. 
(Passenger) A JR Passenger Company in each region 
operates on its own infrastructure.  
<Regulation> JR Freight was established based on the 
Law for JNR Restructuring stipulated in1986. [11/JP] 
Group 3 
USA (Amtrak) (Passenger) Amtrak 
(Freight) Each freight operator operates on its own 
infrastructure. 
<Regulation> Amtrak was established and has access on 
the freight lines by Rail Passenger Service Act enacted in 
1970. [12/US] 
Mexico(TFM, Ferromex) Each concessionaire operates within its concessioned 
network. (*3) 
<Regulation> 50 years concession. (It is renewable for 
another similar period.) [13/MX-1,2] 
Group 4 
Mexico (TFVM) 3 concessionaires access the tracks managed by TFVM. 
<Regulation> Operators (concessionaires) are the 
shareholder of TFVM. [13-MX-3] 
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New Shinkansen Lines (Passenger) A designated JR Passenger Company 
(Freight) Service is not provided. 
<Regulation> The Nationwide Shinkansen Railway 
Development Law [14/JP] 
 
Aoimori Railway (Passenger) Aoimori Railway  
(Freight) JR Freight 
<Regulation> In the passenger sector, a joint-venture 
between infrastructure and the private sector was 
established [15/JP] 
 
(*1)   As studied in Chapter5, the transport policy aims to ensure the management 
independence of railway undertakings fostering competitive neutrality between rail 
operators. Thus this part mainly lists some characteristic of railways such as a certain 
relationship with infrastructure. Regulation for an entry to the services is described in 
Item (2). 
 
(*2)   It also stipulates private participation based on open access regime, but there is no 
competitive access to RAI’s tracks yet. [10/IR] 
 
(*3)   In some cases other operators have track-age rights. These rights in the Mexican 
regulation framework may be classified as follows (Federal Competition Commission, 
2001 p.12): 
▪  Compulsory track-age and haulage rights in specific stretches, where access to 
other concessionaires is necessary for efficiency purposes, were stipulated in the 
concession titles; 
▪  The law provides for the possibility that concessionaires voluntarily and at their 
own convenience negotiate additional track-age and haulage rights; 
▪  After a specific period of exclusivity (20 to 30 years) the regulatory agency may 
impose additional track-age and haulage rights based upon economic and 
technical feasibility, international regulation trends and reciprocity, especially in 
those cases where international agreements are concerned. 
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APPENDIX 4:-a: Relationship between Operators on the Same Track (2) 
Number of new operators and the way of their entry to the market 
Group Country (Railway) Description 
India (IR) Concor and other container concessionaires (*1) [3/ID] 
Vietnam (VNR) One private firm has entered to the passenger market 
through establishing a joint-venture with VNR. [2/VN] 
Indonesia (PT.KA) There is no new entrant. [3/ID] 
Group 1 Tunisia (SNCFT) One private firm entered to the passenger market. 
 The law stipulates that SNCFT has concessioning rights 
on the government’s network. Private companies are 
required to make an agreement with SNCFT in order to 
enter the railway market. [4/TN] 
Sweden (Banverket) (Freight) 18 undertakings operate based on open access. 
(Passenger) 11 companies operate based on franchising.   
(2 companies are mixed operators.) 
UK (Railtrack) (Freight) 4 undertakings based on open access. 
(Passenger) 25 TOCs operate based on franchising. 
Germany (DB Netz) (Freight) 103 undertakings operate through open access. 
(Passenger) 72 operators operate. (*3)  
France (RFF) (Freight) Besides SNCF, 8 undertakings operate through 
open access.  
(Passenger) SNCF holds monopoly. 
(*2) 
Group 2 
Australia (ARTC) (Freight) 12 undertakings operate based on open access.   
(Passenger) 2 passenger operators. (*4) [9/AU] 
Iran (Raja Co.) There are four new entrants in the passenger sector, and 
the number has been increasing. Entry is attained through 
establishing a contract with Raja Co. [10/IR] 
Japan(JR Freight) JR Freight is the only freight operator established by law 
and accesses JR Passenger Companies’ tracks. [11/JP] 
Group 3 
USA (Amtrak) Amtrak is a sole inter-city passenger operator established 
by law and accesses freight railways’ tracks. [12/US] 
Mexico(TFM, Ferromex) A sole concessionaire is selected through a competitive 
bidding. [13/MX-1,2] 
Mexico (TFVM) The three concessionaires are also the share-holders of 
TFVM. [13/MX-3] 
New Shinkansen Lines A JR Passenger Company in the region is designated as a 
sole operator. [14/JP] 
Group 4 
Aoimori Railway <Freight> Only JR Freight continues to use the line.  
<Passenger> Only Aoimori Railway operates since the 
management separation from JR East. [15/JP] 
(*1)  There is a multimodal operator, Concor, which can provide wagons, but the haulage is 
done by IR by its own locomotives. At present, there is a policy of permitting more Concor 
type operators but haulage will be still taken by IR only. [1/IN] But this paper regards IR 
as an integrated railway, and do not discuss these new entrants. 
 
(*2)  The number of operators is referred to: European Railway Agency (2007), JRTT (2006). 
It is expected to increase especially in the European freight market with open access. 
                   
(*3)  70 operators are for regional passenger services, and 2 operators are for inter-city 
passenger services.(JRTT, 2006) As only one operator can receive subsidy from the 
regional authority, despite the regulation of open access, it is not common that the other 
operators perform regional passenger services without subsidies.[7/DE]  
 
(*4)  From ARTC’s perspective, open access also applies to the passenger sector. But except 
one purely commercial operator, other services are heavily subsidized by State 
Governments. With minor exceptions, the two operators use different parts of the 
network. [9/AU] 
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APPENDIX 4:-a: Relationship between Operators on the Same Track (3) 
Disputes and relationship among operators  
Group Country (Railway) Description 
India (IR) (IR is an integrated railway) 
Vietnam (VNR) As the new operator is a joint-venture with VNR, there 
is no particular dispute with VNR. 
They co-operate each other in various issues such as 
timetabling. [2/VN] 
Indonesia (PT.KA) None (Only PT.KA performs railway operation.) [3/ID] 
Group 1 
Tunisia (SNCFT) As the new operator has a contract with SNCFT, there 
is no particular dispute with SNCFT. 
They co-operate each other in various issues such as 
timetabling.[4/TN] 
Sweden (Banverket) When traffic delays are raised by a specific operator, 
sometimes the settlement takes time and energy. (*1) 
[5/SE] 
UK (Railtrack) Mainly, disputes come from lack of infrastructure 
capacity. [6/UK] 
Germany (DB Netz)  Some disputes come from delays of other operator’s 
trains. [7/DE] 
France (RFF)  As a new operator drives only a few trains on the 
French network, there is no serious dispute with SNCF. 
(*2) [8/FR] 
Group 2 
Australia (ARTC) Minor disputes sometimes occur between ARTC and 
operators and/or between operators in the course of 
normal daily operations, usually in the form of differing 
interpretations of ARTC’s decision rules for train 
priority. (*3) [9/AU] 
Iran (Raja Co.) There has been no particular dispute among operators, 
as RAI and Raja Co. cooperate to coordinate a timetable. 
If in any case it occurs, the Board of Director of RAI will 
manage to settle the dispute. New entrants in the 
passenger sector also cooperate with Raja Co. [10/IR] 
Japan(JR Freight) JR Freight and JR Passenger Companies cooperate to 
coordinate a timetable. Additionally, JR Freight has been 
making efforts by some measures for gaining its time- 
slots so as to prevent disputes with JR Passenger 
Companies. [11/JP] 
Group 3 
USA (Amtrak) Disputes on the freight lines are common. In principle, 
the Surface Transportation Board (STB) can resolve 
disputes: in practice, Amtrak has only little power to 
force better treatment from the freight railways. [12/US]
Mexico(TFM, Ferromex) Without other operators’ track-age rights, a sole 
concessionaire operates on the track. [13/MX-1,2] 
Group 4 
Mexico (TFVM) - (TFVM is an infrastructure manager) 
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New Shinkansen Lines None. (One of the JR Passenger Companies is 
designated as an operator for the line) [14/JP] 
 
Aoimori Railway A passenger operator and a freight operator make 
efforts to cooperate, and there is no particular dispute 
among them. [15/JP] 
 
(*1) They have a regulation to settle the conflicts. When operators do not satisfy the 
settlement, firstly, they ask BV for settlement. If it is not settled in BV, they ask it to the 
Railway Agency, a government body, and finally they sue it to the court. Over the period 
2003-2005 there were three cases, which they took the conflicts into the court. [5/SE] 
 
(*2)  At the time of the interview in Dec. 2005, only one new entrant performed the operation 
and SNCF practically helped for the training such as safety measures and so on. [8/FR] 
But the number of operators has increased since then. 
 
(*3)  Some problems also come from capacity constrains of some corridors. This prevents to 
allocate further train paths at desired times. 
These are normally resolved by ARTC train control staff or operation supervisors. The 
ARTC Access Undertaking, a document approved by the Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission, includes a dispute resolution procedure which has been applied 
occasionally.  
In case the ARTC’s dispute resolution procedure prove ineffective in a particular case 
(this has not occurred in any significant way to date), the parties in dispute would have 
recourse to normal legal processes. [9/AU] 
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APPENDIX 4 -b: Relationship between Infrastructure and Operators (1) 
Outline of track access charges  
Group Country (Railway) Description 
India (IR) (IR is an integrated railway) 
Vietnam (VNR) VNR pays 10 % of the VNR’s annual transport revenues 
to Government as track access charges. (*1) [2/VN] 
Indonesia (PT.KA) Government should pay the specified Net Value to 
PT.KA. [3/IN] (Explained in Section 4.7.2) 
Group 1 
Tunisia (SNCFT) Although payment of access charges is expected, 
SNCFT does not pay them to Government based on the 
transit scheme between them. [4/TN] 
Sweden (Banverket) Under legislation in 1988, track access charges were 
reduced substantially to improve rail’s ability to compete 
with road. The main principle is that they should amount 
to the incurred marginal costs of BV in terms of track 
operation and maintenance. (CER, 2005) (*2) 
UK (Railtrack) The British government proposed to establish Railtrack 
as a commercial organization which would in due course 
be privatized itself. Access charges were set as follows: 
(Passenger sector) Regulator has set. 
(Freight sector) Decided based on the negotiations, and 
Regulator approved it.  
Germany (DB Netz) The basic approach is “to allocate total cost (excluding 
those investment and renewal costs borne directly by 
Government) to market segments, and then to price at 
average cost.”(ECMT, 2005b p.99) 
France (RFF) The basic approach is based on short run marginal 
costs. 
“In financial terms, RFF report that it is their aim to 
achieve an operational balance – whereby it covers its 
operating and daily maintenance costs in full – by 2008.” 
(ECMT, 2005b p.96) 
Group 2 
Australia (ARTC) Access charges cover large part of total costs of ARTC, 
but ARTC receives subsidy from the Commonwealth to 
implement a program. (ARTC, 2005) 
Iran (Raja Co.) In the passenger sector, operators do not pay access 
charges. (*3) [10/IR] 
Japan(JR Freight) JR Freight pays “avoidable costs” aiming to shoulder 
only those inherent to freight transportation. (*4) [11/JP]
Group 3 
USA (Amtrak) On freight lines, Amtrak is supposed to pay “variable 
cost” for its access. (*5) [12/US] 
Mexico(TFM, Ferromex) A concessionaire has rights to access the infrastructure 
based on a concession contract. The concessionaire does 
not pay the access charge except in the lines where there 
is track-age right. [13/MX-1,2] 
Group 4 
Mexico (TFVM) The three freight concessionaires pay their access 
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charges, which cover the maintenance costs of the 
Terminal. [13/MX-3] 
New Shinkansen Lines The burden of the operator is kept within the limits of 
the corresponding benefits.(JR East, 2004a) 
(Examined in Section 7.5.3) 
 
Aoimori Railway Access charging is stipulated so as to cover the 
maintenance costs of the infrastructure.(*6) [15/JP] 
 
(*1)   According to VNR, this amount is calculated by 20-25 % of the State supplied budget for 
the management and maintenance of the railway infrastructure. [2/VN] 
 
(*2)   In 2003, the total income from track charges corresponds to 12 % of Banverket’s total 
funds directed to operation and maintenance. (CER, 2005 p.50) 
 
(*3)  In order to promote private participation, access charges are stipulated so as to 
guarantee profits for the new entrants, and it is discharged now. In the freight sector, the 
tariff for wagons is based on the weight, capacity and length of wagons, commodities, 
route and so on. On an average it is about 20 % of the transport income. [10/IR] 
 
(*4)   This scheme has been working for balanced management of JR Freight. For non-JR 
Companies JR Freight pays access charges so as to cover the maintenance costs of the 
infrastructure as explained in the case of Aoimori Railway.(Footnote in Section 7.5.4) 
 
(*5)   The early intent of Congress was that this payment would be small as there was 
considerable excess line capacity in 1970. In general, Amtrak has negotiated access 
charges with the freight railways that are acceptable. However, as lines have 
approached capacity in the last few years, freight railroads are trying to charge Amtrak 
more to allow for the impact on capacity of Amtrak’s operations. [12/US] 
 
(*6)   The maintenance cost which comes from train operation is planned to be beard by the 
operators, Aoimori Railway and JR Freight. The cost for exchange of infrastructure 
assets resulted from life-span aging is planned to be beard by Aomori Prefecture. 
      In practice, Aoimori Railway can not pay the stipulated access charges because of the 
shortage of the annual income. (This issue is studied in Section 7.5.4)   
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APPENDIX 4 -b: Relationship between Infrastructure and Operators (2) 
Disputes between infrastructure and operator 
Group Country (Railway) Description 
India (IR) (IR is an integrated railway) 
Vietnam (VNR) There is no particular dispute between the two entities. 
[2/VN] 
Indonesia (PT.KA) So far the stipulated Net Value could not be paid 
because of shortage of the Government funds. This is the 
main cause of disputes between the two entities. 
(Explained in Section 4.7) [3/ID] 
Group 1 
Tunisia (SNCFT) There is no particular dispute between the two 
entities.[4/TN] 
Sweden (Banverket) The most of disputes are raised by the following cases 
[5/SE]: 
▪ in a case of coordinating timetable especially in limited 
infrastructure capacity; 
▪ in a case of settling train delays by compensation; 
▪ in a case of sudden engineering works. (*1) 
UK (Railtrack) Usually, disputes were raised when trains could not be 
operated punctually. The most problems have resulted 
from the following reasons [6/UK]: 
▪ lack of infrastructure capacity; 
▪ delays caused by other operators or infrastructure. 
Germany (DB Netz) In the passenger sector, some new entrants complained 
that enough information of their train service has not 
been provided for passengers. This issue has been one of 
the serious discussions in the passenger sector. [7/DE] 
France (RFF) SNCF thinks that the access charges claimed by RFF 
are too expensive. [8/FR] 
Sometimes, there are conflicts between SNCF and RFF. 
(The issue is described in Section 5.5.2)  
Group 2 
Australia (ARTC) Even though most disputes are settled amicably there 
are sometimes disputes between infrastructure and 
operator. Disputes are raised in the following cases 
[9/AU]: 
▪ In case things go wrong and an underlying cause is in 
dispute. For example, train derailments when the 
problem might not be clear cut and seem to be in an 
interaction between track and rolling stock. (*2) 
▪ Train control decisions regarding relative priority of 
trains belonging different operators. (*3) 
▪ At the time of issuing new timetables, an increase in 
train numbers requires adjustments to existing 
service to accommodate a new service. In these 
circumstances, sometimes an operator may believe he 
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 is being disadvantaged relative to another operator. 
(*4) 
Iran (Raja Co.) At present, there is no particular dispute as RAI and 
Raja Co. cooperate to coordinate important factors of 
railway operation. [10/IR] 
Japan(JR Freight) JR Freight must follow the control and signalling by JR 
Passenger Companies even in the case of train delays. JR 
Freight obeys the control, and there have not been 
serious disputes. [11/JP] 
Group 3 
USA (Amtrak) There are some disputes about slot allocation and access 
charges as described in the former item. The STB has a 
role to solve the disputes. [12/US] 
Mexico(TFM, Ferromex) On the routes with track-age rights, there are 
disagreements about the amount of infrastructure 
charges. (*5) [13/MX-1,2] 
Mexico (TFVM) There is no particular dispute between the two 
entities.[13/MX-3] 
New Shinkansen Lines There is no particular dispute between the two entities. 
But there are potential risks that future economic and 
social changes enforce modification of the initial scheme. 
[14/JP] 
Group 4 
Aoimori Railway There were some negotiations about the payment of the 
access charges. Aomori Prefecture increased the access 
charges for JR Freight so as to cover the maintenance 
costs. (Studied in Section 7.5.) [15/JP] 
 
(*1)  When engineering works need cancel of some trains, it should be planned in advance of 
regulating timetable. Sudden planning of engineering works results in cutting scheduled 
trains, and it sometimes becomes a cause of disputes among the two entities.[5/SE] 
 
(*2)  However, all such incidents are now independently investigated by the Australian 
Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) and their findings usually stand. [9/AU] 
 
(*3)  ARTC has clear protocols and procedures for train priority, but sometimes these 
decisions still rest on an individual’s judgment and may be called into question. [9/AU] 
 
(*4)  These issues are usually resolved through negotiation, and ARTC’s published Access 
Undertaking has defined dispute resolution processes if normal negotiation cannot 
resolve the matter. [9/AU] 
 
(*5)  “The huge difference in the bids made by each concessionaire and, particularly the lack 
of a detailed methodology on how to translate these differences into the access prices was 
the major controversial issue that had prevented a previous agreement. The regulations 
developed by the sectoral law (LRSF) were not very detailed and only requested the 
inclusion of the maintenance and operating costs, the incremental costs associated to the 
other firm’s operation, depreciation and a reasonable profit for the provider of access.” 
(Campos, J., 2001 p.93) 
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APPENDIX 4 -c: Safety Issues (1) 
Responsibility of railway operation 
Group Country (Railway) Description 
India (IR) IR is responsible for safety issues. Accidents not 
involving passengers are investigated by an internal 
inter-departmental team of IR. Major accidents involving 
passenger trains are investigated by the Commissioner of 
the Railway Safety, which is a statutory authority 
independent of the Ministry of Railways. [1/IN] 
Vietnam (VNR) VNR takes a responsibility for safety. The Railway Act 
stipulates that “railway operators shall be responsible for 
railway safety and order within their operational 
location.” (Vietnam Railways, 2005a p.2)  
Indonesia (PT.KA) PT.KA takes the responsibility for safety. [3/ID] 
Group 1 
Tunisia (SNCFT) SNCFT takes the responsibility for safety. [4/TN] 
Sweden (Banverket) Responsibility for each accident should be determined 
individually whether an operator or BV is responsible for 
it. [5/SE] 
UK (Railtrack) Responsibility for each accident had been determined 
individually whether an operator or Railtrack was 
responsible for it. [6/UK] 
Germany (DB Netz) Responsibility for each accident should be determined 
individually. [7/DE] 
France (RFF) As SNCF performs train operation and also maintains 
infrastructure, fundamentally SNCF is responsible for 
safety. Nevertheless, RFF will be also responsible for 
some accidents when a member of staff in SNCF has 
performed proper works. [8/FR] 
Group 2 
Australia (ARTC) Responsibility for each accident should be determined 
individually whether an operator or ARTC is responsible 
for it. [9/AU] 
Iran (Raja Co.) RAI takes responsibility for the signalling and 
infrastructure. [10/IR] 
Japan(JR Freight) JR Passenger Companies take responsibility for the 
signalling and infrastructure. [11/JP] 
Group 3 
USA (Amtrak) Freight railways take responsibility for the signalling 
and infrastructure. [12/US] 
Mexico(TFM, Ferromex) Concessionaires take responsibility. [13/MX-1,2] 
Mexico (TFVM) TFVM is responsible for the signalling and 
infrastructure. [13/MX-3] 
New Shinkansen Lines A JR passenger company takes responsibility. [14/JP] Group 4 
Aoimori Railway Aoimori Railway is responsible for the operation. 
Aomori Prefecture is responsible for the infrastructure 
such as judgment of the infrastructure usage. [15/JP] 
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APPENDIX 4 -c: Safety Issues (2) 
Disputes / Opinion about safety issues 
Group Country (Railway) Description 
India (IR) Accident disputes are resolved through internal 
arbitration process of IR. [1/IN] 
Vietnam (VNR) There is no particular dispute about safety raised from 
vertical separation. [2/VN] 
Indonesia (PT.KA) Safety in railway operation largely depends on track 
maintenance, but it is difficult for PT.KA to secure 
sufficient funds for the required work.  
(Opinion) Whether the vertical separation functions well 
or not largely depends on the financial support from 
Government. [3/IN] 
Group 1 
Tunisia (SNCFT) There is no particular dispute about safety raised from 
vertical separation. [4/TN] 
Sweden (Banverket) BV has a dedicated section for settling conflicts raised 
by an accident. (*1) 
(Opinion) As the government invests sufficiently in 
infrastructure, safety standard has been kept stable in 
good status. [5/SE] 
UK (Railtrack) Frequently, the neutral body, independent from 
operators and infrastructure, had been involved for 
settling the disputes.[6/UK] 
Germany (DB Netz) Conflicts are tried to be settled down based on the 
contract between an operator and DB Netz. Facing 
serious accidents, an independent regulator will inspect 
the accidents. [7/DE] 
France (RFF) So far serious accidents have not happened. Facing an 
accident, SNCF and RFF try to settle down responsibility 
of it together. 
(Opinion) Not only the responsibility of accidents but 
also the process to keep safety has become more 
complicated through the introduction of vertical 
separation. [8/FR] 
Group 2 
Australia (ARTC) The way to solve the disputes depends upon the 
seriousness of the accident. (*2) 
(Opinion) Provided appropriate measures are in place, 
there should be no negative effects on safety. (*3) [9/AU] 
Iran (Raja Co.) RAI complains that several operators, sometimes, 
operate ill-conditioned rolling stock without caring about 
tracks. This tends to result in damages of the tracks. 
[10/IR] 
Group 3 
Japan(JR Freight) There is no particular dispute about safety raised from 
vertical separation. 
JR Freight runs trains based on the stipulation of each 
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line. JR Freight checks the condition of its own rolling 
stock and the private freighters’ wagons as well. [11/JP] 
 
USA (Amtrak) The interviewee does not think the vertical separation 
has had any effect on safety in the US. All railroads try to 
operate safely, no matter whether they are owners or 
tenants. [12/US] 
Mexico(TFM, Ferromex) The disputes are settled by the insurance companies. 
<Opinion> The result of concessioning is satisfactory. 
Better signalling and control equipment are provided, 
and accidents have been reduced. [13/MX-2] 
Mexico (TFVM) There is no particular dispute. [13/MX-3] 
New Shinkansen Lines There is no particular dispute as only one JR Passenger 
Company is responsible for the safety and operation. 
[14/JP] 
Group 4 
Aoimori Railway There is no particular dispute about safety issues so far 
partly because of the few years’ experience. [15/JP] 
 
(*1)  For settling conflicts they have regulations. Both an operator and BV gather for 
determining the cause of accidents. When accidents are severe the Railway Agency 
inspects the accidents. [5/SE] 
 
(*2)   Minor accidents and incidents are jointly investigated by ARTC and the operator 
concerned and responsibility is allocated by agreement if at all possible.  
Since 1999, more serious rail incidents and accidents have been investigated by the 
Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB), which is an independent organization with 
expertise to investigate and determine the cause of rail accidents and to recommend 
measures to avoid a recurrence. In some cases, there have been protracted disputes, 
particularly where multiple parties are involved. Such disputes are rare but when they 
occur, independent experts are brought in to advise the parties and if this does not break 
the deadlock, prolonged and expensive litigation through the courts can result. [9/AU] 
 
(*3)   Overall, safety performance on the ARTC network continues to steadily improve and 
this trend has been fairly consistent in the periods prior to vertical separation and since. 
In part, this may be due to the rigorous safety accreditation and audit process that exists 
in Australia and the independent accident investigation process managed by ATSB since 
1999. Unlike experience in the United Kingdom with the former Railtrack company, 
ARTC has also retained considerable “in house” engineering expertise which is 
considered essential in order to successfully manage its maintenance contractors. [9/AU]
 
 
[Source for Appendix 4] 
▪ Author, based on the interviews/inquiries to the Railways [1/IN, 2/VN, 3/IN, 4/TN, 5/SE, 
6/UK, 7/DE, 8/FR, 9/AU, 10/IR, 11/JP, 12/US, 13/MX, 14/JP, 15/JP]  
 
 
 
